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Abstract 
This thesis criticises the view that citizens do or potentially could control and shape the 
political institutions that govern them. Such a view conceives of political institutions as the 
product of the collective agency of the liberal citizenry. This thesis treats John Rawls’ political 
philosophy as paradigmatic of this view, one very prevalent in contemporary political 
philosophy. Drawing on the social theory of Friedrich Hayek, it argues that we know too little 
about one another in a large, impersonal society to meaningfully act together in the pursuit 
of shared objectives. This extends to our political institutions, which are the product of 
human action but not design.  We liberal moderns must reconcile ourselves to a political 
world that exceeds our capacity to control and direct it.  
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Thesis Introduction 
 
We live in impersonal social orders. We inhabit political associations that have been called 
“imagined communities” because each member is acquainted only with a miniscule subset 
of her fellow citizens.1 We are also members of very large cooperative schemes, principally 
but not only economic, that extend well beyond national borders. This is historically 
unprecedented. For most of our history we have inhabited largely autarkic and face-to-face 
social orders in which we are personally acquainted with the fellow members of our 
cooperative schemes. Much can be said in favour of this shift towards impersonal social 
arrangements. Market exchange and the extended division of labour have greatly increased 
our wealth and also our well-being across a wide range of indicators. The expanding of our 
social world beyond our immediate tribe means we have many more potential life-options 
available to us than did our ancestors. Life in impersonal orders have also expanded the 
scope of our moral concern beyond our immediate kin to a much wider range of human and 
sometimes even non-human beings.  
Moreover, the wealth and wider opportunities that impersonal orders generate are arguably 
preconditions for the emergence and flourishing of liberal individuality. One might posit that 
a recognisably liberal order must be an impersonal social order.2 At the very least, the liberal 
societies with which we are familiar are impersonal ones. The concern of this thesis is the 
fate of such impersonal and liberal social orders.  For all their benefits, these orders are not 
free of discontent. They expand immensely the scope of social cooperation. Yet their 
operation, and particularly the differential outcomes they engender, do not appear 
grounded in any rational or shared foundation. They are often experienced as the products 
of an alien power whose actions are arbitrary if not unjust. This lack of collective control also 
alienates us from our peers in impersonal orders, peers with whom we share a social world 
but no unifying sense of purpose. In this regard, impersonal social orders stand in tension 
with a widely held democratic intuition: that the good political society is one where citizens 
work together in order to fashion their political institutions according to their shared and 
rational will. This intuition is that the good society is marked by “collective political agency”.  
The goods that one derives from collective political agency are participation in the exercise 
of collective control over one’s institutions and social unity with one’s peers via their 
 
1 I refer to benedict Anderson’s (2006) famous work of the same title.   
2 Though one should be much less confident in making the reverse claim that impersonal orders are 
necessarily liberal.  
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participation in this shared endeavour. Impersonal orders, then, appear to deprive 
individuals of these great goods.  
In response to this predicament, there seem to be two opposing directions in which political 
philosophy might travel. The first is to theorise the conditions under which collective political 
agency may be realised in the modern world. This is the strategy adopted by John Rawls. He 
once wrote that “the comparative study of . . . well-ordered societies is, I believe, the central 
theoretical endeavour of moral theory”.3 A society is well-ordered in Rawls’ sense when 
“everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice, and… the 
basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these principles”.4 
In other words, a well-ordered society is one where citizens share the same intention as to 
which kind of political institutions are desirable and work together to achieve it. Rawls always 
emphasised that just institutions should be attained and maintained through the active 
agency of the liberal citizenry themselves. It should not be dictatorially or paternalistically 
imposed upon them. Citizens of the well-ordered society “act willingly so as to give one 
another justice over time”. 5  
This thesis treats Rawls as the paradigmatic representative of what it terms the associational 
view of political society. This view assumes that collective political agency is possible in a 
liberal impersonal order. The association in which it is exercised is the state, through which 
free and equal citizens come together to collectively manage their own affairs. They form 
communities that, as David Miller puts it, “do things together, take decisions, achieve results, 
and so forth”.6 This understanding of political society is very common if not ubiquitous within 
contemporary political philosophy.7 Those who adopt this view are deeply struck by the 
ethical disagreements of liberal citizens. They worry that ethical diversity might prevent 
liberal citizens from converging on shared aims or principles on the basis of which they could 
govern their association. Rawls wrestled with this dilemma his whole career.  His hope, at 
least initially, was that liberal citizens could all affirm his famous two principles of justice 
whatever other disagreements they might have. At the same time, the recurring criticism of 
the Rawlsian project has been that it is overly optimistic about the prospect for intellectual 
 
3 (Rawls 1974, 13) 
4 (Rawls 1999, 4) 
5 (Rawls 1996, 142) 
6 (Miller 1997, 24) 
7 E.g. (Miller 1997, 2007); (Stilz 2009); (Pevnick 2014); (Habermas 1996); (Pettit 1997); (Waldron 2004)   
10 
 
agreement under modern conditions.8 What is noteworthy, however, is that few of these 
critiques have challenged the underlying model of political society.9 The alternative offered 
to the well-ordered society by many of Rawls’ critics is still an associational model of political 
society but one that places greater emphasis on procedures by which citizens can manage 
their disagreements while they are engaged in the project of collective self-governance.10  
This thesis takes a different tack. It calls into question the associational model itself. In 
making this argument, it draws heavily on the liberalism of Friedrich Hayek. The basic claim 
is that the associational model does not take sufficient account of the deep and pervasive 
mutual ignorance that exists between liberal citizens under impersonal conditions. Hayek 
constantly stressed that in an impersonal society, each individual acts on significant amounts 
of private information unavailable to the rest. I call this Hayek’s fragmentation of knowledge 
thesis. On this view, the outcomes of the interactions of many agents under impersonal 
conditions are not the result of any shared intention despite being the result of many discrete 
human actions. That is, they are unpredictable and irreducible to the intentions of the actors 
causally responsible for them precisely because each acts on their own discrete information 
not known to the rest. In this sense they are emergent outcomes.11  
They are also necessarily emergent outcomes because under impersonal settings mutual 
ignorance about the mass of one’s peers and their circumstances is a hard constraint. Joint-
intentional action by a group is possible only when the shared objective and how each 
person’s contribution combines with the contributions of others to achieve that objective is 
common knowledge between them. Their irredeemable ignorance of one another, however, 
means that liberal citizens could not harmonise their intentions in this way even if they so 
wished. We have before us not a compliance problem but a knowledge problem. This can be 
overcome in smaller, proximate groupings but not in large-scale groupings of liberal citizens. 
If this Hayekian argument is defensible then the associational model is found wanting on 
epistemic grounds.12 Political institutions are necessarily the product of human action but 
 
8 For variants of this now well-established realist critique, see Williams (2008), Geuss (2008) and 
Kukathas (2003).  
9 Kukathas’ (2003) account of the liberal archipelago being one notable exception.  
10 Jeremy Waldron (2004) and Thomas Christiano (2008) are examples of theorists who take this 
position.  
11 An emergent phenomenon “exhibits properties that are different from those displayed by the 
elements [of which it is composed] taken in isolation.” (Lewis 2016, 115) 
12 Similarly, the contemporary literature’s obsession with intellectual disagreement is overstated. It is 
not the sole or even the main barrier to realising collective political agency. Chapter one argues that 
the claim that the mass of liberal citizens are in a state of deep disagreement with one another is 
greatly exaggerated.  
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not any shared intentional design. This is the emergence view of political society to be 
defended in this thesis.  
Another key Hayekian theme of this thesis, one already alluded to in the opening paragraph, 
is the idea that members of impersonal liberal orders might never be fully reconciled to 
them. Hayek thought that we have certain moral intuitions that are genetically inherited and 
difficult to dislodge. These intuitions are adapted to the conditions of the evolutionarily basic 
small group out of which they evolved. They remain embedded deeply enough in the human 
psyche to ensure a constant demand in the intellectual market place for ideologies, such as 
nationalism and socialism, which aspire to govern impersonal orders on the same terms as 
small groupings. We wish to realise at the scale of an impersonal social order the same sense 
of collective purpose and control we had in the primordial tribal unit. If Hayek’s social theory 
is correct, however, we cannot have this aspiration met and we have to find a way to make 
do with this fact. This thesis treats the associational view of politics as a species of the same 
genus thereof. Its great appeal, particularly as expressed by Rawls, is the promise of 
reconciling liberal individualism with a shared political project and social unity underpinned 
by liberal justice. If the arguments of this thesis are successful, the Rawlsian hope of such 
reconciliation are forlorn. The final chapter and the conclusion will engage with the 
implications of this.  
 
Thesis Outline  
 
The thesis is divided into three parts and seven chapters. Part one, consisting of chapters 1-
2, sets out the theoretical framework. Chapter one is expository. It distinguishes the 
associational from the emergence model of political society. There are three key differences. 
Associationalism sees liberal citizens as alienated by intellectual disagreement while the 
emergence view emphasises mutual ignorance. Associationalism conceives of political 
institutions as the product of conscious and collective design while the Hayekian view 
emphasises their emergent nature. Associationalism sees the function of justice as providing 
mutually acceptable terms by which liberal citizens can manage their political association. 
The emergent view sees the function of justice as facilitating interaction between strangers 
who know little of one another and their circumstances. This chapter also outlines Hayek’s 
concern that members of impersonal liberal orders would not be reconciled to them and his 
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worry that they would be institutionally unstable as a result. Chapter two explains why this 
thesis opts not to follow some contemporary classical liberal thinkers in trying to reconcile 
the thought of Hayek and Rawls. The chapter considers two such philosophers, John Tomasi 
and Gerald Gaus, explaining why this thesis rejects their respective approaches. It presents 
an interpretation of Hayek’s ideas stressing that both basic institutional rules and the 
interactions to which they give rise are emergent phenomena. Emergence runs all the way 
down.  
The second part, consisting of Chapters 3-5, attempts to vindicate the emergent over the 
associational view of political society. In so doing, this thesis distinguishes between two 
different forms that the advocacy of associationalism might take. Descriptive 
associationalism claims that actually-existing liberal democracies are collective political 
agents. This view is held by figures such as Anna Stilz, David Miller, Ryan Pevnick and 
Margaret Moore. Descriptive associationalism is invoked to justify various existing practices 
of liberal democratic states. Thus, liberal democratic states’ actually-existing rights to 
exclude immigrants or control their territory or to non-interference from foreign powers are 
said to arise because they can be regarded, in their current form, as purposive political 
associations composed of free and equal citizens. 13 Aspirational associationalism claims that 
the citizens of a normatively ideal regime would constitute a collective political agent. Thus, 
many deliberative democrats lament the incoherence of public opinion under the prevailing 
practice of aggregative democracy but believe that if practices of deliberative democracy 
were to be widely adopted, democratic citizens could then form a genuine collective will with 
which the ship of their political association could be steered. Rawls well-ordered society is 
an unrealised ideal in which, unlike actually-existing liberal democracies, all citizens share 
the aim of governing their political association on the basis of his famous conception of 
justice as fairness.   
The important difference between the two is that aspirational associationalism posits 
idealised citizens with certain motivations that their actually-existing counterparts do not 
have. The citizens of Rawls’ well-ordered society are all motivated to comply with Rawlsian 
justice. This is not true of all their real-world counterparts. The citizens of an ideal 
deliberative regime exhibit much greater motivation to engage in political deliberation than 
do their real-world counterparts.  I have posited this distinction to try and ensure that this 
thesis’ critique of associationalism is as fair and thorough as it might be. If one critiques only 
 
13 For examples of these three claims respectively see Pevnick (2014), Moore (2015) and Stilz (2015).  
13 
 
descriptive associationalism, advocates of aspirational accounts might respond that their 
preferred associational model remains unscathed. If only citizens enjoyed a thicker 
consensus on justice than they do currently or if only they were prepared to deliberate more 
often, perhaps then collective political agency would be possible. Criticising aspirational 
associationalism is intended to forestall such an objection. Additionally, it serves this thesis’ 
objective of showing that insufficient motivation or the prevalence of ethical disagreement 
are not the primary barriers to the realisation of collective political agency. The problem is 
distinctively epistemic.14 Chapter three, then, considers and critiques the descriptive 
associational claim that actually-existing liberal democracies are capable of collective 
political agency. Chapter four considers the prospects for collective political agency if we 
assume that all citizens affirm Rawlsian understandings of justice. Chapter five considers its 
prospects in a society in which practices of deliberative democracy are widely adhered to. In 
each instance, the core claim of this thesis is defended, namely, that collective political 
agency is not possible given the mutual ignorance of impersonally related liberal citizens.  
The third part focuses on the problem of social unity and reconciliation. One of the reasons 
why the associational view is normatively attractive is that it promises to give individual lives 
greater significance than they might do otherwise. Rather than merely pursue my own 
atomised conception of the good, associationalism makes it possible for me to contextualise 
my own achievements as part of a wider whole. This argument dates back to Hegel and a 
particularly compelling contemporary version of it is offered by Rawls in his account of the 
well-ordered society as a social union. That is subjected to critique in chapter six. The upshot 
of the argument of chapters 2-6 is to vindicate Hayek’s claim that an impersonal liberal order 
cannot meet our need for collective control and social unity. Chapter seven then presents 
arguments to alleviate Hayek’s worry that liberal institutions would be unstable as a result.  
Hayek feared that liberal citizens would be alienated from the liberal order because of its 
failure to provide the goods of collective control and social unity. They would constantly be 
tempted by collectivist political projects that promise to rectify this. While such projects 
would realise neither unity nor control, their pursuit would have the unintended 
consequence of undermining a free society. Chapter seven makes two claims to alleviate this 
concern. First, the preference for social unity and control may not be as invariant as it 
assumes. Second, and in any case, a liberal order might prove institutionally robust even if 
many of its citizens were attracted to collectivist political projects. The thesis concludes with 
 
14 We shall have more to say on this point below in the Notes on Methodology.   
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some reflections inspired by Michael Oakeshott as to how we might make do in a world 
where we cannot see our own lives as connecting up to a grand social endeavour.  
 
Notes on Methodology 
 
Before commencing with the argument, I wish to make some notes on methodology.  
In many but not all parts of this thesis we will employ a significant idealisation when 
considering collective political agency. With some exceptions, compliance problems will be 
idealised away in the arguments to follow. Such idealisation, however, is employed here for 
a different purpose than the one found in Rawlsian political philosophy.15 The aim of 
Rawlsian ideal theory is to outline a “realistic utopia,” showing what might be possible 
“under reasonably favourable but still possible historical conditions—conditions allowed by 
the laws and tendencies of the social world”.16 The function of idealisation for Rawls is to 
show what might be feasibly achieved in a future society. Rawls does not think full 
philosophical agreement is a feasible aspiration. He does not idealise his theory by assuming 
that such agreement would be attained in the well-ordered society. He does think it feasible, 
however, to assume that all, or at least nearly all, will affirm and comply with a conception 
of justice whatever other disagreements they might have. Thus, he adds full compliance as 
an ambitious but nonetheless attainable ideal.17 Of course, the idealisation of full compliance 
has been subject to withering criticism.18  
However, another function that idealisation might serve is to explicate distinct necessary 
conditions. In other words, idealisation might serve as a useful analytical device instead of 
 
15 I here follow Onora O’Neill (1996, 40–41) in distinguishing between an “abstraction” which brackets 
but does not deny predicates true of the matter under discussion and an “idealisation” which enhances 
the predicates under discussion. Assuming full compliance is clearly an “enhancement” of the 
characteristics of actually-existing liberal citizens rather than an omission of characteristics they do in 
fact have. 
16 (Rawls 2001, 4) 
17 “We ask in effect what a perfectly just, or nearly just, constitutional regime might be like, and 
whether it may come about and be made stable under the circumstances of justice (Theory, §22), and 
so under realistic, though reasonably favorable, conditions”. (Rawls 2001, 13); c.f. (Rawls 1999, 8) 
18 The problem isn’t simply that full or even close to full compliance seems wildly optimistic under any 
conceivable institutional regime. The problem is that if, as Hume noted, norms of justice are a solution 
to our limited beneficence, then the same agents who are motivated enough to comply fully with 
justice would (presumably) also have enough beneficence not to need justice in the first instance. 
Jacob Levy (2016b, 316–19) articulates this point well. In any case, this thesis will argue that in a large-
scale society justice is primarily a solution to difficulties arising from mutual ignorance rather than 
ethical disagreement.  
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showing us a desirable and possible but not-yet-attained state of affairs. For instance, it has 
often been assumed that a lack of requisite motivation is the main impediment to the 
realisation of a socialist economy. Socialism would be possible if only we could find the right 
kind of socialist citizen.19 The genesis of Hayek’s political philosophy was the argument that 
he and his mentor Ludwig von Mises made in the socialist calculation debate. Hayek and 
Mises wanted to show that socialism would be impossible even if we assume “strict 
compliance” on the part of all involved because there would remain unmet a distinct 
condition also necessary for successful central planning. That condition is knowledge of the 
opportunity cost of the resources under the planner’s control. Thus, both took for granted 
“strict compliance” in their critique of central planning. Their analysis ruled out the possibility 
of such planning failing because of corruption or shirking on the part of either the planners 
or the lower-level managers and workers charged with carrying out the plan. Their 
motivation in so doing was to show how knowledge problems would hinder central planning 
even under circumstances when compliance with the plan was not at issue.20 In idealising in 
this way, they did not need to assume that it would actually be feasible for a socialist 
economy to be characterised by full or nearly full compliance. Indeed, as stalwart critics of 
socialism, neither did entertain such an assumption.  
This thesis idealises away compliance problems for the same reason. Just as Hayek’s 
knowledge renders infeasible central planning even with full compliance, so does it render 
infeasible collective political agency. Thus, chapters four and five take for granted that in the 
Rawlsian society all are committed to liberal justice and that in a deliberative society all are 
committed to deliberative practices in order to show the distinctively epistemic barrier to 
collective political agency would remain even if we grant these assumptions. This 
methodological stance is adopted purely as an analytical device. It should not be taken to 
imply that strict compliance is a feasible aspiration or that our thinking about normatively 
desirable institutions should be premised on such an assumption. 21 This said, we shall relax 
this assumption where it seems appropriate for the argument. For example, it will be relaxed 
in chapter three because that chapter considers the claim that actually-existing liberal 
democratic citizens with their actually-existing motivations are capable of collective political 
agency.  
 
19 Gerald Cohen’s Why Not Socialism? (2009) is for the most part predicated on this assumption. 
Though Cohen does pay some recognition to epistemic problems at the end of the essay.  
20 (Mises 1920); (Hayek 1945) 
21 For the same reason, the thesis also idealises away the problems posed by freedom of movement 
and secessionist movements for the associational model.  
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One might also wonder about the relation between the associational model, as it is defined 
it here, and nationalism. A common definition of a “nation” is a grouping of persons who 
recognise one another as distinct from other groupings and as united by certain cultural 
characteristics such as language or culture.22 Nations and political associations differ of 
course. It is by now a truism in these debates to note that many states contain more than 
one nation and many putative nations lack a state. Some think that national ties are 
necessary for political association. On this view, the thick ties of national culture are needed 
to motivate citizens to participate in political association, particularly when such an 
association calls upon them to make personal sacrifices.23 Others think thinner ties involving 
subscription to shared political principles are sufficient.24 This thesis does not enter into the 
fray of this dispute, which centres on aforementioned compliance problems that are mostly 
idealised away in the argument to follow. It thus says little about nationalism per se but offers 
a critique of collective political agency that would hold regardless of whether the parties in 
question are co-nationals or not. Relatedly, this thesis seeks to critique the associational 
model in general rather than become embroiled in the debate between statists or 
cosmopolitans as to whether political association should be bounded to a Westphalian-
Weberian state or should take an international form, including possibly a world state.25 It 
offers a critique of the associational model that would hold regardless of whether political 
association is limited to contemporary states or extended beyond their current boundaries. 
Finally, this thesis is Hayekian in inspiration but it makes no claim to be a philosophical 
exegesis of Hayek’s own views.26 It is intended to be a contribution to normative political 
philosophy that draws upon Hayek’s social theory. Indeed, chapter two will explicitly modify 
Hayek’s ideas in ways of which he may not have approved.  
 
 
 
 
 
22 Here I follow the definition of David Miller (1997, chap. 2). I accept this definition for the sake of 
argument. Whether the actual groupings in the world to which we apply the epithet of “nations” 
actually meet these criteria is another matter.   
23 E.g. (Miller 1997) 
24 E.g. (Moore 2015) 
25 For an influential defence of statism see Nagel (2005) and conversely for a defence of 
cosmopolitanism see Held (2007).  
26 On that see Kukathas (1989) and Caldwell (2008) 
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Chapter One: Two Visions of Political Society 
 
Abstract 
This chapter compares the associational understanding of political society as exemplified by 
John Rawls and others with the emergent understanding derived from Friedrich Hayek’s 
social theory. The associational view conceives of free and equal citizens fashioning political 
institutions according to deeply shared objectives. The principal bar to such activity is their 
ethical disagreement. The remedy is impartial principles of justice to which all citizens can 
assent whatever else they disagree upon. The happy upshot of this approach is its 
reconciliation of an impersonal liberal order with social unity and collective control. By 
contrast, Hayekian liberalism is more impressed by the mutual ignorance of impersonally 
related liberal agents. Liberal justice facilitates coordination between strangers whose ends 
are opaque to one another. The outcomes of such coordination do not amount to the 
realisation of any shared objectives. They are the result of many disparate human actions 
but not any shared design. This approach denies that a liberal social order can be reconciled 
with social unity and control. The chapter ends by noting Hayek’s worry that liberal 
institutions would consequently alienate their subjects and prove unstable. The remainder 
of the thesis will try to vindicate the emergent approach.  
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework of the thesis. It is divided into seven sections. 
The first section details how the associational understanding of politics is reflected in John 
Rawls’ political philosophy. The second details how it is prevalent within the work of other 
political philosophers such as Jurgen Habermas, Joshua Cohen, Anna Stilz, Margaret Moore, 
David Miller and Ryan Pevnick. The crux of the associational approach is that collective 
political agency is possible save for widespread intellectual disagreement, a problem readily 
soluble with suitably impartial principles of justice. Section three criticises the associational 
assumption that liberal citizens are in a state of persistent and deep disagreement. It argues 
negatively in defence of what is argued for positively in section four, where we turn directly 
to Hayek. That section outlines what I call Hayek’s fragmentation of knowledge thesis to 
suggest that liberal agents are alienated from one another primarily by ignorance rather than 
intellectual disagreement.27 As a point of entry into Hayek’s thought, I also highlight some 
 
27 I should acknowledge my debt here to Adam Tebble’s (2016) insightful paper, “On the circumstances 
of justice”. This chapter and indeed this thesis build on its two core claims: (i) that mutual ignorance 
rather than disagreement is the primary cause of the “circumstances of justice,” and (ii) accordingly 
that the primary function of justice is to facilitate coordination between mutually ignorant agents. 
Ignorance rather than disagreement is primary because even if we posit that all agents share the same 
conception of the good, their ignorance of one another’s circumstances precludes their coordination, 
absent rules of justice, to achieve it. The argument of this chapter builds on Tebble’s insights, 
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perhaps unlikely similarities between his concerns and those of Iris Marion Young. Section 
five details the contrasting role played by justice in the emergence account, namely 
facilitating coordination between strangers who know little of one another. Section six 
emphasises that on the emergence account we cannot ascribe collective intentionality to 
large-scale outcomes because they are properly the result of human action but not design. 
Section seven closes the chapter by highlighting Hayek’s worry that a liberal order would be 
unstable precisely because it cannot meet our deep desire for collective control and social 
unity.  
 
1. Associationalism in Rawls’ Political Philosophy  
The introduction identified three components to the associational model of political society: 
i. Liberal citizens are alienated by intellectual disagreement 
ii. The function of justice is to secure agreement 
iii. Political institutions are the product of the shared agency of liberal citizens 
All three features are present in John Rawls’ political philosophy. We shall treat them in turn. 
That the first two features are present in his thought is uncontroversial enough that a brief 
treatment will be sufficient. Rawls conceives of political society as a “fair system of 
cooperation over time from one generation to the next”.28 Rawls says it should be governed 
by a public conception of justice for the well-known reason that liberal citizens are divided 
over the good. According to A Theory of Justice, one of the subjective circumstances giving 
rise to the need for justice is the fact that “there exists a diversity of philosophical and 
religious belief, and of political and social doctrines”.29 In the later formulation of Political 
Liberalism, Rawls similarly says that we turn to a “political” conception of justice because a 
“diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines. . . is a 
permanent feature of the public culture of democracy”.30 The remainder of this section will 
focus on showing how the third component is a feature of Rawls’ thought. 
 
particularly so in two ways. First, if we take mutual ignorance seriously, then the characterisation of 
liberal citizens as in a state of disagreement is exaggerated if not mistaken. For they will not know 
enough about one another’s views to be so described. Second, it provides a typology of the different 
ways in which justice facilitates coordination between epistemic strangers. 
28 (Rawls 2001, 4) 
29 (Rawls 1999, 110) 
30 (Rawls 1996, 36) 
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The subject of Rawlsian justice is the “basic structure” of society. This refers, of course, to 
“the way which the main political and social institutions of society fit together, and the way 
they assign basic rights and duties and regulate the division of advantages that arises from 
social cooperation over time”.31 Examples of major social institutions are “the legal 
protection of freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, competitive markets, private 
property in the means of production, and the monogamous family”.32 These institutions 
coalesce into a structure the operation of which has a profound effect on the life chances of 
different individuals. This is why they are the appropriate subject of justice. We shall have 
much more to say about this in chapter two. For now we can note that Rawls must implicitly 
accept the following claim to make the basic structure the primary subject of justice. We 
have the requisite knowledge and capacity to intervene upon these institutions understood 
as an interconnected system or structure so as to make the outcomes they engender accord 
with some desired objective i.e. a conception of justice.33 In other words, it is in principle 
possible to design institutions holistically to accord with a normative blueprint. The 
remaining question, then, is which blueprint.  
For Rawls, the answer is his two famous principles of justice. In the well-ordered society, 
everyone accepts and knows all others accept the same principles. He includes this 
stipulation to secure institutional stability of a certain kind. He writes: 
The problem of stability is not that of bringing others who reject a conception to 
share it, or to act in accordance with it, by workable sanctions, if necessary, as if the 
task were to find ways to impose that conception once we [i.e. Rawls and his readers] 
are convinced it is sound.34 
Instead,  
[c]itizens should act willingly so as to give one another justice over time. Stability is 
secured by sufficient motivation of the appropriate kind acquired under just 
institutions. 35 
On Paul Weithman’s recent influential reading, Rawls opts for inherent as opposed to 
imposed stability.36 Inherent stability is secured when liberal citizens have internalised the 
principles of justice such that they are intrinsically motivated to comply with them rather 
than on the basis of external incentives or sanctions. I pay my taxes because I affirm the 
 
31 (Rawls 1999, 7) 
32 (Rawls 1999, 6) 
33 Chapter two will argue that no agent or agency actually has such a capacity. Therefore, assuming 
ought implies can, the basic structure cannot be the subject of justice. 
34 (Rawls 1996, 143) 
35 (Rawls 1996, 142) 
36 (Weithman 2011, chap. 2) 
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difference principle and not because I fear the taxman knocking on my door. Inherent 
stability means that just institutions are secured and realised through the freely-willed 
actions of liberal citizens. Imposed stability – the securing of compliance through “workable 
sanctions” – is the approach to political philosophy Rawls associates with Hobbes. Rawls’ 
respect for the autonomy of liberal citizens leads him to prefer inherent stability. A 
conception of justice should not be imposed on recalcitrant subjects. A just society can be so 
described because its members have freely-willed it to be so. One might think it sufficient 
for Rawls to restrict the first condition to stating solely that everyone should accept the 
principles of justice. The second clause stipulating their awareness that everyone else also 
accepts them might appear unnecessary. However, one person on their own cannot create 
or secure a just society. It is necessarily a shared endeavour. And a shared endeavour gets 
off the ground only when the participants can signal to one another their commitment to it.  
Were I the only good Rawlsian willing to pay his taxes and vote for Rawlsian principles in a 
society full of resolute anarcho-capitalists, I would have no chance of realising Rawlsian 
justice. The success of my contribution to the creation of a just society is contingent on my 
fellow peers making their own contributions. Thus, I need assurance that they too are willing 
to contribute to make worthwhile my own contribution. What is true of me is true of all 
others. It is a truism of the literature on joint-intentional actions that no cooperative activity 
can get off the ground unless the participants’ mutual willingness to participate is common 
knowledge between them.37 Supposing liberal citizens can solve this mutual assurance 
problem, a topic to be explored in chapter four, we can say the following of the well-ordered 
society. The operation of its major institutions accords with a conception of justice that is 
not simply subject to the approval of its citizens. Such institutions continue to be just because 
liberal citizens jointly share the intention that they be maintained. It is in this sense that the 
well-ordered society is the product of the collective political agency of its members.   
Rawls’ associationalist leanings are also present in his international theory, as expounded in 
The Law of Peoples. Rawls there posits that whole nations or peoples have a rational sense 
of their own interests. They wish to “protect their political independence and their free 
culture with it civil liberties, to guarantee their security, territory, and well-being of their 
citizens”.38 Their rational conduct is “organised and expressed in their elections and votes, 
and the laws and policies of their government”.39 On Stephen Macedo’s interpretation, Rawls 
 
37 We shall look at this literature in more detail in chapter three.  
38 Rawls (2003, 34) 
39 Rawls (2003, 25) 
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formulates his theory in this way to protect different national preferences. We might 
understand France and the United States, for instance, as making different collective 
“choices” with respect to work, leisure and economic growth which need to be respected.40 
By the same token, however, “peoples” should be held responsible for their decisions. Rawls 
makes a hypothetical comparison between an industrialised country which develops after it 
“decides” to increase “its” savings rate and a “pastoral and leisurely” country that did not 
make such a decision. He then suggests that it is intuitively clear that, under the assumption 
that each people is free and responsible and able to make their own decisions, that the 
industrialised country should not be taxed to give funds to the pastoral one.41 Rawls views in 
the international sphere is the counterpart of the claim in his domestic theory that a society’s 
basic structure is the product of the freely given and jointly coordinated actions of liberal 
citizens. It follows intuitively from this premise that these citizens are engaged in a form of 
collective agency deserving of normative recognition and for whose consequences they 
ought to bear responsibility. 42  
The introduction also identified social unity and collective control as the two great goods 
secured by political life on the associational view. These positions are found in Rawls’ political 
philosophy also.  First, insofar as the basic structure of society is maintained by the willed 
intentions of liberal citizens, they inhabit a political and social world of their own 
construction. Rawls gives this idea a Kantian-Rousseauvian construal when he says that 
members of the well-ordered society attain their full autonomy. That is, the basic structure 
of their society accords with general principles that they would give themselves were they 
to adopt the autonomous (in the Kantian sense) position of the original position. When they 
obey the law or vote according to liberal justice, they act as self-legislators. 43 Second, citizens 
achieve social unity insofar as they endorse and create the just basic structure together on 
the basis of principles to which they all assent. In the third part of A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
characterises the well-ordered society as a “social union” in which “the successful carrying 
out of just institutions is the shared final end of all the members of society, and these 
institutions are prized as good in themselves”.44 He goes on to say that “this collective 
 
40 (Macedo 2004, 1278) 
41 (Rawls 2003, 117) 
42 However, as I said in the introduction, associationalists don’t need to be statists necessarily. They 
can be cosmopolitans. It depends on whether the associationalist thinks the relevant political 
association should be a nation-state or a world state of some kind.   
43 (Rawls 1996, 77) 
44 (Rawls 1999, 462) 
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activity… must be experienced as a good” and that the “public realization of justice is a value 
of community”.45  
 
2. Associationalism Amongst Other Political Philosophers  
This thesis characterises Rawls as an aspirational associationalist. The referent of the well-
ordered society and the law of peoples are hypothetical members of idealised regimes and 
not the actual liberal democratic polities with which we are familiar. Deliberative democratic 
theorists can also be so characterised.46 They share the Rawlsian assumption that 
disagreement is the main barrier to collective political agency and that the identification of 
impartial principles of justice can help overcome this problem. On their view, however, what 
is required is not so much a society-wide commitment to a particular conception of justice 
but a commitment to deliberative procedures with which such impartial principles may be 
identified. What matters is that citizens are willing and able to enter political deliberation 
the discursive rules of which are premised on the idea that all participants are free and 
equal.47 Deliberative democrats such as Jürgen Habermas and Joshua Cohen have 
formulated similar listings of what the appropriate discursive conditions should be.48 The 
basic idea is that the participants should aim for a rational consensus justifiable to all of them 
understood as free and equal.  
This consensus then constitutes the public will on the basis of which their shared polity 
should be arranged and governed. Hence, in such an ideal deliberative regime, where the 
motivation to engage in political deliberation is widespread and a rational consensus on 
justice is attained, authentic collective political agency would be possible. By contrast, 
deliberative democrats tend to think that the prevailing practice of aggregative democracy 
is a poor method of eliciting the general will.49 Deliberative democrats tend also to believe 
that, apart from collective control, deliberative participation can help foster the values of 
community and social unity. For instance, Joshua Cohen claims that the discursive 
 
45 (Rawls 1999, 463); we shall investigate Rawls’ idea of a social union in chapter six. 
46 (Jürgen Habermas 1983, 1996); (Cohen 1997); (Gutmann and Thompson 1998); (Mansbridge et. al. 
2012); (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004) 
47 Habermas (1995) famously criticises Rawls’ original position as “monological”. Habermas employs 
this term to highlight the fact that the original position does not leave scope for any real deliberation 
about what justice requires. Rawls effectively stipulates principles to which he thinks liberal citizens 
would agree. For a deliberative democrat like Habermas, one cannot second guess the object of 
consensus in this way. It has to be arrived at through actual deliberation.  
48 (Cohen 1997, 74–75); Habermas (1983) 
49 E.g. (Cohen 1997, 75); Habermas (1996, 506) 
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requirement that deliberation be justifiable to all “connects” with the value of community.50 
He suggests that deliberative participation shapes citizens’ identity and preferences so as to 
be aligned with the common good.51 We shall consider the claims of deliberative democracy 
in detail in chapter five. 
There are also many philosophers who adopt a descriptive associational view. These 
philosophers believe we can characterise actually-existing liberal democracies as 
associations of free and equal citizens who have together shaped and determined the 
institutions under which they live. They do so to justify claims made by existing liberal states. 
The remainder of this section will survey their ideas.  Anna Stilz distinguishes between a 
“taker” view of political institutions conceiving of citizens primarily as the beneficiary of 
rights and other entitlements and a “maker” view under which they are the active creators 
of the political and social institutions under which they live.52 The exercise of such maker 
freedom represents something greater than the exercise of mere private rights. Citing Hegel, 
she writes:  
Freedom additionally requires that individuals who sustain state institutions 
together experience this activity as an expression of themselves, not as something 
that they are coerced into performing by an alien power. If citizens attain subjective 
freedom, they will see their state as a creation of their own free cooperation, not as 
an institution of subjugation.53  
The political, social and economic institutions to which citizens are subject are not mere 
“happenings” beyond their control and to which they merely acquiesce. Rather they endure 
because all citizens intend that they do and each freely plays her part in jointly-coordinated 
activity to realise this shared intention.54 Thus for Stilz, as for Rawls, political institutions 
should be the product of the shared agency of liberal citizens. Unlike Rawls, however, she 
doesn’t offer her account as a description of the relations enjoyed by the hypothetical 
citizens of an idealised well-ordered society. Hers is a description of the relations enjoyed by 
real-world citizens of actually-existing liberal democratic regimes. In providing such an 
account she hopes to justify certain moral claims that such regimes make. Hence, claims Stilz, 
if actually-existing liberal democratic regimes are sustained by the shared and active agency 
of their citizenry, and such shared agency constitutes a morally valuable relationship with 
 
50 (Cohen 1997, 74–75) 
51 (Cohen 1997, 76-77) 
52 (Stilz 2015, 7–8) 
53 (Stilz 2015, 12) 
54 (Stilz 2015, 13-14) 
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which outsiders should not interfere, then the rights of sovereignty and territory claimed by 
such regimes are justifiable. 55   
In her defence of territorial rights, Margaret Moore identifies three conditions under which 
a group of persons count as a collective agent or “people” that can legitimately claim 
territorial rights over a geographical space. First, they must conceive of themselves as a 
group “in terms of either being engaged, or desiring to be engaged, in a common political 
project and they are mobilized in actions orientated towards that goal”. Second, they “must 
have the capacity to establish and maintain political institutions, through which they can 
exercise self-determination”. Third, they must have a history of political cooperation with 
one another.56 Moore is keen to stress that the terms of this common project must be 
political such that “people from a wide range of backgrounds and with different conceptions 
of the good are nevertheless prepared to cooperate and compromise in the creation of and 
maintenance of rules to govern their lives”.57 In other words, the shared association should 
be governed by political principles of justice to overcome the problem of disagreement. Like 
Rawls, Moore too emphasises the twin benefits of collective control and social unity enjoyed 
by those fortunate enough to be members of a political association. She writes: 
People who exercise collective self-government have the institutional mechanisms 
to shape the conditions of their existence, and their future together, and are thereby 
more autonomous—or experience a different (collective) dimension of autonomy 
than is involved in most liberal accounts of autonomy, which are mainly focused on 
protecting autonomy through protecting the individual private sphere.58 
 
Further, the civic relationship has a value comparable to family relationships. The family 
relationship is good for children not simply because it instrumentally provides them with 
generic goods such as food and clothing and so on. It is valuable also because children enjoy 
a relationship of love and care with their family. The manner in which the generic goods are 
secured is of intrinsic value.59 Mutandis mutatis, citizens enjoy a comparable relationship 
with one another, one that has an intrinsic value distinct from the generic goods that political 
life provides them, such as having their rights respected.60 As with Stilz, Moore offers her 
account to describe actually existing liberal democratic states in order to justify certain moral 
claims that they and/or their citizens make. Moore too is concerned with territorial claims. 
 
55 (Stilz 2015, 8-12) 
56 (Moore 2015, 50–51); original emphasis 
57 (Moore 2015, 53) 
58 (Moore 2015, 66) 
59 (Moore 2015, 48) 
60 (Moore 2015, 63) 
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On her account, liberal democratic states can legitimately lay claim to the territory under 
their control because they are composed of citizens engaged in the morally valuable 
relationship of collective self-governance and such a relationship would not be possible 
without the requisite territorial control.  
 
In a series of works, David Miller has defended the claim that “[nations] are communities 
that do things together, take decisions, achieve results, and so forth”.61 We can, he thinks, 
speak of people having a shared will under reasonably functioning democratic institutions. 
For then “the political decisions that are taken will embody to a greater or lesser extent the 
articulated beliefs and attitudes of the nation in question”.62 Under such circumstances the 
“policies pursued by the state can reasonably be seen as policies for whose effects the citizen 
body as a whole is collectively responsible, given that they have authorized the government 
to act on their behalf in a free election”.63 Like Moore, he draws an analogy between the 
relationships we have with our families and friends and those we have with our co-nationals. 
Just as we have strong and partial ties with families and friends because they reflect “existing 
[and particularistic] commitments, relationships, and loyalties,” so do we have such ties with 
our co-nationals.64 Indeed, the ties of national history can be very weighty for Miller. Co-
nationals have duties towards one another and also towards their descendants because they, 
in turn, have benefited from the sacrifices of their “forefathers” who “toiled and split their 
blood to build and defend the nation”.65  
Like Rawls, Miller wants to identify the conditions under which citizens would be motivated 
to take part in political association. However, Miller has more of a communitarian bent than 
Rawls and other liberals such as Moore or Stilz. He thinks that intellectual agreement on an 
abstract conception of justice is at best necessary but not sufficient to motivate citizens to 
participate in political association. The aforementioned national ties are also necessary.66 
Though Miller also stresses that the shared national culture should be civic and open to the 
plurality of cultural groups and opinions that one finds in contemporary states.67 So he still 
 
61 (Miller 1997, 24) 
62 (Miller 2007, 127) 
63 (Miller 2007, 128) 
64 (Miller 1997, 57) 
65 (Miller 1997, 23) 
66 (Miller 1997, 57–58); as stated already in the introduction, this thesis will say little about nationalism 
per se when considering the prospects for associationalism. If Miller is right, then nationalism can only 
solve the motivational barriers to collective political agency whereas this thesis is focused on 
epistemic barriers. For a trenchant critique of Miller’s position, see Abizadeh (2007). 
67 (Miller 1997, chap. 6) 
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shares the associational instinct that cognitive diversity or disagreements over ways of life 
are the main obstacles to collective political agency. As with Stilz and Moore, Miller’s account 
is offered as a description of actually-existing states in order to justify pre-existing moral 
claims and practices. For instance, according to Miller, it is in virtue of the fact that the people 
control the state under reasonably functioning democratic institutions that we can justify 
the oft-found belief that all co-nationals are responsible for the actions of their 
government.68  
Ryan Pevnick argues that liberal democratic states are purposive associations that acquire 
property rights over their territory via their shared labour. He believes his quasi-Lockean 
account to be already implicit in Rawls’ characterisation of the well-ordered society as a 
cooperative venture between citizens. The citizenry act together to create public goods – 
“basic infrastructure, defense, the establishment and maintenance of an effective market, a 
system of education, and the like.” 69 These arise though “the coordinated decisions, labor, 
and contributions of members [of the association]”.70 The members are then collectively 
entitled to associative ownership of these institutions. Pevnick connects his thought with the 
aforementioned Rawlsian concept of a social union, arguing that our contributions to a 
framework of publicly provided goods heightens our own personal achievements, for 
subsequently “each of us accomplishes more and lives more broadly than any of us could on 
our own”.71 Again, we see an analogy with the family cropping up. Just as the inheritor of a 
farm claims legitimate title to it, so do the current generation of liberal citizens claim 
legitimate title to the public goods bequeathed to them by their predecessors.72 Like the 
three previous authors, Pevnick intends his account as a description of the practices of 
actually-existing liberal democratic states to justify their right to regulate immigration. On 
Pevnick’s model, the citizenry of a nation have acquired a property right over their territory 
via their coordinated and intentional labour. Just as any property-owner has at least a 
defeasible right to determine who to admit on her property, so do liberal citizens have a 
qualified right to determine who to admit into their political association.73 We shall assess 
the prospect for descriptive associationalism in chapter three.  
 
 
68 (Miller 2007, chap. 5) 
69 (Pevnick 2014, 38) 
70 (Pevnick 2014, 53) 
71 (Pevnick 2014, 38) 
72 (Pevnick 2014, 37–38) 
73 (Pevnick 2014, chap. 1) 
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3. Disagreement and Impersonal Societies 
Our outline of the associational view of political society as found in the work of Rawls and 
other political philosophers is complete. Section four will outline the alternative emergent 
understanding derived from Hayek’s work. To motivate that discussion, this section criticises 
the common associational assumption that liberal citizens are alienated primarily by 
intellectual disagreement. By “alienation” I mean simply that which prevents liberal citizens 
from cooperating politically on the basis of shared ends. Rawls’ inquiry was always premised 
on the assumption that intellectual disagreement was the relevant bar. Finding a solution to 
the problem vexes him his whole career—so much so that it inspires the change in his 
justificatory strategy between A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. Fearing that the 
former draws too heavily on Kantian and Millian understandings of autonomy that not all 
liberal citizens could find acceptable, he reframes his argument for justice as fairness as the 
articulation of ideas already implicit in the public political culture of liberal democracies and 
to which, he now hopes, liberal citizens would have reasons to assent despite all their other 
philosophical differences. In his later work he also allows for the possibility that cognitive 
disagreement might extend to justice itself. 74  
By the end, he offers not so much a theory of justice as a theory of the appropriate kinds of 
public reasons that citizens may cite in exercising power over one another as they manage 
their political association. This project is continued by scholars working in the tradition of 
public reason liberalism.75 Great intellectual effort has thus been invested by Rawls and those 
following in his wake to show how the problem of disagreement in political life can be 
overcome. Many realist scholars remain unconvinced, believing that our ethical diversity 
simply precludes the deep consensus implicit within the well-ordered society. On their view, 
we have to theorise about ongoing political life in a manner that accounts for much more 
disagreement than Rawls’ theory can cope with.76 What nevertheless unites Rawls and his 
critics is the view that ethical disagreement between liberal citizens is the central datum from 
which political theorising should begin. This section will cast doubt on this assumption. 
Quite simply, I claim that our ignorance of the views of most of our fellow citizens makes it 
very difficult to know whether we agree with them or not. Therefore when Rawls refers to a 
“just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by 
 
74 Rawls’ justice pluralism is evident in, for example, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (1997). 
75 Though they disagree as to how to proceed. For two contrasting accounts see Gaus (2012) and 
Quong (2011).  
76 Bernard Williams (2008) and Raymond Geuss (2008) offer two prominent realist accounts.  
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reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines,” he is mischaracterising the 
relationship that obtains between members of large-scale and impersonal social orders.77 To 
clarify, I do not deny that such orders are marked by a plurality of ethical views and their 
citizens have some awareness of this social fact. Nor do I deny that there are ethical 
cleavages of political significance in contemporary liberal democracies, such as the abortion 
controversy in the United States. I also accept the thrust of Rawls’ account of “reasonable 
disagreement,” that different human agents non-culpably reach divergent conclusions when 
considering complicated and difficult issues. However, it goes too far to infer from these 
points that the mass of impersonally related liberal citizens are in a relation of “deep 
doctrinal conflict”78 that is “irreconcilable” 79 and of “absolute depth”.80   
To explicate this claim further, let us look more closely into what Rawls means by reasonable 
disagreement. Rawls believes that liberal citizens will have reasonable disagreements over 
what he terms “comprehensive doctrines”. If a belief is a view on a single subject matter, a 
comprehensive doctrine is an integrated and consistent set of beliefs extending to “issues of 
value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of familial and 
associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct”.81 Such a doctrine 
should cover the “major religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of human life” and 
provide guidance as to how to deal with value conflicts.82  The claim of reasonable 
disagreement holds that individuals who exercise their power of reasoning will arrive at 
differing comprehensive doctrines that are incommensurable with one another and which 
render incompatible judgements on various matters. They will arrive at these divergent 
doctrines non-culpably due to burdens of judgement that encumber all rational agents when 
deciding upon complex matters.83  
The first difficulty with this account stems from Rawls’ own concession that most “people’s 
religious, philosophical and moral doctrines are not seen by them as fully general and 
comprehensive, and these aspects admit of variations of degree”.84 Indeed, it seems that 
only a philosopher of a certain kind will form a comprehensive doctrine in Rawls’ sense. (I 
 
77 (Rawls 1996, 4); emphasis added. 
78 (Rawls 1996, xxviii) 
79 (Rawls 1996, 441) 
80 (Rawls 1996, xxviii) 
81 (Rawls 1996, 13) 
82 (Rawls 1996, 13) 
83 For instance, the evidence may be conflicting or the assessment may involve several considerations 
with no obvious way of weighting them. The full list of such burdens is provided in Rawls (1996, 56–
57). 
84 (Rawls 1996, 160) 
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freely confess to lacking one myself.) Clearly, if citizens lack an opinion on a topic, they can 
neither be described as in agreement or disagreement on it. Some proof for this contention 
comes from the fact that the first thing taught to political philosophy students are the various 
positions that one can take in the discipline. The difference between consequentialist and 
deontological ethical positions might be a bread-and-butter example. The students have to 
be taught these positions precisely because most people don’t have a determinate opinion 
either way before studying the discipline. Even if we restrict our attention to political beliefs, 
empirical evidence suggests that many if not most citizens do not subscribe to a formal 
political philosophy.85 The empirical evidence on voter ignorance of basic political facts 
suggests also that many voters are simply apathetic about politics.86  
This is not the main difficulty however. Suppose that all liberal citizens did take the time to 
form comprehensive doctrines and become well-informed about politics. Perhaps such 
circumstances would obtain in a future Rawlsian society. Granting that under such 
circumstances liberal citizens would form comprehensive doctrines that differ in content, it 
would still not follow that they would be in a state of agreement or disagreement—at least 
if the latter terms are understood in the relevant intersubjective sense. It would prove 
helpful here to distinguish between two senses in which the notion of agreement is used. 
The statement “Rosie and Jim agree that proposition X is true” doesn’t necessarily mean that 
either are first-personally aware that the other also believes X or indeed of the other person’s 
existence. It could simply mean that they have both independently concluded that X is true. 
The statement “Aristotle and Confucius agree that excellence of character is important,” for 
example, can be made plausibly only in this sense since neither could have been aware of 
the other’s existence. However, the statement “Rosie and Jim agree that proposition X is 
true” could also be interpreted as indicating that Rosie and Jim both believe that X is true 
and that each knows that the other believes that X is true. They could each become aware 
of this after having independently determined the truth of X or perhaps after having 
deliberated with one another to arrive at that conclusion. 
In other words, the terms “agreement” or “disagreement” could be used to refer solely to a 
correspondence of views (or lack thereof) or with the extra requirement that the parties 
being referred to it are cognisant of that fact. Our normal usage of these terms presumes 
both conditions are in place. So does the particular phrasing that two or more people are in 
 
85 The classic study of voters’ lack of any discernible ideology remains that of Phillip Converse (2006).  
86 For a review of the empirical evidence on voter ignorance, see Somin (2013, chap. 1). 
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a state of agreement or disagreement. Certainly, political theorists presume both conditions 
are met when they characterise liberal citizens in such a manner. When Rawls says liberal 
citizens are profoundly “divided” by various doctrines, we can only take him to mean that 
they are aware that their opinions differ.87 It is hard to see how a group of persons could be 
divided by intellectual differences that they don’t know they have. Thus, if liberal citizens are 
to be so described as disagreeing in the relevant intersubjective sense, they need to have 
mutual knowledge of one another’s views. If they are to be described as in a state of 
disagreement that is “irreconcilable” and of “absolute depth” they need a high degree of 
mutual knowledge of one another’s views.88 However, in an impersonal society each citizen 
will have such concrete knowledge of the views of only a subset of their peers – friends, 
family and co-workers say. Given the limited knowledge that each individual citizen has of 
most of her peers, one can characterise liberal citizens en masse as being in a state of 
agreement or disagreement only to a very limited extent.  
Now, the Rawlsian might concede this but object that it is beside the point with which Rawls 
is ultimately concerned. What matters is not whether citizens know all the important 
differences in one another’s comprehensive doctrines but whether they know of those policy 
areas with respect to which their differing comprehensive doctrines lead them to disagree. 
For instance, the feminist does not need to know all the intricacies of Catholic doctrine to 
know that he will disagree with many Catholics about the permissibility of abortion. (And 
vice-versa.) Rawls’ characterisation of liberal citizens as in a state of disagreement en masse 
rests only on their knowing the politically salient differences in their comprehensive 
doctrines. The difficulty with this objection is that even with respect to political preferences, 
knowledge of what the mass of our fellow citizens think is not easy to come by. One prime 
facie plausible mechanism by which we might learn the political preferences of our fellow 
citizens is their voting patterns. Thus, we shall respond to this objection by demonstrating 
that voting patterns reveal much less about citizens’ political preferences than one might 
think.  
 
87 (Rawls 1996, xxv); emphasis added.  
88 The thought here being that I need to know a great deal about another citizen’s views to be able to 
say that our disagreements are as stark as the Rawlsian story intimates i.e. we don’t just disagree 
about, say, a particular policy but also on the deeper philosophical and even metaphysical premises 
that inform our policy positions. But absent substantive knowledge of the actual comprehensive 
doctrines of most of my fellow citizens, how can I know that my disagreements (if indeed we do 
disagree) with them extend to the “absolute depth” of which Rawls speaks?  
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The fact that 42.4% and 40% of the United Kingdom electorate voted for the Conservative 
and Labour parties in the 2017 General Election might be taken to imply that 42.4% of the 
UK electorate favour the contents of the Conservative Party manifesto and 40% the Labour 
Party manifesto. This inference is dubious enough in the real world where it is safe to say 
that voters are not always fully knowledgeable about the policies of the parties or candidates 
for whom they vote. However, even if we posit well-motivated voters who carefully read 
manifestos, the inference would still be mistaken. For voters do not always agree with every 
policy of the candidates they vote for. It is quite conceivable that a party voter would agree 
with only some of its policies and disagree with others but still vote for it because they 
conclude that the benefits of implementing the policies they favour outweigh the costs of 
implementing those they don’t. Given the highly limited range of choices in the political 
market place and the heterogeneity and plurality of the citizens governed by liberal states, 
it seems that many voters would have to compromise in this manner when deciding how to 
vote. 
If so, this greatly limits the utility of voting patterns as a heuristic to assess the views of one’s 
fellow citizens. When our well-informed and motivated voters opt for a party with a 
particular manifesto, the most we can say for sure is that they approve some of the policies 
it contained. We do not know which, if any, of those policies the voter disagreed with but 
judged to be a price worth paying for the benefits of the policies they did favour. Nor do we 
know the relative strengths of their preferences for or against a particular policy.  A real-
world example might prove useful here. Until recently the Republican Party of the United 
States had campaigned strongly on a platform of free trade. If we naively took voting patterns 
as an effective proxy of voters’ political views, then we might have concluded that Republican 
Party voters were also staunch supporters of free trade. Yet, Donald Trump won both the 
2016 Republican Party presidential primaries and the presidential election on an explicitly 
protectionist platform, suggesting that free trade did not actually rank highly in the 
preferences of many Republican Party voters in the recent past. Indeed, perhaps for many, 
their optimal policy all along was protectionism. It looks as if they voted for the Republican 
Party in the past because of its campaigning for other issues that they ranked higher in 
importance than free trade, a policy with which they might well have disagreed.  
It might be objected that this problem is attenuated to the extent that the policies offered 
by a political party entail one another. Two or more policies entail one another if supporting 
one is itself reason to support the others. The greater the degree to which the policies of a 
party entail one another in this way, the more does the decision to vote for them reveal 
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about the political preferences of their voters. Thus, suppose that a political party runs a 
policy programme consisting of 26 policies A-Z that entail one another in this sense. Then we 
might infer, from the mere fact of their voting for them, that the party’s voters supports all 
26 policies. The mutual entailment assumption means we can rule out the possibility that 
they trade-off the benefits of favoured against the costs of disfavoured policies. Thus it 
allows us to infer more from their voting decision than if we allowed for such trade-offs. 
While without the assumption, the most we can say for sure is that a party voter supports 
some of its policies. With the assumption, we can say that the voter supports all the 
policies.89   
The trouble is that it is very hard to think of how policies can be mutually entailing in this 
way. Perhaps they would be so if they logically entailed one another. Policy A and B would 
logically entail one another if I could affirm A and reject B only on pain of logical 
contradiction.90 But policy platforms do not work that way. There is no logically necessary 
connection between the typical policy platforms we see in most liberal democracies. For 
instance, we often observe that parties on the left of the political spectrum are in favour of 
both higher immigration and greater welfare spending. There is no necessary entailment of 
these positions. We can imagine voters who believe in all three of the possible other 
configurations of positions one might take with respect to these two issues. That is, one 
might be in favour of higher immigration and lower welfare spending (a typical libertarian 
view) or lower immigration and lower welfare spending (a typical conservative view) or lower 
immigration and higher welfare spending (a typical view among some communitarians and 
even some Rawlsians). If we can conceive of individuals with such views, then the mutual 
entailment assumption with respect to these two policy areas is unsupported and we cannot 
invoke it to rule out the possibility of voters trading off favoured against disfavoured 
policies.91 The fact of someone voting for a pro-immigration, pro-welfare spending party is 
consistent with their favouring both policies but also consistent with the libertarian view so 
long as the libertarian valued expanding immigration more than restricting welfare spending 
or the communitarian view so long as the communitarian valued increasing welfare spending 
more than restricting immigration. What is true of these two policy issues seems true also of 
other typical policy correlations – e.g. policy programmes aiming to liberalise abortion and 
privatise state-owned enterprises or those aiming to increase taxation and adopt a more 
 
89 Though we still don’t know the relative strength of their preferences for these policies.  
90 Perhaps policy B would amount to ¬A. 
91 Of course, that there is no logical contradiction between one’s views on two issues doesn’t imply 
that those views are necessarily true.   
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liberal approach to drug policy.92 Therefore, the mutual entailment assumption appears to 
be without foundation. All this is not to deny that voting patterns reveal something about 
voter preferences and by extension reveal to liberal citizens some policy areas over which 
they disagree. We can, of course, safely infer from British and American voting patterns that 
UK citizens are divided over the issue of Brexit and US citizens over gun control. The point is 
that once we take into account the inevitable fact of voter compromise in a restricted 
political marketplace, our power to make such inferences is much less than often claimed.  
One suspects that political philosophers who place ethical disagreement at the centre stage 
of political life simply generalise to society-at-large the experience of intellectual life within 
the academy. Here we have a small subset of the wider population united by a shared 
vocation, shared standards of inquiry and sustained social interaction in fora like academic 
conferences. They specialise in forming comprehensive perspectives over complex and 
difficult subject matter, the sort over which good-faith reasoners will arrive at divergent 
outcomes. As specialists in the business of arguing, they also spend a great deal of time 
debating with one another to try and establish who is right, though more often than not this 
debate leads to the entrenchment of rival positions rather than the conclusive victory of one 
view. It is under these specific conditions that we can identify a community of interlocutors 
with shared knowledge who experience disagreements in the relevant intersubjective sense. 
Indeed, given the specialised nature of the academy, leading academics often know their 
interlocutors personally. However, academic disagreements are to a large extent self-
contained in the particular community in question. To take the example of political theory, 
the intricacies of the distinctions between left-libertarianism and Rawlsianism, classical 
liberalism and right-libertarianism or luck- and deontic-egalitarianism typically make sense 
only to the participants within the discipline. Members of the public-at-large are not party 
to such disagreements. Indeed, neither are many academics who specialise in different 
 
92 I must confess I struggle to think of any policy propositions or even more abstract political 
philosophy propositions that strictly entail one another. Even those that seem to do so initially are 
subject to counter-examples. For example, one might think that the propositions that “a property 
rights regime leads to much worse consequences for human welfare than socialism” and “we ought 
to replace capitalism with socialism” entail one another, such that someone who believes one of these 
would by that fact have reason to believe the other. But one can conceivably affirm the first and reject 
the second if they think, their terrible consequences aside, private property rights are nonetheless still 
deontologically justified – I owe this observation to Jason Brennan (2014b). Alternatively and perhaps 
less outlandishly, one could affirm the first but also think that, say, we are unable to implement 
socialism and that the best system available to us currently is capitalism. As Wittgenstein (1958) 
observed, our beliefs are connected with one another through webs of judgements rather than tight 
logical entailment.  
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fields. The epistemic relationship of a specialised community of academic inquirers maps 
quite poorly unto the relationship of liberal citizens en masse.  
 
4. Alienation Under the Emergent Account 
We will now outline the emergent understanding of political society to be derived from 
Hayek’s work. Mutual ignorance rather than intellectual disagreement is the primary source 
of alienation on this account. As a precursor to our discussion of Hayek, it would help to 
begin with a thinker with whom he has some perhaps unexpected similarities, Iris Marion 
Young.93 She and Hayek disagree of course over economic policy and indeed over the status 
of liberalism itself. However, in Justice and the Politics of Difference Young makes some 
methodological claims about the way political and social theory is conducted that are 
strikingly similar to those of Hayek. She criticises political theorists, both liberal and 
communitarian, for pursuing what Michel Foucault called the Rousseauist dream, citing the 
following passage of the former:  
It was the dream that each individual, whatever position he occupied, might be able 
to see the whole of society, that men’s hearts should communicate, their vision be 
unobstructed by obstacles, and that the opinion of all reign over each.94 
For Young, the Rousseauist dream is utopian in the pejorative sense because it assumes a 
“co-presence of subjects” which is possible at most only in face-to-face societies.95 It fails to 
account for the sociological fact that members of impersonal social orders are opaque to one 
another. Against this, she argues that “politics must be conceived as a relationship of 
strangers who do not understand one another in a subjective and immediate sense, relating 
across time and distance”.96 Time and space, in her parlance, mediate the relationship 
between persons, rendering them strangers to one another. By the same token, persons 
enjoy unmediated relations with one another in face-to-face settings where they do have a 
“subjective and immediate sense” of one another. Now, Young recognises that totally 
unmediated relations are impossible - “[even] a face-to-face relation between two people is 
mediated by voice and gesture, spacing and temporality”.97 We can never see things literally 
from another’s first-personal perspective and their account of it to us, no matter how rich or 
 
93 See Tebble (2003) for an extended comparison of the Young and Hayek, upon which this section 
draws. This section has profited greatly from Tebble’s discussion there.  
94 Cited in Young (1990, 229). 
95 (Young 1990, 231) 
96 (Young 1990, 234) 
97 (Young 1990, 231) 
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immediate, will always remain a representation. Her point, I think, is that we can distinguish 
relationships by the degree of mediation they entail. While we each have unfiltered access 
to the soul of no one, perhaps not even our own, this doesn’t prevent us making a firm 
distinction between the degree of mediation and transparency available between those who 
enjoy the spatio-temporal proximity of face-to-face relations and those who do not. In this 
sense, we can say that relations between members of impersonal orders are spatio-
temporally mediated in a manner that those occurring between members of face-to-face 
orders are not.  
On the basis of this epistemic distinction, Young accuses political philosophers of a modelling 
error. They assume members of large-scale orders have mutual knowledge of a magnitude 
apropos of smaller-scale settings. Once we realise this, we need to model differently such 
large-scale orders. Rather than romanticising the idyllic Gemeinschaft or the deliberative 
polis, she suggests that we look to the contemporary city as a normative ideal.98 She does 
not intend by this a normative defence of sociological urbanisation or city life as such. Rather, 
I take her to see social relations within the city as a valuable metaphor for how political and 
social theorists should model large-scale impersonal orders that will, of course, contain 
within them both urban and rural spaces. She defines city life as the “being together of 
strangers”.99 In cities a very wide array of people from different social backgrounds, 
communities and groups interact with one another as part of very complex schemes of social 
cooperation without any deep sense of social unity or of participation in a common project: 
City life is a vast, even infinite, economic network of production, distribution, 
transportation, exchange, communication, service provision, and amusement. City 
dwellers depend on the mediation of thousands of other people and vast 
organisational resources in order to accomplish their ends. City dwellers are thus 
together, bound to one another, in what should and sometimes is a single polity. 
Their being together entails some common problems and common interests, but 
they do not create a community of shared final ends, of mutual identification and 
reciprocity.100 
Political theorists often model public spaces as a “realm of unity and mutual understanding”. 
Young notes that this is not our experiences of public spaces in urban settings in which one 
encounters a diversity of opaque others.101 Indeed, it is the possibility of encountering 
unknown or new experiences that lends to city life its “eroticism”.102 The normative ideal of 
 
98 (Young 1990, 238) 
99 (Young 1990, 237) 
100 (Young 1990, 238) 
101 (Young 1990, 240) 
102 (Young 1990, 239) 
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the city doesn’t posit citizens engaged in any kind of common political project nor even trying 
to overcome their ethical differences so as to embark on such a project. It posits the social 
cooperation of strangers who know little of one another. This is a more appropriate 
methodological starting point, she thinks, for thinking about impersonal orders than the 
assumption of co-presence found in both communitarian and left-liberal political theory.  
Hayek’s understanding of an extended liberal order has much in common with Young’s 
normative ideal of the city. His central inquiry, as expounded in works such as The 
Constitution of Liberty and Law, Legislation and Liberty, is to understand how coordination 
takes place among a mass of dispersed and spatio-temporally separated individuals, each of 
whom acts on their own localised knowledge. He understands a liberal order as an extended 
network of exchange and interaction between countless strangers too ignorant of one 
another to constitute, in Young’s words, “a community of shared final ends, of mutual 
identification and reciprocity”. He famously argued that socialist central planning was 
infeasible because the knowledge that the planning agency would need in order to formulate 
and execute a comprehensive economic plan was unavoidably dispersed and fragmented. It 
is not possible for a sovereign actor – be it the Politburo or the demos as a united body – to 
aggregate this knowledge and act upon the totality of it. I am going to term this Hayek’s 
fragmentation of knowledge thesis. What Hayek has in mind here is not, for the most part, 
the fact that theoretical knowledge is unavoidably dispersed as a result of academic 
specialisation. He thought that under modernity we tend to be overly bewitched by this kind 
of knowledge, exaggerating its importance in human affairs.103 The referent of the 
fragmentation of knowledge thesis is in many ways more prosaic and practical forms of 
knowing that can be understood in contradistinction to those forms expressible in explicit 
and general principles. 
Such knowledge is of “the particular circumstances of time and place”. In the economic 
context it means to “know of and put to use a machine not fully employed, or somebody’s 
skill which could be better utilized, or to be aware of a surplus stock which can be drawn 
upon during an interruption of supplies”.104 Knowledge of such particulars are readily 
enjoyed by actors who are, as it were, in-situ, Hayek referring to them as the “man-on-the-
spot.” In respect of this kind of knowledge, “practically every individual has some advantage 
over all others in that he possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be 
 
103 (Hayek 1945, 521); (Hayek 2006 [1960], 24); c.f. (Oakeshott 1991) 
104 (Hayek 1945, 522) 
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made”.105 Much of it is also tacit. In terms of Gilbert Ryle’s famous distinction, it is know-how 
rather than know-that.106 Holders of such knowledge might struggle to verbally communicate 
it to outsiders. It is embodied in organisational routines and workplace practices, as well as 
in traditions, customs and conventions more generally. In successfully acting in the world we 
are as much reliant on such knowledge as embodied in “[our] habits and skills, our emotional 
attitudes, our tools, and our institutions” as we are on our theoretical knowledge.107 
Importantly, such knowledge is often of fleeting and temporary relevance. The knowledge 
of surplus stock, for instance, might be useful only during an interruption to the supply chain. 
Much of it is also “frequently contradictory”.108 Facts of the world are never merely given but 
require interpretation. The interpretations that actors adopt depend much on the context 
and what they are trying to achieve. The same plot of land can be a holy site for pilgrims, an 
investment opportunity for a real estate agent and something in need of conservation for an 
environmentalist.  
One may be tempted to see these forms of knowing as primarily instrumental. We use them 
as a means to realise our higher ends and values, which can themselves be couched in 
general principles, much like a Rawlsian comprehensive doctrine. Hayek thought this 
mistaken. Much of our understanding of the good life or moral conduct is tacitly embedded 
in the forms of life in which we participate. As already mentioned, very few of us subscribe 
to a Rawlsian comprehensive doctrine covering “all recognized values and virtues within one 
precisely articulated system”.109 While we certainly have a practical understanding of what 
gives our life value and the moral goods we wish to realise, we may struggle to explicate in 
the form of a doctrine all such commitments. Hayek observes that in our ordinary life we 
“are constantly choosing between different values without a social code prescribing how we 
ought to choose”.110 In any case, even those who try to live their life according to abstract 
principles have to interpret them in concrete settings which in turn requires knowledge of 
particulars. The substance of their conception of the good will be practical knowledge. One 
doesn’t just follow the priestly vocation in the abstract, one does so in a particular parish 
with a particular group of parishioners in a particular location and so on.  
 
105 (Hayek 1945, 522); c.f. (Hayek 2006 [1960], 26–27) 
106 (Ryle 1945) 
107 (Hayek 2006 [1960], 24)  
108 (Hayek 1945, 519) 
109 (Rawls 1996, 13) 
110 (Hayek 2001 [1944], 60–61) 
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Such knowledge is not inevitably fragmented amongst members of a group. Size and the 
degree of heterogeneity matter. In small groups where members are not spatio-temporally 
distant, share the same local circumstances and social practices, and where transaction costs 
are low, practical knowledge can be relevantly shared. This is so even with respect to its tacit 
component, which can be transmitted and learnt via imitation. Eugen Weber claims that 
members of the typical nineteenth century French village barely needed to speak with one 
another, such was their intuitive understanding of one another’s behaviour:  
 [T]he peasant shows what he does or is about to do in forms of behaviour that are 
wholly familiar to his fellows and so are easily interpreted by all of them. If one sees 
a man in such a place, at such and such a time, on can generally tell what he is up to. 
Deduction based on concrete observation is what counts, and speech adds little to 
this.111  
By the same token, however, this epistemic transparency is lost if the group in question are 
the impersonally related members of contemporary liberal societies. Few would deny that 
the fragmentation of knowledge under such circumstances poses difficulties for large-scale 
social coordination. Many think, however, that the relevant knowledge can be aggregated 
by the use of two potential mechanisms. The first is effective statistics. In aggregating 
information, such mechanisms overcome the fragmentation of knowledge. However, it is 
precisely the knowledge of particular circumstances for which standardising statistics 
struggle to account. Hayek writes: 
The statistics which such a central authority would have to use would have to be 
arrived at precisely by abstracting from minor differences between the things, by 
lumping together, as resources of one kind, items which differ as regards location, 
quality, and other particulars, in a way which may be very significant for the specific 
decision [that they are looking to undertake].112 
Additionally, given its temporary relevance much pertinent knowledge would lose its 
relevance once it reaches the central authority and the tacit component is not even 
amenable to central aggregation.113 The second is democracy. We shall have much more to 
say about this in the chapters to follow, but for now we can make the following observations. 
To the extent that the fragmentation of knowledge refers to tacit knowledge, it is hard to 
 
111 (Weber 2007, 92) 
112 (F. A. Hayek 1945, 524); by analogy we argued above that the standardised nature of choices 
available in the ballot box are a poor proxy for each person’s concrete and possibly even idiosyncratic 
political preferences.  
113 Recalling the old military dictum that the generals are always prepared to fight the previous war. 
For an extended analysis of the blind-spots of synoptic state rationality, particularly with regard to 
local and practical knowledge, see Scott (1998).  
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see how it can be conveyed effectively through voting or deliberation.114 To the extent that 
it is fleeting knowledge of particular circumstances, it is hard to see how each citizen can 
convey it to all her fellow citizens in a timely fashion. To the extent that it is perspectival 
knowledge dependent on what one is trying to achieve, it is hard to see how such knowledge 
can be aggregated unless one particular perspective is privileged. Furthermore, deliberative 
democrats such as Jürgen Habermas and Joshua Cohen concede that democratic citizens can 
properly pool their knowledge to form a genuine collective will only in face-to-face groupings 
where they are comparatively epistemically transparent to one another.115  
We will be at pains to show in this thesis that the fragmentation of knowledge would prevent 
liberal citizens acting in unison even if they all individually affirm the same principles of 
justice or some other normative value. For there would still remain the problem of signalling 
this fact to one another.116 The arguments from section two above have already cast doubt 
on the possibility of this happening. Chapter four will develop these claims. Further, even if 
this problem were overcome and liberal citizens did become mutually aware of their abstract 
commitment to justice, they would still face a knowledge problem in coordinating their 
actions to attain that end.117 It is of great significance that the emergent view sees mutual 
ignorance rather than disagreement as the primary barrier to collective political agency. It 
means that the emergent view is much less salutary about our prospects for attaining it. If 
disagreement is the primary issue, then the problem seems at least in principle soluble. We 
just find principles on which we can agree. If, however, what prevents us from acting en 
masse on shared intentions is mutual ignorance, the prospects of a solution seem even less 
promising. The tacit, fleeting and localised nature of the practical knowledge held by each 
citizen precludes it from being communicated to all the others. Our inability to take collective 
control is a fact of life with which we would need to make do. Or so the analysis to follow 
will argue.  
 
 
 
 
114 This claim is elaborated by Pennington (2003).   
115 I offer an extended critique of attempts to scale-up deliberative democracy in chapter four of this 
thesis.  
116 Per our analysis from section two, that they individual affirm the same principles does not mean 
that they agree in the relevant intersubjective sense.  
117 (Tebble 2016b, 19) 
41 
 
5. The Emergent Account and the Function of Justice 
On the associational understanding, we turn to abstract and impartial principles of justice to 
overcome intellectual disagreement. As goes the familiar argument, a self-governing political 
association cannot be based on the principles of utilitarianism or Catholicism or even too 
robust a commitment to autonomy since each of these will be reasonably rejected by some 
sincere citizens. Therefore, we abstract away from our particular disagreements to find 
governing principles that are suitably impartial and to which all citizens can assent. The 
currency of Rawlsian justice, for instance, are primary goods that purportedly anyone would 
want whatever else they want. On the emergent understanding, the rationale of abstract 
principles of justice are rather different. The problem is not so much that I disagree with 
those I cooperate with but that I know little about them. We typically interact with strangers 
in a liberal society. Far more often than not, we don’t know the conception of the good or 
religion of the person sitting next to us on a train or in front us in a queue or who sells us 
something in a shop. We often don’t know this information even of our co-workers and 
neighbours. Here I refer only to those with whom we consciously interact. In an economy 
characterised by an even moderate division of labour, we have mediated relations with 
countless others apart from those with whom we have direct relations. Of these unseen 
others we often have scarcely any knowledge. Our interactions with all these strangers are 
facilitated by abstract and impartial rules of justice. It does not seem right, however, to say 
that justice resolves disagreement. After all, if they are strangers we typically don’t know 
their views on ethics or other matters. 
These observations make clear that the function of justice under the emergent 
understanding is to facilitate interaction between strangers despite their mutual ignorance. 
The puzzle to be solved is this. If each agent acts on private knowledge unknown to all other 
agents save those in her immediate vicinity, then one might wonder how agents can 
coordinate their individual plans so as to be compatible with one another. Hayek spends his 
whole career trying to show coordination under such conditions is, in fact, possible so long 
as agents exhibit some regularity of behaviour in the manner in which they act upon their 
otherwise idiosyncratic circumstances and knowledge. It is possible, in other words, so long 
as the agents subscribe to common rules when acting on their localised information.118 If 
such rules are to be understood and followed by numerous agents acting under variegated 
 
118 (Hayek 1982a, 39–44) 
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circumstances, these rules of just conduct will have to display a certain purpose-
independence.119  
A helpful metaphor once used by him was the highway-code.120 Any road network will have 
very many road users with very many different destinations. No driver knows nor do they 
need to know the destination of the other drivers. Nor is there a global controller who knows 
the destination of each of the drivers. Still, the vast majority of road journeys end at their 
destination. Road users successfully coordinate with one another because they subscribe to 
common rules of the road e.g. they all drive on the left- or right-side. Such rules enable 
countless road users to generate reasonable expectations of one another’s behaviour and 
successfully coordinate their actions despite their mutual ignorance of one another’s 
destinations. They are purpose-independent rules insofar as they do not mandate any 
particular destination but specify constraints on how one arrives at any destination. Mutatis 
mutandis in a liberal social order, adherence to common rules allows individuals and 
communities to successfully interact and coordinate with one another while acting on their 
own idiosyncratic knowledge and values. Hayek’s understands these “rules of just conduct” 
in a fundamentally Humean manner. They relate to the stability of possession, the transfer 
of property by consent and the fulfilment of contractual promises. They are abstract and 
instrumental rules that do not specify ends to be pursued but conditions to be adhered to in 
such pursuit. In this regard they facilitate cooperation between agents from a wide variety 
of ethical and cultural frameworks. Often they are best understood as negative prohibitions. 
Rather than prescribing actions-to-be-performed, they merely proscribe a limited range of 
actions – e.g. stealing or trespassing – while otherwise granting individuals freedom of 
action. There are three ways that conformity to such rules facilitates coordination between 
epistemically alienated liberal agents. 
a) Economising on interpretive labour in large-scale settings 
I borrow the term “interpretive labour” from David Graeber.121 Social life is possible only if 
we can understand the meaning and intent behind one another’s actions. We need to be 
able to see things from the perspective of another person and discern what they meant in 
performing a particular action or making a particular utterance if we are to respond 
 
119 (Hayek 1982a, 80–81). Hayek long thought that the propensity to follow abstract rules was deeply 
embedded in human nature. In his work on theoretical psychology, The Sensory Order (1987 [1952]) 
and his paper “rules, perception and intelligibility” (1967a), Hayek advanced the claim that the mind 
itself is a device that classifies external stimuli according to abstract rules of classification.  
120 (Hayek 2001 [1944], 78); c.f. (Schmidtz 2010, 84–86) 
121 (Graeber 2015, 41); c.f.(Rawls 1999, 409–10)  
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appropriately. Interpretive labour is the process or act of gaining such knowledge of another 
actor. Social life requires not just that we engage in such labour but that we do so efficiently. 
In economic terms, we can view interpretive labour as a transaction cost which needs to be 
minimised if we are to secure the benefits of social cooperation. Predictable and 
conventional norms of behaviour fulfil this economising function. When someone I have just 
met initiates a hand shake, they are signalling by such a customary act their intention to greet 
me. Not only does their customary behaviour efficiently signal their intention to me but also 
readily available is an act-type on my part that efficiently signals to them my intention to 
reciprocate their greeting. I simply raise my own hand to meet theirs. Customary rules 
perform this economising function only if they are affirmed and understood by those party 
to the interaction. The gesture to shake someone’s hand could not effectively signal intent if 
directed to someone unfamiliar with the custom. That we behave in such-and-such way in 
this kind of situation needs to be common knowledge between us.  
In small-scale societies the relevant rules can be derived from the shared cultural and 
religious framework of the group, as anthropologists have long argued. According to Marcel 
Mauss, for the Native American Tribes of the American Northwest and the Polynesian tribes 
of Papa New Guinea, economic exchange was “only one element” of interactions that 
extended to “banquets, rituals . . .  dances, festivals, and fairs”.122 These elaborate rituals 
allow members of these groups to reliably signalling their intent to one another and thereby 
coordinate their actions. The drawback here is that intra-group exchange and interaction is 
made difficult since an outsider will lack knowledge of the group’s customs and rituals. A 
foreigner would, for example, find it exceedingly difficult to join the much discussed gift 
economy of the Kula Ring of the Tobriand islands in Papa New Guinea. It consisted of a highly 
complex barter economy the rules of which were derived from the elaborate and particular 
cultural framework of the several thousand inhabitants of those islands.123 
Efficient rules of interpretive labour in a large-scale and diverse society must take a different 
form. They need to be understood and easily subscribed to by followers of a heterogeneous 
and variegated array of cultural forms. They cannot be embedded within any particular 
cultural form but should exhibit a certain generality. Hand-shaking is a good example of such 
a rule. It can be easily learnt and internalised by people from many walks of life. I might know 
very little about the person who initiates a hand-shake. Still I instantly recognise what they 
 
122 (Mauss 2002, 6–7) 
123 (Mauss 2002, chap. 1) 
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are trying to do. Analogously, the same can be said of generalised rules to do with possession, 
exchange and promise-keeping. They constitute norms that allow diverse individuals to 
successfully signal their intentions to one another. I do not know about the religion, hobbies, 
interests or values of the Uber driver whose services I procure and vice-versa. I could even 
be a tourist residing in the country temporarily. Nonetheless subscription to generalised 
rules of exchange allows us, at least most of the time, to successfully interact with one 
another. This is the great and often overlooked benefit of the cash nexus.124 
b) Reducing the need for collective decision-making  
Hayek writes of the importance of “general rules governing the conditions under which 
objects or circumstances become part of the protected sphere of a person or persons”. He 
refers, of course, to rules demarcating private property rights. When such rules are accepted 
in the community, they enable “each member of a society to shape the content of his 
protected sphere and all members recognize what belongs to their sphere and what does 
not”.125 Hayek’s claim is that given the inevitable fragmentation of knowledge, any complex 
and large-scale society would require property rights, whether these are formally or 
informally recognised.126 The reason for this is that it is difficult to carry out a “coherent plan 
of action unless we are certain of our exclusive control of some material objects; and where 
we do not control them, it is necessary to know who does if we are to collaborate with 
them”.127 In a similar vein, Gerald Gaus conceptualises property rights as the partitioning of 
the social space into different jurisdictions each of which is governed by a particular right-
holder.128 Jurisdictional rights are purpose-independent insofar as they provide each rights-
holder with significant latitude as how to arrange their jurisdiction. Such partitioning helps 
us deal with the fragmentation of knowledge in large-scale societies by alleviating, at least 
somewhat, the need for the coordination of plans.  
Supposing the property regime does a reasonable job of internalising the costs and benefits 
of the actions of each rights-holder, each can govern her jurisdiction as she wishes without 
worrying about the countless alternative uses that might be made of the resources under 
 
124 As stressed by Hayek (1982b) throughout Law, Legislation and Liberty but particularly chapter 10 
of volume 2.  
125 (Hayek 2006 [1960], 123) 
126 (Hayek 1988, chap. 2); this was de facto true even of the Soviet Union, see Roberts (2002, 261). 
127 (Hayek 2006 [1960], 123); of course the point can be generalised beyond “material objects” to 
intangible property claims.  
128 (Gaus 2012a, 370-380); the right-holder need not be a singular individual, as demonstrated by 
Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) work on the commons.  
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her control by other members of the community. In direct contrast, under a system of 
collective ownership, each will have to ensure that their utilisation of a resource is 
compatible with the potential plans that all other agents might have for it. This may be 
possible in very small-scale settings, such as the hypothetical camping trip valorised by 
Gerald Cohen in his short book Why not Socialism? Cohen imagines a small group of 
egalitarian campers who treat their camping facilities as under collective control for the 
duration of their trip. The group have shared understandings as to who should be able to use 
which resources for the duration of the trip as well as who should perform which chores.129 
Direct and conscious coordination on how resources should be used are feasible given the 
epistemic transparency that holds between the group. However, as Cohen himself 
acknowledges later in the book, this is precisely what is missing between members of a large-
scale society.130 Note that this justification for property differs from that of the associational 
approach. On the associational view, we need property because liberal citizens would be 
unable to reconcile their competing claims as to how their common resources should be 
utilised. On the emergent view, we need property because liberal citizens are unaware of 
the claims each might make as to how such resources should be utilised. 
I believe we can generalise this epistemic claim to liberties other than property rights.131 Let 
us take some that are prominent within Rawls’ account of the basic liberties. These include 
“freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought [and] 
freedom of the person”.132 Now, it is at least conceptually possible to imagine that rights 
such as these were held not individually but collectively. One could not just decide for 
oneself, say, what to do with one’s body or where to live or how to worship and so on but 
would have to gain the assent of the whole community for each decision. This would be an 
egalitarian society insofar as each person would have an equal stake in the “common pool” 
of societal resources. Perhaps something approximating this is possible in a small-scale 
community. Benjamin Constant’s “liberty of the ancients” arguably was not far off this 
system of social organisation.133 However, it is immediately apparent that this would cause 
grave coordination problems if transposed to a large-scale society. Any exercises of a 
 
129 (Cohen 2009, chap. 1) 
130 (Cohen 2009, chap. 4) 
131 Though the point here is moot if one adopts the strident libertarian position that all rights are 
reducible to property rights. I take the classical liberal view that there are individual rights not 
reducible to property or jurisdictional rights. On this distinction, see John Tomasi’s Free Market 
Fairness (2013, Chps 2 &4).  
132 (Rawls 1999, 53) 
133 “Thus among the ancients the individual, almost always sovereign in public affairs, was a slave in 
all his private relations”. (Constant 1819) 
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significant liberty would need the assent of millions of others if we take the “community” in 
question to be members of a typical nation-state. In Richard Epstein’s apt words, such a 
system of collective ownership “builds a form of institutional paralysis into the very fabric of 
social lives”.134 Privatising these kinds of decision-making, again, circumvents this mammoth 
collective coordination problem. Each can decide how to use their body or which speech-
acts to engage in or how to worship the divine using only their own information without 
having to gain the consent of all other members of society. Again, the difficulty is not so much 
that we might disagree with the countless other competing claims that might be made on 
the use of our “bodily resources,” but that we cannot fathom what they might be.  
 
c) Transmission of dispersed information  
This is perhaps the coordinative function of rule-following with which Hayek is most 
commonly associated. In small-scale social orders where parties had mutual knowledge of 
one another’s needs and contributions, economic distribution and adaptation to changing 
circumstances could be the product of conscious choice and design. Recourse to such 
methods is precluded in large-scale social orders due to the fragmentation of knowledge. 
Nonetheless, indirect coordination is possible so long as market actors respect Humean rules 
of just conduct and exhibit the following regularity in their behaviour - “they will normally 
prefer a larger return from their efforts to a smaller one, and . . . they will [often] increase 
their efforts in a particular direction if the prospects of return improve”.135 The unintended 
result of subscription to these common rules is the formation of signals in the form of market 
prices that reflect tacitly, and albeit imperfectly, the dispersed information of countless 
actors otherwise mutually ignorant of one another’s circumstances. Hayek gives the famous 
example of a change in the price of tin.136 Suppose that some unknown event renders the 
supply of tin comparatively scarce. The price of tin rises. The price rise is passed down to the 
consumer through the successive profit-maximising behaviour of agents down the supply 
chain. The consumer of tinned goods doesn’t need to be aware of either this distant event 
or the perturbations it has caused in the tin and other related industries. They simply take 
note of the increase in price and economise their behaviour accordingly. In this way they 
incorporate in their behaviour information of which they have no direct apprehension.  
 
134 (Epstein 1995, 56) 
135 (Hayek 1982a, 45) 
136 (Hayek 1945, 526) 
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Wide spread subscription to liberal rules of just conduct do not transmit information merely 
through price signals. They also facilitate widespread social experimentation. We all 
potentially benefit from the emergence and adoption of new social practices that emerge 
from this process. This is the theme that Hayek stresses particularly in the first three chapters 
of The Constitution of Liberty. The freedom of action afforded by rules of just conduct allows 
a wide range of responses to social problems and challenges based on the local knowledge 
of agents in situ. This is particularly useful in aiding adaptation to changing circumstances: 
“[every] change in conditions will make necessary some change in the use of resources, in 
the direction and kind of human activities, in habits and practices”.137  The experimentation 
afforded by rules of just conduct maximises the possibility of discovering new social practices 
to respond to changing circumstances. These can then be transmitted to society-at-large via 
processes of imitation. Crucially, the adopters need not know what makes this particular rule 
or norm successful nor of the alternative attempts that did not prove successful. They tacitly 
“gain” such knowledge simply by imitating the practice. Such processes occur not simply in 
the economic sphere but also in the moral sphere. One need only consider the rapid changes 
in, say, gender norms or attitudes to homosexuality that have occurred in many parts of the 
world in the last few decades. In recent years, Hayekian scholars have applied this insight 
unto questions of social justice, arguing that the Rawlsian ideal of a well-ordered society 
united by one conception of social justice is defective. In a complex and open society, our 
understanding of distributive justice should be open to change and evolution both to be able 
to respond adequately to changing circumstances and to take advantage of the benefits of 
social learning and experimentation.138 Again, we see the epistemic benefits of the 
comparative purpose-independence of the rules of just conduct. We need rules open to a 
wide range of experimentation precisely because we do not know a priori which experiments 
will prove useful. If we did, there would be no need for the experiments in the first place.  
I wish to end this section by noting an important distinction. One can accept Hayek’s 
argument that abstract rules of just conduct are needed to facilitate interaction under 
impersonal settings without assuming that all these rules should originate from the same 
source – e.g. the state. Thus, the rules governing transactions on an app-based taxi platform, 
stock listings on a stock exchange, the demarcation of property rights in a homeowners 
association or credit card transactions around the world might all be described as rules of 
just conduct in the Hayekian sense. They facilitate interactions between many agents and 
 
137 (Hayek 2006 [1960], 26) 
138 On this see Pennington (2011) and Gaus (2019).  
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groups with a wide range of different purposes. Yet none of these rules originate from the 
same source nor should they all be seen as the application of one general scheme of property 
rights. Hayek himself was not as clear on this as one would like.139 The point here is to resist 
the temptation to connect the exigencies of governance in large-scale societies with a legal 
centralism that sees the state as the only important maker and enforcer of institutional rules. 
The importance of this distinction will become apparent in the following chapter, where we 
use Hayek’s ideas to criticise the idea that there is a monocentric source of institutional rules 
in society.  
 
6. The Emergent Account and Unintended Outcomes   
The associational view sees political institutions as the product of the coordinated agency of 
liberal citizens who act upon and realise their shared intentions. The emergent view stresses 
that large-scale social outcomes are the result of human action but not intentional design. 
Hence, Hayek stresses that the outcomes or “order of actions” to which interactions under 
the rules of just conduct give rise are not reducible to the intentions of the parties whose 
actions are causally responsible for them. In this sense, these outcomes are emergent and 
unavoidably so. Trying to directly engineer a particular manifestation of the order of actions 
is impossible if not very difficult since such outcomes will “always be an adaptation to a large 
number of particular facts which will not be known in their totality to anyone”.140 Each acts 
on the basis of some knowledge unknown to the rest and this knowledge cannot be pooled 
in impersonal settings. We have already made note of how such pooling is precluded by the 
tacit, localised and fleeting nature of this information. Another important factor is that the 
data itself is constantly in flux. The countless agents-in-question are constantly revising and 
updating the information they act upon as a result of their continuous interactions with one 
another. 
Now, Hayek is sometimes interpreted as saying that these emergent outcomes, or 
spontaneous orders to use his famous terminology, are black boxes about whose operation 
we can barely say anything.141 This interpretation is not correct. Hayek does think that we 
 
139 For an excellent critique of Hayek’s legal centralism, see Stringham (2015, chap. 13). 
140 (Hayek 1982a, 40) 
141 As already mentioned, emergent phenomena “exhibit[s] properties that are different from those 
displayed by the elements [of which they are composed] taken in isolation” (Lewis 2016, 115). Hayek 
himself rarely used such terminology, preferring his better known term of “spontaneous order”. This 
thesis tends to adopt the “emergence” phrasing because it emphasises, in a way that I don’t think the 
notion of “spontaneity” does, the disjuncture between the individual intentions of liberal agents and 
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can achieve an “explanation of principle” with regard to such phenomena.142 We can 
understand the character of different institutional rules and say something about the broad 
range of outcomes or “orders of actions” to which they might give rise, without being able 
to predict any particular manifestation. Thus, we can make the broad based prediction that 
market-based institutions outperform institutions of central planning. However, and as 
attested to by the dire record of economists in this area, we cannot predict specific growth 
rates. In this respect, Hayek’s social theory is widely regarded as anticipating the science of 
complex systems that is increasingly influential in fields ranging from computer science to 
cognitive psychology.143 Scholars in this field have formally shown that complex systems 
composed of interdependent variables are compatible with a very large range of conceivable 
outcomes, limiting greatly our ability to predict their outcomes.144  
On this Hayekian view, the aspiration for collective political agency and social unity is based 
on an exaggeration of our ability to predict let alone control the outcomes of large-scale 
coordination between epistemically distant strangers. Particularly in Law, Legislation and 
Liberty, Hayek tries to offer a different understanding of a liberal order. It consists of agents 
whose political unity does not extend beyond common subscription to instrumental rules of 
just conduct. This order constitutes a “Great Society” because under modernity there is no 
“single” society to which we belong but most of us are members of “many different 
overlapping and interlacing societies.”145 The Great Society, then, will consist of many groups 
with sufficient mutual knowledge of one another’s purposes and circumstances such that 
their internal governing rules would promote substantively shared ends. The order as a 
whole, however, is more akin to a decent system of traffic lights then an association in pursuit 
of shared ends. Iris Marion Young’s proposed re-orientation of political theory was already 
to be found in Hayek’s Law, Legislation and Liberty. For the Great Society is a model of 
political society that does away with the assumption of co-present subjects.  
At this juncture it is important to also note that Hayek’s thinking about the extent to which 
the rules of just conduct can be rationally designed changes during his career. The early 
Hayek of The Road to Serfdom and of The Constitution of Liberty is much friendlier to rational 
 
the outcomes to which their interactions give rise. In this way the distinction between the 
associational conception is rendered more vivid.  
142 (Hayek 1955); (Hayek 1967b 29-31) 
143 On this see Vaughn (1999) and Lewis (2016, 2012).  
144 “A mere 10 variable equation system can generate approximately 181,440 possible solutions.” 
(Vaughn 1999, 242 (n4)) 
145 (Hayek 1982c, 476) 
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design of such rules in order to make maximally beneficial use of spontaneous ordering 
forces. On this early Hayekian view, “explanations of principle” can help us predict, albeit in 
broad-based terms, the order of actions arising under different rules of just conduct. They 
provide us with a rational basis to socially engineer such rules to obtain outcomes we 
consider more desirable. Though such engineering will always fall short of planning for any 
specific order of actions. Hence, he speaks of “planning for competition” in the Road to 
Serfdom and dedicates a third of The Constitution of Liberty to providing quite programmatic 
and detailed policy prescriptions to legislators.146 There is a distinct change of emphasis, 
however, by the time Hayek writes Law, Legislation and Liberty. There he conceives of the 
rules of just conduct as evolving slowly over time through the countless case-by-case 
decisions of common law judges. In other words, the later Hayek begins to think that both 
the order of actions and the underlying rules of just conduct are the emergent result of many 
human actions but no overall design. This is not to say that he completely eschews legislation 
in his later work. However, the task of legislation is now the more limited one of “correcting” 
“grown” law when it does not adapt to new circumstances fast enough or begins to develop 
in undesirable directions.147 With this distinction in mind, the argument of this chapter might 
be subject to the following objection. A reconciliation between Hayekian social theory and 
the Rawlsian associational model might be possible if we adopt the early Hayekian view. We 
might then conceive of liberal citizens as enjoined in a political association under which they 
rationally and collectively decide the rules of just conduct that would govern their 
interactions in the otherwise spontaneous order of civil society. This, roughly put, is how I 
believe we can interpret John Tomasi’s work, Free Market Fairness.148 Chapter two is 
dedicated to rebutting this important objection. It defends a position akin to that of the later 
Hayek. It argues that the system of institutional rules governing a liberal order, and not 
simply the order of actions to which such rules give rise, should be seen as emergent 
phenomena rather than the rational construct of a civically-engaged liberal citizenry. 
 
7. Hayek’s Worry   
Hayek does not himself use the term “collective political agency” but I think it captures well 
the kind of politics that he thought was unfeasible in the contemporary world, namely one 
 
146 (Hayek 2001 [1944], 43); (Hayek 2006 [1960], part. 3) 
147 (Hayek 1982a, 88–89); Hayek also stresses the emergent and evolved nature of the rules of just 
conduct in his final work, The Fatal Conceit (Hayek 1988, chap. 3).  
148 (Tomasi 2013) 
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that aspires to subject large-scale and unavoidably emergent social processes to some form 
of collective control. The difficulty with this kind of politics for Hayek is not simply its 
unattainability. The issue is that the attempt to realise it would undermine a free society. 
When Hayek writes The Road to Serfdom, the desire for collective political agency is reflected 
in the demand for socialism. That work is famously dedicated to showing the threat to 
freedom stemming from such politics. In the latter half of the twentieth century, when the 
failures of command-and-control socialism were becoming all too apparent, collective 
political agency was espoused to realise social justice. Hence, Law, Legislation and Liberty is 
dedicated to showing the threat to freedom posed by patterned conceptions of social justice. 
While for Hayek the goals of such politics will always prove to be chimerical, the restrictions 
on individual freedom that arise in the pursuit of such goals will be all-too real. Both in Law, 
Legislation and Liberty and in his final work The Fatal Conceit, Hayek also begins to evince 
scepticism about our ability to resist the lure of the politics of collective control.  
By this late stage of his career, Hayek thought that the desire for collective political agency 
is an evolutionary inheritance. Our core moral intuitions are adapted for life in the face-to-
face tribal groupings in which we evolved and in which unified action towards the “the direct 
pursuit of felt needs or perceived objects” was genuinely possible.149 Members of liberal 
orders would find it difficult to discipline their evolutionarily atavistic moral intuitions when 
they are engaged in politics.150  They would consistently be tempted to apply the 
“unmodified, uncurbed, rules of the micro-cosmos (i.e., of the small band or troop, or of, say, 
our families) to the macro-cosmos (our wider civilisation)”.151 If Hayek’s psychological thesis 
is correct, two important implications follow. First, liberal citizens will find it difficult to 
endorse the liberal order. Its workings will appear to them as something of an alien power 
that they cannot control. Second, they will be perennially attracted to political projects 
incompatible with liberalism. The institutional stability of a liberal order will be put into 
doubt. Since this thesis adopts Hayek’s stance that collective political agency is not possible 
 
149 (Hayek 1982c, 160) 
150 While this evolutionary conjecture strikes me as at least plausible, Hayek’s claim that the desire for 
collective political agency is deeply engrained in human nature need not depend on it. That the 
following is true seems sufficient: “human emotions are attached to concrete objects, and the 
emotions of justice in particular are still very much connected with the visible needs of the group to 
which each person belongs” (Hayek 1982b, 143). Indeed, the concern that the abstract relations of a 
liberal order are alienating is also found in figures such as Hegel, Marx and Weber. It is unsurprising 
that Hayek, who came of intellectual age in Vienna, would share this concern. Andrew Gamble (2007, 
44-46 & 180-2) brings out well the parallels between Weber and Hayek. 
151 (Hayek 1988, 14); Gerald Cohen’s (2009) hope that we can model a large-scale society on the norms 
of a weekend camping trip is an interesting philosophical expression of this desire. 
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between impersonally related liberal citizens, it behoves us to engage with Hayek’s concerns 
on this issue. Chapter seven will alleviate Hayek’s concerns about the stability of liberal 
institutions. The conclusion to this thesis will provide some reflections on how we can 
personally reconcile ourselves to a social world which exceeds our collective capacity to 
control and direct it.   
 
Conclusion  
 
A summary of the claims of a long chapter are in order. The chapter began by outlining the 
associational understanding of political society. This popular conception is found in the work 
of John Rawls and other prominent political theorists. It conceives of political society as an 
association through which citizens exercise collective autonomy over the basic structure of 
their social world. The primary barrier to achieving this great social good is cognitive 
disagreement. This is overcome by purpose-independent principles of justice that transcend 
the partisan intellectual differences of liberal citizens. In contradistinction to this view, the 
chapter then proposed the alternative, emergent understanding of political society rooted 
in the thought of Hayek. On this view, liberal agents are alienated primarily by mutual 
ignorance. Purpose-independent rules of justice are akin to traffic management systems that 
facilitate coordination between countless agents whose ends and purposes are opaque to 
one another. Political society cannot be seen as an association through which citizens 
exercise collective agency. For the fragmentation of knowledge between liberal agents 
precludes their acting on shared intentions. Instead, the outcomes of their interactions are 
unintended phenomena. The difficult upshot of the emergent view is our having to come to 
terms with this fact. Chapters 3-6 will attempt to vindicate the emergent understanding of 
political society over the associational one. However, before moving on to that task, chapter 
two will explain why this thesis has not followed those classical liberal philosophers who 
attempt to reconcile Hayek and Rawls.  
I wish to end this chapter by making some remarks as to the wider, quite deflationary 
implications that the emergent view of political society poses not just for the notion of 
collective political agency but also for ideal theory, the approach to conducting political 
philosophy espoused by Rawls and others. These remarks will help also to distinguish the 
emergent view of political society from other Hayekian-inspired critiques of Rawlsian 
political methodology. An “ideal” theory of justice is supposed to be an inspiring and 
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demanding vision of the just society that can aid political reform in an action-guiding manner. 
The term was coined by Rawls in Theory.152 His well-ordered society is supposed to be just 
such an inspiring vision.153 
A theorise can idealise on various dimensions. As we have already seen Rawls idealises along 
the dimension of compliance. He imagines a well-ordered society in which all fully comply 
with its directives.154 Laura Valentini helpfully identifies two further dimensions in which a 
normative political theory might be idealised.155 One dimension of idealisation refers to 
whether the theory aims to identify a perfectly just “end-state” as opposed, more modestly, 
to instances of concrete injustice requiring reform. The latter alternative to end-state 
theorising is helpfully sketched out by Amartya Sen. He famously argues that Rawlsian end-
state theory is neither necessary to combat concrete instances of injustice nor sufficient 
since the former’s distance from day-to-day political realities means it provides little or no 
action-guiding help in combatting such injustices.156 The other dimension is the degree to 
which the content of the theory of justice incorporates real-world “factual constraints”. The 
more the theory’s prescriptions make allowances for factual and contextual constraints, the 
more non-ideal it would be on this dimension. From this perspective Rawls’ theory of justice 
is actually less idealised than that of a figure like Gerald Cohen. While the latter insists that 
the content of justice must be “fact-independent,” Rawls does allow certain factual 
constraints to determine the content of his two principles of justice.157 One such constraint 
being the fact of moderate scarcity.158 The assumption being that a theory of justice 
premised on the absence of scarcity – Marx’s second stage of socialism for instance – would 
not be practically useful for the kind of world that we inhabit.   
Now, much of the criticism of ideal theory, particularly in its Rawlsian variant, has focused 
on the implausibility of full compliance. It is often argued that the pervasiveness of ethical 
disagreement as well as sheer self-interest in political life renders implausible any theory of 
justice that assumes their absence. As previously mentioned, the emergent view defended 
in this thesis assumes away compliance problems to highlight the epistemic shortcomings of 
 
152 (Rawls 1999, 7–8). While Rawls coined the term, he quite obviously did not innovate the approach. 
Philosophers and social thinkers have concerned themselves with outlining inspiring visions of 
normatively perfect societies since at least Plato.  
153 Thus we might say that for Rawls, the implementation of an ideal theory of justice is the object of 
collective political agency.  
154 (Rawls 1999, 215–16; 7–8) c.f. (Rawls 2001, 66) 
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Rawls’ approach to political philosophy. In this regard it is similar to other Hayekian-inspired 
critiques of ideal theory prevalent in the literature. The nub of these critiques, however, 
similar to that of Sen, have been on end-state idealisation. They point out that the theorist 
cannot know what the perfectly just society would like. End-state theories of justice beg the 
epistemic question posed by Hayek’s thesis as to the fragmentation of knowledge in a large-
scale society. Just as no one can aggregate the necessary knowledge to plan the production 
and distribution of goods and services in a complex economy, no one can aggregate the 
necessary knowledge to furnish a blueprint of perfectly just institutions. What we require 
are classical liberal meta-institutions which in utilising dispersed knowledge can help us 
discover which principles or institutions are the most just.159   
The emergent view of political society is not in tension with these other Hayekian-inspired 
critiques. However, it takes a different tact. On the emergent view, a further epistemic 
barrier to attaining ideal theory would remain even if we knew for sure the correct end-state 
theory of perfect justice. The remaining barrier would be the inability of citizens to co-
ordinate their actions to attain this given end due to the fragmentation of knowledge in a 
large-scale society. In terms of Valentini’s typology, the emergent view criticises ideal theory 
not so much for positing an end-state of justice but for overlooking epistemic, factual 
constraints on the ability of citizens to harmonise their intentions and actions. Quite separate 
from the difficulty of identifying what the given ends of political reform should be, the 
problem on the emergent view is that there is no collective, identifiable agent for whom such 
a theory could be action-guiding. There is no practicable duty-bearer for ideal theory. This 
last claim will be elaborated upon in greater detail in the next chapter.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
159 The aforementioned works of Gaus (2019) and Pennington (2011) provide versions of this critique, 
as do Adam Tebble’s account of “epistemic liberalism” (2016a) and Nozick’s (2012 [1974]) famous 
meta-utopia in the last third of Anarchy, State and Utopia.  
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Chapter Two: “Rawlsekianism” – a Critique 
 
Abstract 
The prior chapter attempted to drive a wedge between the Hayekian and Rawlsian 
understandings of political society. The emergent understanding derived from Hayek’s 
thought emphasises the undesigned and spontaneous nature of political institutions. The 
associational understanding exemplified by Rawls emphasises that just political institutions 
stem from the collective political agency of liberal citizens. Some contemporary classical 
liberals have adopted a more conciliatory approach, combining Hayekian insights about 
emergent social phenomena with Rawlsian justificatory ambitions. This chapter considers 
and critiques two such attempts at a reconciliatory approach, those offered by John Tomasi 
and Gerald Gaus. The central claim is that institutional systems, like the order of interactions 
to which they give rise, are emergent phenomena. They cannot be made to accord with the 
shared intentions of the citizenry.  
 
Introduction 
 
“Rawlsekianism” was a term coined by Brink Lindsey in an op-ed for the New Republic 
magazine on Decemeber 11 2006. At the time, Lindsey was vice president for research at the 
classical liberal US think tank, The Cato Institute. Lindsey calls on his fellow classical liberals 
to abandon their “fusionist” political alliance with conservatives and instead seek common 
ground with the progressive left. After noting some overlap between “libertarian” and 
“progressive” policy stances, he says that a nascent alliance between these groups should be 
one that, “at the philosophical level, seeks some kind of reconciliation between Hayek and 
Rawls”.160 A colleague of Lindsey and ideological fellow traveller, Will Wilkinson, would dub 
this nascent philosophical view, “Rawlsekianism,” the aim of which is “to fortify Rawls’ theory 
of justice with a Hayekian grasp of the coordinating function of prices, and the dynamics of 
spontaneous order”.161 As a political movement, for better or for worse, the movement does 
not appear to have gotten very far. However, several contemporary classical liberal 
philosophers are working in a “Rawlsekian” framework as it is defined by Wilkinson. Jason 
Brennan and John Tomasi have given this philosophical framework the more formal 
academic title of “neo-classical liberalism”.162 It behoves this thesis to explain why it has not 
adopted this framework.  
 
160 (Lindsey 2006) 
161 (Wilkinson 2006) 
162 (Brennan and Tomasi 2012) 
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This chapter thus considers two of the leading attempts to reconcile Rawls and Hayek, those 
of John Tomasi and Gerald Gaus respectively. Tomasi’s approach is based on a sharp 
distinction between institutional rules and the outcomes – the “order of actions” in Hayek’s 
terminology – which they engender. On Tomasi’s reading of Hayek, we cannot directly 
engineer the order of actions because we lack the requisite knowledge. They are necessarily 
emergent phenomena. However, we can affect the order of actions indirectly via 
modification of the institutional rules under which agents operate. Tomasi thus reads 
Hayek’s view as being very similar to Rawls, for whom the subject of social justice is the basic 
structure of institutional rules rather than the outcomes they engender. Tomasi’s approach, 
then, is to socially engineer the basic structure to make maximal use of emergent ordering 
forces. Thus, collective political agency is still possible under this Rawlsian construal of 
Hayekian ideas, save that we must, as indeed does Rawls, restrict our focus to the basic rules 
and not try to directly engineer outcomes. Tomasi terms this approach, “market democracy”.  
This chapter criticises Tomasi’s view on the grounds that one cannot insulate the design of 
institutions from Hayek’s knowledge problem. It argues against the concept of a societal 
“basic structure” that can be systemically reformed according to a synoptic conception of 
justice. Instead, it argues that institutional rule-making and enforcement in impersonal 
liberal societies is in practice polycentric. There is no Archimedean point from which the basic 
structure of rules can be reformed. On the view presented here, both the institutional rules 
and the outcomes which they engender are emergent phenomena. Emergence, we might 
say, runs all the way down. Gerald Gaus takes a different tack to Tomasi. He, like this chapter, 
sees both institutional rules and the outcomes they engender as emergent phenomena. 
However, Gaus tries to claim that institutional rules can emerge spontaneously through 
human action and not design but nonetheless be seen as a collective political choice. For 
Gaus, we have consented to rules for whose spontaneous emergence and entrenchment our 
actions were causally necessary even if we did not intend those rules to be dominant. This 
thesis chapter criticises Gaus’ view by arguing that the unintended nature of emergent 
phenomena cannot be squared with the intentionality necessary for genuine consent.  
The argument to follow is divided into six sections. Since the reconciliatory approach stems 
in part from the limitations of Hayek’s critique of social justice, the first section begins with 
a brief summary of that claim and the debate it inspired. Hayek’s critique of social justice did 
little to question the necessity and possibility of institutional design and focused its ire on 
those understandings of social justice that aimed directly for patterned distributive 
outcomes. Section one concurs with Hayek’s critics that his critique has little to say to 
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conceptions of social justice focused on institutional rules and situates Tomasi’s fusion of 
Hayek with Rawls within the context of that debate. However, sections 2-5 try to show that 
Hayek’s knowledge problem can be applied to questions of institutional design in a manner 
that poses a more fundamental challenge to the Rawlsian framework. To this end, the second 
section shows how Rawlsian justice presupposes a monocentric source of authority that can 
act upon and reform institutional rules holistically. The third and fourth sections critique this 
assumption. The third argues that the state is not the only source of major institutional rules 
in the social order. Private governance and informal social norms are among the other 
sources of rule-making and -enforcing authority. The fourth argues that the state itself is 
better seen a network of partially independent agencies rather than a tightly controlled 
hierarchy that acts and speaks with one legislative voice. The upshot is that there is no agency 
that can holistically and systemically reform institutional rules in the manner presupposed 
by the Rawlsian framework. Section four closes by showing that this critique undermines 
even John Tomasi’s classical liberal construal of Rawlsian justice.  
Sections five and six turn to Gerald Gaus’ version of the reconciliation strategy. Section five 
details Gaus’ argument that spontaneously emergent institutional rules have been 
consented to by those whose actions were casually necessary for their emergence. Section 
six critiques Gaus’ argument and also responds to two responses he might make. The nub of 
our critique is that Gaus conflates Humean acquiescence with more demanding notions of 
consent and intentional agency. Finally, I do not claim the construal of Hayekian ideas 
presented here to be exegetically accurate of Hayek’s own views. Those who see Hayek and 
Rawls as fellow travellers can muster ample exegetical evidence that Hayek himself was on 
their side, though in the latter part of his career he evinced greater scepticism about our 
ability to design liberal institutions, as we saw in the previous chapter. The argument of this 
chapter is closer to the spirit of the later Hayek. Still, this is a Hayekian argument that departs 
from some of Hayek’s own claims and works.  
 
1. The Limitations of Hayek’s Critique of Social Justice 
Hayek’s critique of social justice in the second volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty, The 
Mirage of Social Justice, is directed principally at one type of such theory, namely, one which 
requires the distribution of income to track the moral desert of persons. This is peculiar 
target given that such theories are not the only or even the most prominent accounts of 
social justice within the academy. I believe Hayek’s critique was aimed at more popular 
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intuitions one finds in conventional political discourse.  What he had in mind, I think, was the 
popular complaint one hears in market societies that it is unfair that members of morally 
upright professions, teaching or nursing say, earn so much less than professions considered 
less upright, such as banking or estate agency. Hayek considerers these intuitions to be 
atavistic holdovers from the ethic of the small tribal group. In such proximate settings, where 
we can reliably predict the impact our actions will have on our fellows and where we have 
concrete knowledge of their conduct, it is feasible to enforce a conception of justice 
patterned on desert.163 In a large-scale social order, however, we lack information as to the 
merit of most of our peers.164 Therefore, we lack the epistemic capability to implement 
patterned conceptions of justice. At bottom for Hayek, such sentiments reflect a 
misunderstanding of the emergent nature of market distributions and a naïve, 
anthropomorphic belief that incomes must be consciously decided by a central agency.165  
This is not to say that market outcomes will be arbitrary. Well-functioning markets will tend 
to allocate income to those who utilise their abilities in ways that are useful to others.166 
However, the usefulness of one’s talents to others in a diverse society will at best weakly 
track their moral worthiness, if “worthiness” here means the degree of effort one has put in 
or hardship they have experienced. In David Schmidtz’s characterisation of Hayek’s view, a 
free society rewards outputs rather than inputs.167 In addition, since we lack the capacity to 
directly determine market outcomes, Hayek claims that it is conceptually incoherent to 
evaluate them as just or unjust: 
Strictly speaking, only human conduct can be called just or unjust. If we apply the 
terms to a state of affairs, they have meaning only in so far as we hold someone 
responsible for bringing it about or allowing it to come about. A bare fact, or a state 
of affairs which nobody can change, may be good or bad, but not just or unjust.168 
 
From this premise it follows straightforwardly that the emergent distributions of income we 
see on the market cannot be just or unjust. If ought-implies-can but we cannot directly 
engineer market distributions, then social justice so understood is indeed a mirage.  
 
There has been a voluminous literature on Hayek’s critique. It is fair to say that his view has 
generally not been well received. Some of the criticisms, I believe, are misplaced. Many argue 
 
163 (Hayek 1982b, 90) 
164 (Hayek 2006 [1960], 83) 
165 (Hayek 1982b, 62–64) 
166 (Hayek 2006 [1960], 82–85) 
167 (Schmidtz 2016) 
168 (Hayek 1982b, 31) 
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against Hayek by pointing to cases where individuals have ex-post duties towards others who 
have been wronged or are in distress. Under such circumstances the duty-bearer has 
obligations to assist despite bearing no responsibility for the original suffering or distress. 
Thus Raymond Plant points out that a bystander acts unjustly if they do not help an elderly 
person who has fallen into the gutter on a windy day.169 Eric Mack observes that one can 
come to possess stolen goods unknowingly but still have duties of rectification to the 
owner.170 I do not think these criticisms hit the mark. Hayek is not denying that I can 
sometimes be held responsible to change state of affairs which I did not intended or whose 
occurrence I had nothing to do with. Hayek’s claim is that I can only be responsible for things 
that are in my capacity to change. These individually-focused case studies clearly show duty-
bearers with such a capacity. They do not refer to “state of affairs which nobody can change”. 
By contrast, Hayek’s claim is that there is no agent or agency capable of directly engineering 
distributive outcomes on the market to accord with desert, even one who reacts ex-post.  
 
A more substantial difficulty for Hayek’s view, however, is the aforementioned fact that not 
all or even the most prominent theories of justice aim to directly bring about a particular 
distribution. This is certainly not the Rawlsian strategy. Rawls famously says that his theory 
of justice is an instance of pure procedural justice – “there is a correct or fair procedure such 
that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has 
been properly followed”.171 He goes on to issue the following remark that could forgivably 
me mistook as one of Hayek’s: “[i]f it is asked in the abstract whether one distribution of a 
given stock of things to definite individuals with known desires and preferences is better than 
another, then there is simply no answer to this question”.172 The site of Rawlsian justice is 
the basic structure under which private decision-making takes place. If the basic structure is 
just so ipso facto is any resultant distribution. Indeed Hayek himself claims to be in 
fundamental agreement with Rawls’ approach to justice. In The Mirage of Social Justice he 
writes that he has “no basic quarrel” with Rawls for precisely this reason.173 Once Hayek 
makes this concession, however, his critique of social justice, if construed more broadly than 
the narrow target of principles aiming for a direct distribution, appears to lose its bite. What’s 
more, as we saw in chapter one, Hayek himself concedes that we can make broad-based if 
 
169 (Plant 1994, 171) 
170 (Mack 2018, 98–99); for other variants of this critique see Johnston (1997, 610) and Lister (2013, 
412–13) 
171 (Rawls 1999, 75); emphasis added.  
172 (Rawls 1999, 76) 
173 (Hayek 1982b, 100) 
60 
 
not fine-grained predictions about the operation of different institutional rules. This belief is 
reflected in the many proposals in his own writings to improve the spontaneous workings of 
liberal society by reforming its institutional rules. If Hayek concedes that we are capable of 
reforming institutional rules and have at least some ability to predict the effects of those 
changes, then he appears to offer no categorical critique of social justice as understood in 
the dominant Rawlsian sense, an observation made by many critics.174 Indeed, in one of his 
discussions of Rawls he even concedes that that there “exists a genuine problem of justice 
in connection with the deliberate design of political institutions”. In the same passage he also 
offers a thought experiment extremely similar to the original position as a device with which 
we can engage in comparative institutional evaluation.175 It seems, then, that Hayek is a 
Rawlsian after all.    
 
Now, if this is accepted, it doesn’t follow that Hayek has nothing to say to Rawls. The 
Hayekian can accept the general Rawlsian framework while tempering some of Rawls’ 
specific proposals on the basis of Hayek’s epistemic concerns.176 It is against this backdrop in 
the academic debate that, I think, we can understand John Tomasi’s insightful proposal to 
combine a Rawlsian justificatory approach to social institutions with a Hayekian appreciation 
of the importance of spontaneous ordering in achieving social goals.177 He terms this 
proposal “market democracy”. His proposal amounts to a classical liberal construal of Rawls’ 
conception of justice as fairness. The central proposition is that economic liberties should be 
regarded as basic and consequently deserving of strong constitutional protection along with 
the civil and expressive liberties normally favoured by left-liberals. Though there are also 
other policy programmes.178 Running throughout Tomasi’s analysis is a Hayekian scepticism 
about the effectiveness of securing social goals directly through institutional guarantees.179 
Instead, he argues that Rawlsian aims are best attained by the indirect method of securing 
basic liberties, including economic ones, and allowing spontaneous ordering forces to 
 
174 Versions of this objection have been advanced, among others, by Miller (2003, 108), Lister (2013, 
423) and Lukes (1997, 78). 
175 (Hayek 1982b, 132) 
176 For example, the lack of counterfactual knowledge means that we’ll never truly know if the 
difference principle has been met.  
177 I refer here to his Free-Market Fairness (2013)  
178 These include government funding (though not provision) of education and health care (2013, 243-
244), constitutionally enforced constraints on government borrowing and fixed monetary expansion 
rules (2013, 255), free trade and open immigration (2013, 261-262), a basic income (2013, 230) and 
even possibly affirmative action (2013, 310). 
179 See particularly Tomasi (2013, chap. 7).   
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operate.180 Spontaneous order is, in Tomasi’s words, a “strategy of social construction” in 
achieving social justice.181 Far from being incompatible, Hayekian and Rawlsian liberalisms 
are complementary on Tomasi’s score.  
 
The inadequacy of Hayek’s own critique of social justice notwithstanding, his knowledge 
problem poses a deeper challenge to the associational understanding of political society than 
implied by Tomasi’s proposal. In unearthing this challenge, we can again make note of 
Hayek’s changing attitude towards deliberate institutional design as his career progresses. 
Compared with his early work, the Hayek of Law, Legislation and Liberty and The Fatal 
Conceit is much more likely to describe the rules of just conduct as themselves emergent 
phenomena. The remainder of this chapter will build on Hayek’s later scepticism. To say that 
social justice is not about the distribution of goods and services to particular persons but the 
design of institutional rules merely pushes back the epistemic worry. Given the 
fragmentation of knowledge between numerous and heterogeneous actors in large-scale 
societies, why should we think that the complex structure of rules and norms under which 
they interact can be holistically designed to effect social justice? We shall develop and 
articulate this argument in sections 2-4.  
 
2. The Implicit Monocentricity of the Basic Structure 
 
Firstly it is important to see that the Rawlsian idea of a basic structure presumes the 
existence of an authority with the capacity to reform the major institutional rules of a society 
systemically. That is the task of this section. I borrow from North, Wallis and Weingast the 
following broad definition of institutions.  
Institutions are the “rules of the game” . . .  the patterns of interaction that govern 
and constrain the relationships of individuals. Institutions include formal rules, 
written laws, formal social conventions, informal norms of behaviour, and shared 
beliefs about the world, as well as the means of enforcement.182 
What is helpful about this definition is that it includes not simply formal laws but also extends 
to conventions and norms. The importance of this will become apparent in the argument to 
follow.  
 
180 (Tomasi 2013, chap. 8) 
181 (Tomasi 2013, xvii) 
182 (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, 15) 
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The defining characteristic of Rawls’ “basic structure” is that it refers to the major institutions 
of a society understood as a unitary system.183 As we saw in chapter one, examples of the 
institutions that comprise such a system include “the legal protection of freedom of thought 
and liberty of conscience, competitive markets, private property in the means of production, 
and the monogamous family”.184 This emphasis is not incidental to Rawls’ project. It is the 
manner in which these institutions combine with one another to produce a profound, 
pervasive and crucially differential effect on citizen life chances that is important for Rawls. 
If we are worried about the causes of such inequality, we cannot simply focus on the 
operation of the education system in isolation from, say, the distribution of healthcare and 
in turn we cannot think about these without considering, say, the operation of the tax 
system. Unequal life chances are a product of how the system of rules operates rather than 
simply the operation of its bare institutional components. Our efforts at institutional reform, 
by the same token, should be systemic. Piecemeal and disconnected interventions on 
specific parts of the system would be insufficient. This is the idea Rawls is trying to express 
when he says that the basic structure is the primary subject of a conception of justice. 
Indeed, he says that justice as fairness sets up an “[a]rchimedean point for assessing the 
social system”.185 Tomasi appears to agree with Rawls that a conception of justice applies to 
“the social order as a whole”.186 This is a task for which he thinks a classical liberal conception 
of justice is better suited than those preferred by Rawls and other left-liberals. 
This Rawlsian aspiration, however, is feasible only if we assume a central pole of authority 
that is capable not just of reforming all major institutional rules but doing so in a coordinated 
manner. Each intervention will be but one step in a larger plan to make the system of rules 
accord with the wished-for conception of justice. To borrow a term from Vincent Ostrom, it 
presupposes a monocentric source of institutional rule-making and reform.187 Against this, I 
wish to argue that rule-making authority in large-scale societies is fundamentally polycentric. 
There are many sources of institutional rules.  Since no one authority has a monopoly on 
their production, none have the power of wholesale reform over the system of institutional 
rules holistically understood. Further, Hayek’s knowledge problem places stern limits on the 
ability of these centres of authority to directly coordinate their rule-making activities such 
 
183 It refers to the manner in which major social institutions are “taken together as one scheme” (Rawls 
1999, 6); or “fit together into one unified system of cooperation” (Rawls 1996, 22); or “fit together 
into one system of social cooperation” (Rawls 2001, 10). Emphasis added.  
184 (Rawls 1999, 6) 
185 (Rawls 1999, 230–32) 
186 (Tomasi 2013, xiv) 
187 (Ostrom 1972, 3–5) 
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that they accord with a normative blueprint. Since the system of rules is the product of the 
rule-making authority of many actors and sources, it cannot be the subject of any synoptic 
design.188  
Some further clarifications are in order at this stage. We should distinguish between the 
claim that we can normatively evaluate a system of institutional rules and the claim that we 
can comprehensively reform them. Hayek appears to deny the former claim in his later 
work.189 This chapter does not. We can safely evaluate the system of rules in Sweden as much 
better than those in North Korea. This is not to deny however, as scholars in the discipline of 
development have highlighted, that identifying institutional systems that are better than the 
status quo and successful reform in that direction are two quite different things.190 For ease 
of exposition, I will from now on just refer to “institutions” or “institutional rules” rather than 
adding the “holistic” or “systemic” adjectives. The over-arching focus on the system of rules 
should make clear that particular agents or agencies are capable of changing particular rules 
and these decisions often have a predictable impact on particular actors. Barnet Borough 
Council has recently increased its council tax rates and as a resident of the Borough of Barnet 
I can personally testify that the decision has had an impact. I am also not denying that the 
decisions of some actors can have a great deal more impact on the system of rules than 
others. The decisions made by the House of Commons has much more impact on the system 
of institutional rules of Great Britain than those made by Barnet Borough Council. Still, the 
claim is that there is no one locus of agency that can alter the whole system of rules as it 
likes.191  
 
188 I offer then an Ostromian construal of Hayek’s ideas. While Michael Polanyi coined the term, the 
notion of a “polycentric order” of overlapping but independent rule-making jurisdictions was 
developed extensively by the Ostroms e.g. Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom (1972). The difference is that 
the Ostromian project, as I understand it, was to argue for the empirical and normative benefits of 
institutional alternatives that are more polycentric than prevailing structures. I am instead 
emphasising that already-prevailing institutional structures are more polycentric than is often 
assumed.  
189 In the second volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty (1982b, 24) Hayek claims that rational 
evaluation can only be “immanent” to a particular system of rules. That is, our rational evaluation is 
ever limited to evaluating a proposed new rule or a proposed amendment to an existing rule on 
grounds of its compatibility with the other pre-existing rules in the system. On this strongly coherentist 
view, one lacks a rational basis to step back and rationally evaluate the system of rules taken as a 
whole. 
190 On this see Easterly (2007). 
191 I am grateful to Selina Hofstetter whose forceful objections made me clarify this point.  
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The monocentric source of authority presumed by Rawlsian and other advocates of 
comprehensive institutional change is the state. David Miller puts the point well when he 
writes that theories of social justice presume: 
… that there is some agency capable of changing the institutional structure more or 
less the way our favored theory demands. It is no use setting out principles for 
reforming the basic structure if in fact we have no means to implement these 
reforms. The main agency here is obviously the state: theories of social justice 
propose legislative and policy changes that a well-intentioned state is supposed to 
introduce.192  
Further, Rawlsians and others presume that the state-in-question is a liberal democratic one. 
I will thus spend the next two sections arguing that the capacity of the liberal democratic 
state to comprehensively reform institutional rules is greatly exaggerated. I will claim in 
section three that the state is not the only maker and enforcer of fundamental institutional 
rules and in section four that the state itself is not a unitary agency so much as a network of 
agencies and groups many of whom have autonomous decision-making power. 
 
3. Against Legal Centralism 
Many political theorists and social scientists subscribe to the doctrine of legal centralism. 
This is the view that the state is the only important creator and enforcer of institutional rules, 
without which we could manage at best minimal social coordination.193 There are strong 
reasons to think that the doctrine of legal centralism is mistaken. For one thing, any 
associationally complex society will have multiple rule-making and -enforcing authorities. To 
varying degrees, homeowners associations, universities, churches, professional bodies, trade 
unions, corporations, shopping centres, night clubs and so on will create rules that would 
bind members and those resident on their property. Many will also have internal procedures 
for settling conflicts and changing the content of their rules. Some of these associations, such 
as the Catholic Church, are very complex associations indeed.194 The Rawlsian will 
immediately respond that the basic structure does not directly refer to the internal 
governance of such associations but to more fundamental rules that form the background 
 
192 (Miller 2003, 6); emphasis added. I am grateful to Billy Christmas for pointing me to this reference.  
For an excellent review of how the state is either implicitly or explicitly presumed to be the agent of 
comprehensive institutional change in contemporary political theory, inclusive of Rawls as well as 
other theorists, and an argument as to why this is an unjustified methodological presumption, see 
Christmas and Byas (2019). 
193 (Ellickson 1991, 4, 138–47); (Brennan 2018, 238–40) 
194 I draw here on Jacob Levy’s Rationalism, Pluralism and Freedom (2016a).  
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against which all associations and persons operate. Examples might be rules demarcating 
property rights, contract law and the provision of public goods. Surely, the Rawlsian will 
object, these fundamental rules are created and enforced by states and can be revised as 
necessary in the pursuit of social justice.195  
Even with respect to these kinds of rules, however, the legal centralist position is weaker 
than it initially appears. Take the governance of international trade.  Peter Leeson documents 
that 90% of international commercial contracts contain clauses stipulating that any 
subsequent dispute should be settled by a private arbitration agency. There are over one 
hundred such agencies ranging from the London Court of International Arbitration to the 
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. He also observes that there is 
no formal or universal body of international trade law. The parties have to select the body of 
law with which any dispute will be settled. These range from the evolved customary law of 
the Lex Mercatoria to any national body of law.196 Thus, there is neither a single source nor 
enforcer of the rules governing international trade. Edward Stringham has documented how 
in both the past and more recent times the basic rules governing market exchange have often 
been produced by private actors. The rules governing the first stock exchanges in Britain and 
Holland were formulated and enforced endogenously by the exchanges themselves since 
state actors would refuse to enforce what they saw as immoral gambling.197 Today, many 
consumer e-commerce transactions are facilitated by the privately produced rules and 
regulations of financial intermediaries such as Paypal, Visa or Ebay.198 International financial 
markets also rely a great deal on privately produced rules. For example, the contractual rules 
for complex over-the-counter financial derivatives are created by an international trade 
organisation, The International Swaps and Derivatives Association.199 Stringham is also 
sceptical of the “shadow-of-the-state” thesis that these rules are enforceable only because 
the parties can ultimately turn to the state. As with the early stock markets, states sometimes 
refuse to enforce privately produced rules. Other times, state actors do not know how to 
enforce rules governing markets of which they have little knowledge. Still at other times the 
 
195 Such is the view developed and defended by Murphy and Nagel (2002) in their The Myth of 
Ownership: Taxes and Justice. 
196 (Leeson 2008) 
197 (Stringham 2015, chaps. 4 & 5) 
198 (Stringham 2015, chapter 7); of course there are markets which rely on state-enforced law. Those 
markets reliant on stringent intellectual property rights might be an example. The point here is that 
this is not as general a truth as often assumed.  
199 (Stringham 2015, 179–83) 
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volumes of transactions are so high but the unit value of each is so low that it is impractical 
to turn to the state for every instance of wrong-doing.200  
Robert Ellickson has documented case studies of market actors governing themselves 
through informally generated social norms. These actors range from international whalers 
to Californian ranchers. 201 He suggests that social and commercial life might be governed by 
informal norms to a much greater extent than one might assume from a legal centrist 
perspective. He cites empirical research showing that ordinary people “know little of the 
private substantive law applicable to decisions in everyday life”. For example, 96 per cent of 
Californian therapists did not know of an important California Supreme Court ruling that 
dealt with therapist tort duties in instances where their patients had uttered threats against 
third parties.202 If market agents are often unaware of the legal rulings that are supposed to 
govern their exchanges, this suggests that their impact might be more limited than is often 
assumed. As for public goods, Elinor Ostrom has famously documented many cases of 
communities around the world establishing and enforcing their own rules with respect to the 
provision of local public goods.203 Even with regard to the most basic of state functions, we 
find that states do not always have a monopoly on the creation and enforcement of 
institutional rules. David Skarbek has documented how the United States has effectively 
outsourced the internal governance of most of its prison system to prison gangs, many of 
whom have their own explicit constitutions to which new members have to agree upon 
joining.204 None of this is meant to deny that state law-making has a very substantial impact 
on the composition of institutional rules in any social order. Rather, to borrow a phrase from 
Jason Brennan, the “marginal value of public governance” is much less than one might 
assume.205  
It might be objected that these examples merely show instances where the state has 
unnecessarily ceded power to other actors. All they demonstrate is the need for stronger 
state institutions that can “rationalise” the social space by bringing these plural and disparate 
source of authority under its control.206 However, there is an epistemic reason to think that 
state actors will have to cede significant amounts of de-facto decision-making power to other 
 
200 (Stringham 2015, chap. 1) 
201 (Ellickson 1991) 
202 (Ellickson 1991, 145) 
203 (Ostrom 1990) 
204 (Skarbek 2011) 
205 (Brennan 2018) 
206 The notion of the rationalising state that incorporates intermediate sources of authority is explored 
by Jacob Levy (2016a) in his Rationalism, Pluralism and Freedom. 
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actors. The production of institutional rules for complex societies faces a knowledge problem 
analogous to that facing economic coordination.207 Different domains of social life require 
different rules depending on local circumstances and the state is often poorly placed to 
assess these compared with actors on the ground. Private arbitration, to take an example, is 
popular in complex commercial contracts because the parties typically require agencies who 
have specialist knowledge of their business sector. Universities decide upon and enforce 
their own scholarly standards because they, rather than state officials, have the best 
understanding of them.208 Further indication of this epistemic deficit comes from the fact 
that when states do appropriate the authority of non-state bodies, they often replicate the 
institutional rules already built up by associations and practitioners on the ground. When the 
US Federal Government implemented the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 and 1934, for 
example, it “simply mandated many of the requirements that the New York Stock Exchange 
had already adopted”.209 David Green and David Beito demonstrate that many of the 
functions performed by the contemporary welfare state were already pioneered by 19th 
century worker-run mutual aid societies.210  
It is also worth taking further note of informal social norms as a particularly important 
alternative authority to the state. The topic of social norms has gained prominence among 
political theorists and social scientists in recent years. Christina Bicchieri’s high profile 
account defines social norms as default rules of behaviour to which agents conform because 
they believe that a sufficiently large subset of their peers follow the norm and that a 
sufficiently large subset of their peers normatively expect them to follow it.211 Such social 
norms, then, are enforced in the first instance not by the threat of legal sanction by the 
reciprocal expectations of compliance by community members. There is no doubt that states 
sometimes have the power to change social norms by legislative action. The rapid change in 
social norms with respect to drink-driving following state campaigns might be a good 
example of this. More often than not, however, social norms constrain the legislative ability 
of states such that laws in tension with social norms are not widely followed. Thus, Bicchieri 
observes that a range of programmes in the developing world, from those designed to 
prevent child marriage to educating girls to inducing communities to build and use latrines 
 
207 Here we are combining Hayek’s insights with those of Ostrom (1990). 
208 To take a more concrete example, Stringham documents how the private firm PayPal had to 
develop its own risk-management tool to deal with fraud simply because officials at the FBI had very 
little knowledge of the internet or their business model. (Stringham 2015, chap. 7) 
209 (Stringham 2015, 81) 
210 (Green 1993); (Beito 2000)  
211 (Bicchieri 2006, 5) 
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have failed because they were not in keeping with local social norms.212 The failure of various 
Western states’ attempts to wage “wars” on drugs might be interpreted in a similar light. 
The prohibition against drugs cuts against the social norms of large swathes of the 
population.  
The argument thus far is consistent with Adam Smith’s famous critique of the “man of 
system”. He thinks “he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much 
ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board” but does not consider 
that on “the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion 
of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might chuse to impress upon 
it”.213 The man of system overlooks that he is but one of many rule-making and -enforcing 
authorities in the social order. These other agencies have a “principle of motion” of their 
own. This alone, I think, is enough to undermine the Rawlsian thought that we can 
comprehensively reform the basic structure from some Archimedean point. However, we 
can go further than this. The idea of a singular man of system is itself an abstraction. The 
state is not a unitary actor but closer to being a polycentric network of partially independent 
agencies and actors.  
 
4. The State as a Polycentric Network 
Consider three ways we might model the state:  
1. Leviathan – a singular and all-powerful actor.  
2. Corporate organisation – a hierarchically-structured organisation led by a centralised 
decision-making body i.e. a legislative chamber. 
3. Network – an interrelated and decentred network of agencies, each with significant 
discretionary power and autonomy. 
 
The Leviathan model, dating back to Hobbes, is a popular way of modelling the state, 
manifestations of which include the “revenue-maximizing monarch, a stationary bandit, or a 
single-actor ‘representative agent’”.214 We might conceive of such an agent as an all-
 
212 (Bicchieri 2006, 48) 
213 Cited in Levy (2016a, 66–67). I here follow Levy’s reading that the “pieces” with their own “principle 
of motion” are not the bakers, brewers and butchers from Smith’s other famous metaphor but distinct 
rule-making authorities.  
214 (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, 17) 
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powerful actor who can intervene exogenously upon the system of rules. It is probably this 
understanding of the state that is most conducive to the Rawlsian aspiration of wholesale 
institutional reform. Whatever its theoretical utility in certain contexts, it is neither 
sociologically nor empirically realistic and I think we can safely discard it here. I suspect that 
most political theorists have the organisational model in mind. This is certainly more 
empirically realistic. We picture an organisation at the apex of society with legislative 
authority to reform existing institutions. Note that the state as organisation is already 
constrained in its ability to effect reform compared with the state as leviathan. Such a state 
is no longer an all-powerful entity exogenous to the institutional rules of the game but a 
bureaucratic organisation whose operations are, in part, constrained by those rules. Its 
operation might be constrained by a separation of powers for instance. To the extent that it 
is so constrained, its ability to reform the institutions holistically will be so constrained. I 
however wish to go further and claim that the state itself is closer to a network of actors than 
a unitary organisation controlled by a legislative centre.215  
 
The term “state” is a short hand for a network of different agencies. These agencies are 
functionally differentiated, consisting of executive, legislative, judicial, administrative, 
defence and welfare bodies. Internally each of these bodies will be further differentiated into 
sub-functions. For example, the judicial system in the United Kingdom consists of the 
Supreme Court, criminal courts, civil and family courts and so on. State agencies are also 
hierarchically differentiated. There are local, central and indeed international government 
bodies. For example, citizens of the United States can be subject to the laws of the United 
States Congress, state legislatures, city governments, municipal governments and county 
governments, not to mention native-American tribal governments. The welfare or regulatory 
arms of contemporary states, particularly, consist of a vast number of agencies and 
organisations. Under the rubric of the “British State” one can find the National Health 
Service, the British Broadcasting Corporation, The British Military, the Department for 
Education, The British Police force, the Secret Intelligence Service or “MI6”, The Security 
 
215 A couple caveats are in order at this juncture. First, the analysis to follow is restricted to liberal 
democratic states chiefly because that is the sort of institution that Rawlsians and others think should 
implement social justice. Though much of the analysis below is applicable also to non-democratic 
and/or non-liberal states whose activities are large in scale and complex in scope. Second, the 
argument to follow is applicable to state institutions as we find them in typical nation states such as 
the United Kingdom or the United States whose populations run into the millions and in which the 
scale of state activity is commensurately large. It may not apply to smaller states such as Monaco or 
the Vatican. At the same time, Rawls and other advocates of social justice also have these larger states 
in mind and do not restrict their claims to smaller outlier states.  
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Service or “MI5” and The Bank of England just to name a few.216 There is a reasonable case 
also that we should include among the agencies of the state some nominally private entities. 
The distinction between “public” and “private” is not always clear-cut. For example, when 
states outsource or privatise a function but continue to regulate the entities that take over 
those functions, the status of those entities becomes unclear. It is not obvious whether, say, 
firms in the United Kingdom’s highly regulated private rail network are “private” or “public” 
organisations. However, the analysis to follow will focus on “formal” state agencies, thus it 
will even downplay the complexity of the network of state institutions.  
 
Several considerations can be offered in support of the contention that these various entities 
are closer to a network of agencies, each with a “principle of motion of its own”, than a 
unified hierarchy controlled by a legislative centre. The first is democracy. At any one point 
in time, different branches of the state will be composed of the representatives of different 
parties. Over time, the composition of different branches will change from election-to-
election. Whether viewed at a particular moment-in-time or diachronically over time, the 
legislative output of states will be a function of the representatives of different political 
parties with often incommensurable if not directly opposed aims. Nor can we say that the 
outputs of legislative chambers straightforwardly reflect the intentions of any actors. As 
Jeremy Waldron has observed, the divergent and incommensurable views of individual 
legislators means that they often can’t directly agree on the content of legislation. Instead, 
they fall back on procedural rules that can yield collective legislative outputs from the 
variegated inputs of individual legislators. The upshot, however, is that “under the conditions 
of modern legislation, it is often implausible to describe legislative acts as intentional acts”. 
Instead we should see legislation as an “artificial resultant of the acts of individual legislators, 
structured and related to one another through certain procedures, decision-functions and 
perhaps machines”.217 Waldron’s radical thesis is that much contemporary state legislation 
is the result of the human actions of many legislators but not any overall design.218  
 
216 According to the UK government website, the British state consists of 25 Ministerial Departments, 
20 non-ministerial departments, 402 Agencies and other public bodies, 82 High Profile Groups, 12 
Public corporations and 3 devolved Administrations. That is a total of over 500 distinct bodies and 
department (UK Government Website, 2019). 
217 (Waldron 2004, 128) 
218 It is worth noting that the dynamic of competition for the reins of power is hardly limited to 
democratic states. Even nominal one-party states consist of coalitions with differing aims and interests 
who frequently compete with one another. They are not unitary entities. The Chinese Communist 
Party, for instance, is often understood to consist of two distinct “elite” and “populist” coalitions. 
Purges, whereby one part of the elite coalition removes another, is not an infrequent occurrence in 
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Another relevant consideration is the manner in which state institutions are deliberately 
designed to have firewalls between one another and prevent concentrations of power. The 
most obvious example in this regard is the separation of the legislative and judicial functions 
of the state. However, state institutions are deliberately fractured along other dimensions. 
Actors within state institutions will often deliberately cede authority to other actors in order 
to make credible commitments to third parties. Over the last few decades the governing 
parties of many liberal democratic states ceded decision-making capacity with respect to 
interest rates to independent central banks. In tying their own hands from using interest rate 
policy for short-term electoral purposes, they could make credible commitments to third-
party economic actors in financial markets and elsewhere. Political economists Douglass 
North and Barry Weingast explain the formation of liberal democratic institutions through 
just such a mechanism.219 The British Crown was comparatively much better placed to raise 
debt finance following the introduction of parliamentary constraints on its sovereignty in the 
aftermath of the Glorious Revolution. These constraints reassured the King’s creditors that 
they had credible means to hold the King accountable to his financial commitments. In turn, 
they were more willing to lend to the Crown. When the actors in the “centre” of what we 
might call the “state-network,” be they a monarch or an elected government, make such 
commitments, they will be credible only if hands genuinely are tied and decision-making 
powers genuinely devolved to other agencies, as indeed seems to have been the case in the 
Glorious Revolution.  
The third consideration is epistemic. The sheer scale and breadth of contemporary state 
activity is quite remarkable. A subset of the activities undertaken by contemporary states 
include war-making, combatting terrorism, regulating drug use, promoting cultural 
integration, devising pedagogical techniques to teach children, administering tax schemes, 
combatting climate change, regulating nuclear waste, administering welfare, and so on. 
Many of these activities require specialist knowledge that cannot be centralised but will be 
held by practitioners within the relevant agency. For example, the decisions as to which 
health treatments are available on the United Kingdom’s National Health Service are made 
not my MPs but by a specialist clinical body, the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Expertise.220 The vast majority of members of the UK Parliament are not trained medical 
professionals and lack the knowledge to make these assessments. Crucially, the 
 
such states. For an argument that anticorruption drives are used in China as weapons in intra-elite 
power struggles, see Zhu and Zhang (2017).  
219 (North and Weingast 1989) 
220 (Rawlins and Culyer 2004) 
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fragmentation of knowledge here is not only of theoretical knowledge but also the more 
practical sort highlighted by Hayek. What Mill observed of the nineteenth century British civil 
service is no less true today: 
Every branch of public administration is a skilled business, which has its own peculiar 
principles and traditional rules, many of them not even known in any effectual way, 
except to those who have at some time had a hand in carrying on the business, and 
none of them likely to be duly appreciated by persons not practically acquainted with 
the department.221  
The less the legislative centre of the state-network understands the activities and practices 
of agencies at the “periphery”, the less it can directly control their activities. 222   
The fourth consideration is based upon an insight of Carl Schmitt. He argues that the 
implementation of a rule has an unavoidably “decisionistic and personalistic” element to 
it.223 His point is not merely the familiar one that law is indeterminate and requires 
interpretation. Schmitt says who interprets the rule matters. That one interpretation rather 
than another will be selected is a function of the personality, characteristics, judgements, 
circumstances and so forth of the particular official. If we interpret Schmitt through a 
Hayekian lens, we can say that the substantive interpretation of a law depends on the local 
knowledge and values of the in-situ practitioner. Even when the state-network appears to 
operate in the most hierarchical fashion, the centre might be in less control than it appears 
because the “gaps” in the formal instructions it issues are filled by other state agents. This 
was precisely what Michael Lipsky found in his famous study of “street-level bureaucrats”. 
Central state policies would list several criteria or values to be upheld without specifying how 
they were to be traded-off against one another. These and other such decisions were left to 
the street-level bureaucrats who tangibly interacted with citizens on the ground. Lipsky 
concludes that such bureaucrats had significant discretion in deciding how general and often 
vague policy commitments emanating from the centre were concretely implemented.224 If 
the implementation of a policy depends to a non-negligible degree on the discretion of 
agents on the periphery of the state-network, this is another constraint on the ability of the 
legislative centre to direct the network.  
 
221 (Mill 1861, 58) 
222 The premise of the British political satire Yes Minister was precisely this information asymmetry. 
The show depicts an elected minister struggling to get his way because he is ignorant of the manner 
in which departments work in comparison to the civil servants who have spent their whole careers 
working within them. 
223 (Schmitt 2005, 48); Michael Oakeshott (1991) makes a similar point in his famous essay 
“Rationalism in Politics”. 
224 (Lipsky 2010) 
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The fifth consideration is based upon a critique of public policy studies provided by the 
philosopher Mark Bevir.225 He observes that the dominant theoretical frameworks used in 
that discipline, rational choice inspired “neoliberalism” and “institutionalism,” do not 
adequately account for how the contingent and variable beliefs of state actors influences 
their behaviour. These frameworks assume that such actors’ behaviour is a predictable 
function of objective and ascertainable social facts. These are narrowly construed incentive 
structures for the rational choice theorist and fixed institutional procedures for the 
institutionalist. However, what both these approaches overlook is the manner in which the 
actors-in-question subjectively interpret their situation according to their own lights. An 
actor might respond differently to a given situation than predicted by the theory or they 
might even categorise the situation differently than the theory. The upshot is that public 
policy is not a predictive science. The response of actors in the periphery of the state network 
to the centre’s directives will depend on the variegated and contingent interpretations they 
make of those directives and their own particular circumstances. This implies that policies 
will rarely achieve their intended consequences and often generate unintended ones. The 
outcomes of such policies might be better conceived of as what Charles Lindblom once 
termed “mutual adjustments” between different agencies. He writes: 
In the United States, for example, no part of government attempts a comprehensive 
overview of policy on income distribution. A policy nevertheless evolves, and one 
responding to a wide variety of interests. A process of mutual adjustment among 
farm groups, labor unions, municipalities and school boards, tax authorities, and 
government agencies with responsibilities in the fields of housing, health, highways, 
national parks, fire, and police accomplishes a distribution of income in which 
particular income problems neglected at one point in the decision processes become 
central at another point.226 
Note that for Lindblom “mutual adjustment” does not mean that these government or quasi-
government agencies consciously decide through an explicit voting or deliberative procedure 
how income will be distributed amongst themselves. Instead, mutual adjustment takes place 
between agencies acting upon their own localised information and interpretation of their 
interests. Hence there is no “comprehensive overview” of the income distribution which 
instead “evolves” through their iterated interactions. To formulate these insights in the 
language of this thesis, the income distribution in Lindblom’s example is the emergent 
outcome of many agencies lobbying for their own purposes and adjusting to one another’s 
efforts in an unpredictable and complex manner.  
 
225 The following draws upon Bevir (2013) 
226 Lindblom (1959, 85); emphasis added. 
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The sixth consideration, related to the last, is the dynamic of interest group politics. A 
significant amount of legislation in contemporary states arises because particular groups 
have an interest to campaign or lobby for particular laws. In Mancur Olson’s well known 
account, the benefits of such legislation are concentrated among members of the group 
while the costs are dispersed across society-at-large.227 Farming subsidies exist, for instance, 
primarily because farmers are incentivised to lobby for them. To the extent that interest 
group politics are prevalent in the political process, state legislation will reflect the discrete 
priorities of different interest groups rather than the coordinated plan of a sovereign 
legislative centre. The seven consideration is the sheer number of laws and regulations 
produced by contemporary states. If the state is closer to a polycentric network than a 
hierarchically structured organisation, we should expect a proliferation of laws on disparate 
matters that would not exhibit any coherence. This is indeed the case. Michael Huemer 
observes that the United States Code Of Federal Regulations, which excludes statutes passed 
by Congress as well as state and local laws, ran to 152,456 pages in 2010, covering a plethora 
of topics ranging from the spacing of spark plug gaps to others describing matters as specific 
as “the signing of documents related to excise taxes on structured settlement factoring 
transactions”.228  
We have built up our argument to the following picture. Any social order will consists of a 
plurality of producers of institutional rules, both within and outside what I have called the 
state-network. There is no agent or agency who can adopt an Archimedean perspective and 
intervene holistically on the system of rules as a whole. Such a system is the product of the 
institutional rule-making and enforcement of a plurality of authorities rather than any overall 
design. To return to our core contention from chapter one, ethical disagreement or 
compliance problems are not here the primary difficulties. We could posit that all these 
disparate actors universally subscribed to, say, Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness or 
Tomasi’s conception of justice as free market fairness. The fragmentation of knowledge 
under large-scale settings is in play here just as it is in the economic context. These 
authorities produce rules based at least partly on their own proximate knowledge 
unavailable to the rest. Even positing abstract consensus on a conception of justice, the 
 
227 (Olson 2003 [1971]) 
228 (Huemer 2013, 280–81) 
75 
 
problem of coordinating and rendering compatible their rule-making initiatives still 
remains.229  
Let me emphasise again that the argument is about our ability to design institutional 
structures systemically. Thus I do not deny that particular political actors are often in a 
position to reform specific rules. We can even appropriately invoke considerations of social 
justice in evaluating their decisions. There are actors within the state-network of the United 
States who might be able to reduce incarceration rates or within that of the United Kingdom 
who might be able to liberalise onerous restrictions on the supply of new housing. I think 
one can safely say that both ought to be done and even invoke reasons to do with social 
justice in both cases. Reforms such as these, however, are piecemeal forms of social 
engineering in the Popperian sense. They are a far cry from holistic reform of the major 
institutional rules conceived of as a unitary system along the lines of Rawls’ basic structure. 
I concede that a partial exception to the argument I have offered are certain historical 
moments when a handful of persons are able to formulate constitutions that subsequently 
bind the rest of society. The US case most obviously comes to mind. However, such “great 
constitutional moments” are rare. They might be the exception that proves the more general 
rule that I am defending here. Even then the ex-post operation and evolution of these 
institutions will depart from the intentions of the original designers.230 
At this point, John Tomasi might offer the following objection. Perhaps the arguments 
mustered in this and the prior section speak against Rawlsian or socialist conceptions of 
justice that tend to overlook Hayekian concerns. However, Tomasi might argue, it does not 
speak against his more epistemically modest conception of justice. Free market fairness 
tends to eschew direct interventionism after all in favour of utilising spontaneous ordering 
forces as much as possible to further the end of social justice. The hugely ambitious forms of 
social engineering necessary to realise, say, fair equality of opportunity or the difference 
principle would not be entailed by Tomasi’s construal of Rawlsian justice. In response, it 
should be conceded that a classical liberal blueprint for the basic structure is probably less 
 
229 The second principle of justice as fairness requires that socio-economic inequalities be arranged so 
that, first, offices and positions are open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity and, 
second, that their arrangement is of the greatest benefit to the least advantaged. At the least, this 
seems to require the coordination of multiple layers of government with respect to policy areas as 
diverse as health, housing, taxation, pensions, monetary policy, trade, the family and education. Even 
if we posit that all these government officials fully subscribe to justice as fairness, the problem remains 
as to how they will practically coordinate their many disparate policy initiatives to arrive at the desired 
outcome given that the fragmentation of knowledge is in play.   
230 Hence the perennial complaint of classical liberals in the US that the scope and scale of the 
contemporary federal government far exceeds anything envisaged by the founders.  
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susceptible to the problems we have identified, but it is far from being entirely free of them 
either. For one thing, as we already observed above, Tomasi’s conception of justice does 
entail the implementation of a policy programme including the funding of education and 
healthcare, the implementation of monetary rules, the provision of a basic income and even 
affirmative action. To the extent that these policies add up to a programme of systemic 
institutional reform then they are susceptible to the concerns we have just raised.  
For another, the core of Tomasi’s proposal, that state institutions should secure basic 
economic liberties, is definitely susceptible to the concerns raised above. According to 
Tomasi, economic liberties are liberties of working and owning. Working liberties allow one 
to use one’s time and body in ways that one sees fit. Ownership liberties refer to the liberty 
to buy-and-sell goods and services as well as to hold and use property.231 Free market 
fairness holds that economic liberties should be among the constitutionally protected basic 
rights of liberal citizens.232 The basic structure of a Tomasian society, then, is arranged such 
that all citizens have access to a robust and one would assume mutually compossible list of 
such liberties among other personal and civil ones. However, we have already seen that some 
of the most important markets, such as those for international trade or some financial 
markets, are governed by non-state sources. The economic liberties of actors in these 
markets are not determined by the state.  
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether entrenching a “basic” list of economic liberties for all 
economic domains is a coherent enterprise in a complex and diverse society. Under such a 
setting my economic liberties would exhibit at least some variation from context-to-context. 
Consider the different configurations of economic liberties I have when I buy a complex 
derivative contract, obtain a mortgage for a house, purchase some trademarked software, 
farm on land I hold in common with fellow farmers, purchase non-voting ordinary shares in 
a company, work as a member of an employer-led cooperative, claim the entitlements that 
I am owed as a member of a mutual society, own real estate concurrently with at least one 
other person  and purchase an asset-backed security whose revenues are derived from the 
present and future musical sales of leading pop star.233 It seems very unlikely that we can 
abstract away from these domains a “unitary list” of economic liberties. Perhaps that is the 
problem as far as Tomasi is concerned. We can’t have a “checkerboard” solution to property 
 
231 (Tomasi 2012, 53–54) 
232 (Tomasi 2013, 121) 
233 The last of these examples is based on a real bond issued by the musician David Bowie.  
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rights.234 However, this response would overlook that it is often desirable that the precise 
configuration of economic liberties or property rights vary from domain-to-domain. What 
makes for efficient property rules in an Ostromian commons might well not do so in an 
auction house. In insisting on a unitary scheme of basic liberties, then, Tomasi’s conception 
of justice retains Rawls’ overly centralised understanding of institutional rule-making.235  
 
5. Gerald Gaus’ Liberalism 
Let us take stock. We began by noting the key limitation of Hayek’s critique of social justice. 
It did not apply to theories of justice, like that of Rawls, whose subject is institutional rules 
rather than the outcomes they engender. One potential response is offered by Tomasi. 
Concede the point and try to incorporate Hayekian insights into a Rawlsian justificatory 
framework. We took another strategy in arguing that Hayek’s knowledge problem applies 
also to the design of institutional rules. Just as there is no Archimedean point from which we 
can directly engineer distributive outcomes, there is no such point from which we can 
holistically reform systems of institutional rules. On our construal of Hayekian social theory, 
both the system of institutional rules and the interactions to which they give rise are 
emergent phenomena. It behoves us at this juncture, however, to engage with Gerald Gaus’ 
liberal theory.  
Gaus, like Tomasi, presents a form of liberal political philosophy that tries to reconcile 
Hayekian and Rawlsian insights. However, unlike Tomasi, he does not see spontaneous 
orders only as a tool of social construction that we utilise when consciously designing the 
basic structure. Gaus thinks that the basic institutional rules of liberal society are themselves 
the product of an emergent and evolutionary process. On his view, institutional rules are not 
designed but arise spontaneously through the iterative interactions of countless liberal 
agents. In this respect, Gaus takes the same approach as this thesis. However, in contrast to 
this thesis, he also thinks that spontaneously emergent institutional rules can nonetheless 
be viewed as the product of the shared and active agency of liberal citizens. In other words, 
 
234This is a reference, of course, to Ronald Dworkin’s famously dismissive attitude to competing legal 
jurisdictions.  
235 I note in this regard the school of thought that sees market institutions arising in Europe 
spontaneously as a result of competition between many rule-setting authorities. For instance, Barry 
Weingast (1995) thinks the industrial revolution occurred in Britain as an accidental by-product of its 
“market preserving federal structure”. According to this school of thought, there was no conscious 
plan to arrange the basic structure to accord with a unitary list of economic liberties.  C.f. Pennington 
(2011, 196–97); (Fink 2012). 
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that institutional rules are emergent phenomena does not preclude their being understood 
as chosen and even consented to by the liberal citizens from whose actions they emerge. 
Rawlsian justificatory ambitions can be combined with a thoroughgoing Hayekian account of 
the origin of social institutions. Gaus’ liberalism therefore provides a distinct and strong 
challenge to our attempt to drive a wedge between Hayekian and Rawlsian liberalisms. I will 
argue over this and the next section that Gaus’ attempt, while creative, fails. Either the 
institutional rules have been actively chosen or they are emergent. I will contend they cannot 
be both and that Gaus’ argument plays on an ambiguity between Humean acquiescence and 
more substantive notions of consent and choice. I draw primarily on his Order of Public 
Reason (OPR).  
Gaus’ locates his inquiry on the same pasture as Rawls and Rousseau. His book is offered as 
an answer to the following question: “How can free and equal moral persons claim authority 
to prescribe to other free and equal moral persons?” His answer, in short, is that “a publicly 
justified morality – one that the reason of each endorses – allows each to remain free while 
subject to moral authority.”236 He is deeply troubled by the potentially authoritarian nature 
of interpersonal morality. Such morality gives one licence to issue imperative demands to 
others – “You must do this”. In issuing a demand, the demander claims authority over 
another and this is troubling if we assume persons are free and equal.237 Imagine, however, 
a community of agents living under moral rules all endorse. Under such circumstances, 
making a moral demand of another is not inconsistent with respecting them as free and 
equal. In so doing I am simply asking them to live up to commitments that ex hypothesis they 
themselves endorse.238  
What is particularly interesting about Gaus’ proposal is that his philosophical focus is not 
simply the judicial laws of the state but social norms or what he calls social morality – “the 
shared rules, shared expectations and requirements, and shared understanding of 
appropriate demands and sanctions that structure our life together”.239 These are demands 
that we make upon one another in the context of everyday life. They are not necessarily 
enforced by the state. Gaus observes that the focus of Mill’s On Liberty was social morality 
in this sense i.e. those rules occupying an intermediate position between those coercively 
enforced by the state and those decided upon by the individual herself on the basis of 
 
236 (Gaus 2012a, 5) 
237 (Gaus 2012a, 22) 
238 (Gaus 2012a, 29) 
239 (Gaus 2015b, 143) 
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conscience. 240 Legitimate social morality lays the foundation for legitimate state authority 
on Gaus’ score. Coercively imposed institutional rules are legitimate when they accord with 
or build upon already established and publicly justified social-moral norms. So he is 
concerned in the first instance with how legitimate rules of social morality arise. The core 
inquiry of OPR is how members of the public might converge upon social-moral rules that all 
of them can endorse. 241 
The difficulty is that no consensus is forthcoming because liberal citizens have reasonable 
disagreements in the Rawlsian sense – Gaus uses the term “evaluative pluralism” – about 
the most appropriate rules. Still, Gaus thinks there are ways in which we can prune this 
disagreement. With respect to a particular issue, each person can rank rules such that they 
compile that person’s eligible set of rules. This consists of all the rules that person ranks 
above having no rule with respect to that issue. This allows us to identify a socially eligible 
set of rules that excludes any rule that every member of the public ranks below having no 
rule on the issue and any rule that is dominated by another rule in the personal eligible set 
of every member of the public.242 Thus, if A is ranked higher than B in the personal eligible 
sets of all, we can drop B from the socially eligible set and If C is ranked lower than no rule in 
the personal eligible sets of all, we can drop C. 243  
Drawing on Benjamin Constant, Gaus identifies two other further such pruning strategies. 
Firstly, all members of the public have reasons to affirm those social rules that promote basic 
rights of agency.  Following Stanley Benn, Gaus thinks we moderns, our deep cognitive 
diversity notwithstanding, cannot but help see ourselves as self-directed agents.244 Qua such 
agents we can be understood to have reasons to affirm social rules that are reasonable 
interpretations of certain rights pre-requisite to such agency. These include a defeasible 
presumption of liberty with respect to the pursuit of our goals, the right not to be coerced 
or deceived, the right to freedom of conscience, rights against harm and rights to 
assistance.245 Secondly, members of the public have reasons to affirm property rights or, to 
use Gaus’ own parlance, jurisdictional rights. Such rights devolve morality on certain matters 
to individuals and communities. The Catholic Church and the British Humanist Organisation 
 
240 (Gaus 2012a, 3) 
241 Members of the public has a technical connotation in Gaus’ theory. They are moderately 
idealised versions of their real-life counterparts. (Gaus 2012a, 26–27; 267) 
242 The latter is a Pareto rule.  
243 (Gaus 2012a, 321–23) 
244 (Gaus 2012a, 337–40) 
245 (Gaus 2012a, 341–59) 
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can enforce their own social rules within the jurisdiction of their own property. Jurisdictional 
rights prune the eligible set by reducing the need to agree on a common rule for many 
matters. Each member of the public, claims Gaus, will have strong reasons to affirm rules 
constituting reasonable interpretations of jurisdictional rights so as to uphold their personal 
evaluative standards in a diverse world.246 These two further pruning strategies reduce the 
size of the socially eligible set but do not leave us with a singleton. For abstract rights of 
agency and jurisdictional rights can be interpreted in many ways. These strategies only 
exclude those social rules that are not plausible interpretations of these general 
commitments, still leaving us with a numerous socially eligible set of candidate rules. At this 
point philosophical reason seems to run out.  
Gaus turns to a Hayekian solution. He thinks we can converge on a set of action-guiding rules 
to govern our social life through bottom-up social interactions. Gaus’ argument here is 
technical and quite abstract. He uses two different game-theoretic models to advance it. I 
focus here on the model he terms the “Kantian coordination game”.247 The basic idea is to 
imagine a very large number of agents engaged in repeated interactions. During each 
interaction agents have the choice of acting on a social rule from the socially eligible set. 
Agents successfully coordinate if they both act on the same rule. Gaus assumes that agents 
always prefer successful coordination to their acting on different rules, even if successful 
coordination requires them to act on a rule that is not their first-best. When the players begin 
interacting, the initial strategy of each player is to act on the rule that they consider first-best 
or optimal. However, this means that some players will fail to engage in successful 
coordination and so will change their strategy to rules they consider less than optimal in 
subsequent rounds in order to increase their chances of successfully coordinating with 
others. Over time, Gaus shows formally that the agents will converge on one social rule, 
which will not be the optimal rule for everyone or even possibly anyone.  
The principal mechanism is a network affect.  As one rule becomes popular, ever more 
individuals subscribe to it to increase their chances of successful coordination creating a self-
generating tendency towards convergence on that rule. Which rule is selected, however, 
cannot be predicted ex ante. It is the emergent and unintended consequence of individuals 
trying to act on their most preferred rule given the likewise preferences of all the other 
players. Despite our converging on the equilibrium rule in “a contingent and accidental way”,  
 
246 (Gaus 2012a, 372–86) 
247 (Gaus 2012a, 393–400) 
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Gaus believes we can still see this as a self-legislated morality in the Kantian/Rousseauvian 
sense.248 How could this be so? He writes:  
With a rule in equilibrium, she [i.e. an agent] best satisfies her standards given what 
others are doing… Her freedom is not the freedom of an asocial agent who is free 
simply when she does what she thinks best regardless of what others do, but the 
freedom of a social moral agent who considers what her evaluative standards deem 
is the best thing to do given what others justifiably do on the basis of their own 
standards. We can think of this as a social Realm of Ends populated by free and equal 
persons with diverse evaluative standards. When a person takes this perspective, 
she sees that she is free when she acts on a moral rule that is in equilibrium.249  
 
The obvious objection to characterising the equilibrium rule as the product of a “social realm 
of ends” is that there is no genuine collective choice in these interactions. Gaus 
acknowledges this – “the group, as a group, does not choose its moral rules”.250 Nonetheless 
we have chosen the rule though our “interdependent” individual choices:  
As interdependent individuals, we choose our moral rules — at least, if we are 
lucky enough to actually possess bona fide moral rules. In the end, this is a real 
choice of actual people; not a hypothetical choice, or one dictated by impartial 
reason.251 
 
Since it is a real choice, it binds. Once a rule is converged upon, we can say that “a free society 
consents to the moral rule to which we are all bound”.252 Gaus’ claim, then, is that a group 
of persons have chosen to be governed and bound by a rule if they have converged upon it 
through repeated interactions. This is so even if, by hypothesis, the process of converging on 
this rule was “contingent and accidental” and the agents involved did not and indeed, due 
to their disagreements, could not consciously decide upon the rule before their interactions. 
According to Gaus, then, rules that emerge through human action but not design can 
nonetheless be described as chosen and even consented to by the actors-in-question.  
To verify the accuracy of this reading, I compare it to renderings of the same argument that 
Gaus has offered in publications separate to The Order of Public Reason. In one paper he 
responds to John Simmons’ famous critique of hypothetical accounts of consent. Simmons 
has long argued that the generic qualities of a state are insufficient to create an obligation 
to obey. Actual consent by the governed is also necessary.253 In response, Gaus reiterates the 
 
248 (Gaus 2012a, 400) 
249 (Gaus 2012a, 402); original emphasis. 
250 (Gaus 2012a, 402); original emphasis.  
251 (Gaus 2012a, 402) 
252 (Gaus 2012a, 403); emphasis added. 
253 E.g. (Simmons 1999) 
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same above account of rule-convergence through interdependent choices.254 He repeats the 
claim that the equilibrium social rule is “a real choice of actual people”. Insofar as a state 
only “protects, sustains, and develops our social morality,” then we are coerced by laws to 
which we as a society have consented through an “on-going” process of interdependent 
social choice.255 Therefore, claims Gaus, his ideal liberal state is subject to the actual consent 
which Simmons says is necessary to generate legitimacy. In another paper he even writes 
that we can see the equilibrium rule as the expression of a general will in the Rousseauvian 
sense: “[it is] this social process, which can lead to a uniquely justified outcome but which 
itself need not be justified [i.e. convergence on a rule through iterative interactions], that 
allows society to form a general will on a variety of matters without resort to the political 
process”.256 Now, Gaus’ arguments here are stylised and refer to convergence on one rule 
only. If they are successful, however, they can be generalised easily to systems of 
institutional rules. We would then be able to say that liberal citizens have consented to such 
a system if all the rules comprising it arose from their interdependent choices.  
It would also then seem that there is no necessary tension between an associational 
understanding of political society which conceives of citizens as exercising collective agency 
over the institutional rules that govern them and the emergent understanding that sees such 
rules as the result of human action but no overall design. For on Gaus’ score participation in 
an emergent process leading to the emergence of an equilibrium rule counts as consent to 
that rule. Further, to the extent that citizens participate in this emergent process together 
we can say that they have all consented to the equilibrium rule. The rule is thus the 
expression of collective agency on the part of all citizens despite it emerging in an unintended 
manner. Pace the contention of this chapter and this thesis more generally, the Rawlsian and 
associational desideratum that liberal citizens create and sustain the institutions that govern 
them does not fall foul of the Hayekian dictum that large-scale rules are hard to intentionally 
design. Indeed, Gaus’ claim that we have consented to the emergent rule is striking given 
Rawls’ own reluctance to use the language of consent in his political theory.257 In assessing 
Gaus’ claim here we must answer the following question. Do I really consent to a rule if I 
 
254 (Gaus 2012b, 116–20) 
255 (Gaus 2012b, 121–23) 
256 (Gaus 2011b, 91) 
257 While Rawls thinks the well-ordered society is just because of the deliberate intention of liberal 
citizens to give justice to one another, he also thinks that the exit costs of leaving such a society are 
too high for us to be able to say they have consented to being a member of it. See, for instance, 
Rawls (2001, 182). 
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contributed to the social process leading to its unintended emergence as the equilibrium 
rule? The next section will reply in the negative.  
 
6. Assessing Gaus’ Argument  
Consider the following intuitive and common sense definition of consent once offered by 
John Simmons: “First, consent must be given intentionally and (perhaps this is redundant) 
knowingly; as with promising, one can consent insincerely, but not unintentionally. Second, 
consent must be given voluntarily.”258 The first part of Simmons’ definition captures how 
intentionality is built into our understanding of consent and indeed agency more generally. 
It is very hard to see how consenting to be under a state of affairs cannot also entail intending 
to be under that state of affairs. Hence, we normally say that consent has to be informed 
because one has to know beforehand what they are getting into. Intentionality is built also 
into our wider understanding of autonomy. Autonomous persons form intentions as to which 
objectives they would like to achieve and act upon them. Kantian self-legislation just is 
intending to put oneself under the authority of a universal law. So if we are to say that a 
member of a free society “chooses” or “consents” to the moral rule under which they are 
governed, then we are also to say that they did so with intention. Ex hypothesis however, 
this condition is not met in emergent social process. They arise through many human actions 
but no intentional human design. Therefore, Gaus’ ascription of consent and choice to the 
outcomes of this process seems misplaced.  
 
One obvious response from Gaus is to say that the rule in equilibrium has, in fact, been 
chosen with intention by all members of the group, at least eventually. Even if they started 
the Kantian coordination game by playing a different rule, each must have eventually 
switched to the rule which is now in equilibrium. Therefore, they did actually consent 
(intend) to be under the jurisdiction of that rule from the point at which they started 
complying with it. One difficulty with this response is made clear by Gaus’ own observation 
that once the rule is in equilibrium it can still bind “one who holds out, refusing to choose 
our rule”.259 Clearly, it cannot be said of these hold outs who refuse to comply at all that they 
 
258 (Simmons 1976, 276); Simmons, correctly in my estimation, says we cannot be very precise about 
what voluntariness entails save to say that the consequences of saying “no” cannot be excessively 
deleterious. The traveller who intentionally pays Hobbes’ highwayman after being told “your money 
or your life” has not, then, properly consented to handing over their money.   
259 (Gaus 2012a, 403) 
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have intended to conform to the rule. Be this as it may, there is a bigger difficulty. The 
attribution of consent to those who subscribe to the rule only after it is established or 
otherwise close to being established as the equilibrium rule of the community is problematic 
for a familiar reason.  
 
Suppose I find myself in a community where everyone is expected to conform to rule X. We 
can posit that the community converged upon the rule by playing Gaus’ Kantian coordination 
game. I am a member of this community and I think very little of rule X. I initially tried to 
promote the use of other rules but they lost out in the emergent process that led to it 
becoming the equilibrium rule. Since the rule is now entrenched in the community, my 
effective choice now is conforming or leaving the community. I have lived in this community 
all my life and know of little else. I lack financial means to leave. Thus I conform to rule X. Do 
we conclude that I have consented to the rule? The answer seems to be a negative one. The 
exit costs are so high that we find it difficult to say I voluntarily subscribe to X. Thus even if 
we concede that the emergent social process will meet Simmons’ intentionality requirement, 
at least eventually, his second condition of voluntariness remains unmet. Under these 
circumstances, it seems much more apt to say I acquiesce to X. We might imagine richer 
and/or more cosmopolitan members of such a community for whom the exit costs might not 
be as prohibitive as for myself. Still, any society will contain at least some individuals for 
whom the exit costs are high enough such that we cannot impute consent from their bare 
compliance. Hume’s critique of the social contract hinged on this very point.260  
 
Gaus might advance a second response at this juncture. The criticisms advanced thus far 
misunderstand the role that the emergent process of the Kantian coordination game plays 
in his argument. We turn to it to solve the indeterminacy that stems from Gaus’ deliberative 
model that comes earlier in the sequencing of his argument. The emergent process of the 
Kantian coordination game selects only from those rules that are already within the socially 
eligible set. Hence, they are already subject to some form of prior endorsement by all 
members of the public. One should not be in a situation, such as that of my hypothetical self 
with respect to rule X, of either subscribing to a rule one cannot endorse or leaving the 
 
260 “Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artizan has a free choice to leave his country, when 
he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day, by the small wages which he 
acquires? We may as well assert, that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the 
dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, 
and perish, the moment he leaves her.” (Hume 1777d) 
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community in question. There are two difficulties with this response. Firstly, recall that for a 
rule to be in the socially eligible set, it simply has to be ranked better than no rule by all 
members of the public with respect to the issue it covers. However, an improvement on no 
rule is often a very low bar to meet. I might “endorse” highly authoritarian rules in the sense 
of ranking them above Hobbesian anarchy, though the former might still fall far short of my 
first-best rules. That a rule is in the socially eligible set could mean it is subject to no stronger 
form of endorsement by members of the public than this. Again, it looks like Gaus is 
presenting what amounts only to Humean acquiescence as a more substantive form of 
endorsement.  
 
Secondly, and returning to our argument from the previous chapter, in an impersonal society 
characterised by mutual ignorance, we would be ignorant of the content of the socially 
eligible set because we do not know what most of our fellow citizens believe. Thus we do not 
know whether any converged-upon rule is in the socially eligible set. Now, I believe Gaus is 
at least implicitly aware of this difficulty. His aforementioned pruning strategies seem 
designed to overcome them. Recall his claim that all persons qua self-directed agents would 
affirm abstract rights of agency and jurisdictional rights. By extension, they would have 
reasons to endorse rules constituting reasonable interpretations of such rights. We can then 
infer such rules to be in the socially eligible set despite our not having direct knowledge of 
the concrete views of the mass of our fellow citizens. For we would know that as abstract 
agents they would have reasons to endorse such rules, to coin a familiar Rawlsian phrase, 
whatever else they want or believe. The problem, however, is that it does not ineluctably 
follow that all self-directed agents would affirm the abstract rights of agency and jurisdiction 
that Gaus claims they would.  
 
To take one already mentioned example, Gaus believes that all such agents would affirm the 
“presumption in favor of liberty” and by extension any rule that is a reasonable 
interpretation thereof. This presumption is that individuals are normally at liberty to do as 
they please such that the burden of justification falls on those who propose to coerce them. 
Yet, this presumption is contested philosophically. Jürgen Habermas, to name just one high 
profile philosopher, rejects it.261 It also seems to be contested by real members of the public. 
When Gaus himself, along with Shaun Nichols, tested the principle through empirical 
 
261 Habermas claims that the liberties of the moderns and ancients are “co-original”. On his score, 
public and private autonomy are “not possible without the other, but neither sets limits on the other”. 
(Habermas 2001, 767)  
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experiments, they found that “rule followers sometimes suppose a principle of natural 
liberty [i.e. a prime facie presumption in favour of freedom], sometimes its denial”.262 So 
even if we accept that all of our fellow citizens are self-directed agents, we cannot infer ipso 
facto that they all affirm the presumption of liberty and by extension that reasonable rule-
interpretations of that principle are in the socially eligible set.  
 
Another example is Gaus’ view that all self-directed agents will endorse a scheme of 
jurisdictional property rights that are strong in two senses: “[they] are not easily overridden 
and [which] are extensive, including private property in capital assets”.263 Again, this does 
not seem true of all (or perhaps even most) political philosophers. Gerald Cohen’s Why Not 
Socialism is ultimately a paean to the benefits that self-directed agents derive from society-
wide collective decision-making.264 As before then, even if we accept that all of our fellow 
citizens are self-directed agents, we cannot infer ipso facto that they affirm strong and 
extensive jurisdictional rights and by extension that reasonable rule-interpretations of such 
rights are in the socially eligible set. Thus, Gaus’ pruning strategies fail to overcome our 
ignorance of the contents of the socially eligible set. In summary of this section, the most we 
can say about agents whose actions were causally responsible for the emergence of an 
equilibrium rule in the Kantian coordination game is that they have acquiesced to that rule. 
Gaus ascription of consent is inappropriate because the exit costs of leaving the typical 
nation-state are such that the voluntariness condition necessary to consent is not met. His 
potential response that the equilibrium rule is subject to a form of prior endorsement in 
virtue of being in the socially eligible set fails because we do not know its content. Even if we 
did, the rules that compose it are subject to a very weak form of endorsement i.e. they are 
merely ranked as better than no rule. For better or for worse, the emergent rules of social 
morality are something that happen to us. They are not the product of our will. 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
262 (Gaus and Nichols 2017, 80) 
263 (Gaus 2012a, 377) 
264 (Cohen 2009)  
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The first chapter distinguished between the Rawlsian associational understanding of political 
society and the Hayekian emergent understanding. This chapter has explained why this 
thesis has resisted the temptation to reconcile these contrasting visions. The task of outlining 
the theoretical framework is complete. We now turn to the second part of the thesis and the 
task of vindicating the emergent understanding over the associational one. We will consider 
and critique the prospects for collective political agency in the “non-ideal” circumstances of 
actually-existing liberal democracies and the more idealised circumstances of Rawls’ well-
ordered society as well as those posited by deliberative democratic theorists.  
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Part II: The Prospects for Collective Political Agency 
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Chapter Three: Descriptive Associationalism 
 
Abstract 
This chapter considers the claim that citizens of actually-existing liberal democracies work 
together to achieve shared objectives. It examines two models: the joint-intentional action 
model and the principal-agent model. The first holds that the citizen-body as a whole acts 
together. The second holds that the citizen-body as principal appoints an agent in a 
democratically elected government to act on its behalf. This chapter argues that neither are 
plausible since both overlook epistemic constraints facing liberal citizens. It also clarifies the 
implications that the arguments of this thesis have for our understanding of the value of 
democracy.  
 
Introduction 
 
Descriptive associationalists hold that citizens of actually-existing liberal democracies are 
capable of forming and acting upon shared objectives and that the major institutions under 
which they live are the product of such shared and intentional coordination. As we saw in 
chapter one, this view is espoused by figures such as Anna Stilz, David Miller, Ryan Pevnick 
and Margaret Moore. To recap: Stilz conceives of citizens as active “makers” of the 
institutions under which they live;265 Miller writes that [nations] “are communities that do 
things together, take decisions, achieve results, and so forth;”266 Pevnick sees liberal 
democratic nations as acting together to create public goods through “the coordinated 
decisions, labor, and contributions of members;”267 and Moore claims that actually existing 
nations have territorial rights because “a large majority [of their] people are in a relationship 
with one another which is characterized by a shared political commitment to establish rules 
and practices of self-determination”.268 What unites authors such as these is the belief that 
actually-existing liberal democracies are associations through which citizens do things 
together as part of a common enterprise. They fight wars, develop their economy, decide 
their own laws, determine the nature and extent of their dealings with other states, and so 
on. This chapter assesses and critiques this characterisation of the actually-existing 
relationship between liberal citizens.  
 
265 (Stilz 2015, 7–8) 
266 (Miller 1997, 24) 
267 (Pevnick 2014, 38) 
268 (Moore 2015, 34) 
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It considers two ways in which descriptive associationalism might be theoretically fleshed 
out. The joint-intentional model states that the citizen-body as a whole form and act upon 
shared intentions. This view is explicitly defended by Anna Stilz and Margaret Moore. Both 
draw on the concept of a joint-intentional action as it has been philosophically defined. 
Scholars in this field have explicated the conditions under which a grouping of persons can 
appropriately be described as acting upon jointly shared intentions. The principal-agent 
model posits instead that the citizen-body appoints an agent – a democratic government – 
who acts on their behalf as their representative. This chapter argues that both models posit 
implausible knowledge requirements on the part of liberal citizens.  The argument to follow 
is divided into nine sections. Sections 2-4 deal with the joint-intentional model. Section two 
explicates the necessary conditions for a joint-intentional action, drawing upon the account 
of Michael Bratman. It highlights the high degree of mutual knowledge required of a 
grouping of persons party to such action. Section three presents a general argument as to 
why large-scale citizen groupings lack such knowledge. The claim to the contrary has been 
developed to the furthest extent by Anna Stilz. Section four thus rebuts her particular 
argument.  
Sections 5-8 deal with the principal-agent model. Section five fleshes out this view in greater 
detail before subjecting it to critique. Section six argues that voters can express their “will” 
to governments in only a limited sense. The expression of their preferences is limited to 
issuing binary judgements on propositions preselected by the political class. The tacit and 
inarticulate component of voter knowledge is not included. Even if one thought that binary 
judgements on propositional statements is an adequate way for citizens to express their will, 
sections 7 and 8 argue that the principal-agent model would still not be plausible. Section 7 
argues that while the electorate might issue approval of the stated aim of a policy, its 
substantive implementation is always at the autonomous discretion of state officials. 
Perhaps the discretionary authority of state officials would not be such an issue for the 
principal-agent model if citizens could retroactively judge governmental performance. 
However, section eight argues that citizens also lack the requisite knowledge to undertake 
such evaluation. On the basis of these epistemic considerations, it is concluded that the state 
cannot be understood as the agent of the citizenry. Finally, section 9 discusses the relation 
of this chapter’s argument and that of the thesis as a whole to claims as to the value of 
democracy. While this thesis is sceptical with regard to intrinsic claims as to democracy’s 
value, it is quite compatible with instrumental and even epistemic such claims. In this chapter 
we take into account how compliance problems, stemming both from ethical disagreement 
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and mundane self-interest, effect the prospects for collective political agency in addition to 
epistemic problems. We thus relax the strict compliance assumption adopted elsewhere in 
the thesis. This seems appropriate as we are here considering actually-existing citizens and 
state actors with their actually-existing motivations and beliefs.  
 
1. The Joint-Intentional Action Model 
What do we mean when we say that a group of persons does something together? A 
common sense answer would be that together they formulate a shared goal and try to 
achieve it. There is by now a well-established philosophical literature formally explicating the 
conditions that need to hold for a group of persons to be able to act together in such a way. 
At first approximation, we can say that both the intention to be realised and the means by 
which it is to be realised need to be common knowledge between the members of the group 
if they are to relevantly share the intention in question.269 It is only natural then that political 
philosophers look to this literature when they try to explain how a group of citizens might 
act together. Margaret Moore defines a “people” as a collective agent that is the appropriate 
holder of territorial rights. A collective agent, in turn, refers “to an entity with two or more 
members that can perform joint actions” as they are technically understood in the 
philosophical literature.270 Anna Stilz has in various works also argued that citizens are 
capable of joint-intentional actions as that concept has been philosophically explicated. 
Explicitly building on Michael Bratman’s account, she claims that in obeying the law, dutifully 
paying their taxes and exercising their say in democratic politics, liberal citizens all do their 
part in the joint-intentional activity of realising a common scheme of just law.271 This section 
explains the philosophical puzzle that the joint-intentional action tries to solve. Additionally, 
it will detail Bratman’s account of the demanding degree of mutual knowledge required of 
parties to a joint-intentional action. Sections 2 and 3 will explain why these conditions are 
not met in the typical citizen grouping.  
The philosophical literature on joint-intentional actions arose to solve a puzzle that arises 
when one tries to make sense of the idea of several agents doing something together. 
Suppose two people decide to go for a walk. On their way out, a third person asks them what 
they are doing. One replies, “we have decided to go for a walk”. The implication is that they 
 
269 (Bratman 1999); (Gilbert 1992); (Searle 1990); (Tuomela 2005) 
270 (Moore 2015, 21) 
271 (Stilz 2009, chap. 7); (Stilz 2015, 105–16); (Stilz 2016, 13–14) 
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both have a shared intention to embark upon the joint-activity. However, if an “intention is 
a mental state or event, and minds belong to individual persons” then it seems unclear how 
more than one person can share the same intention.272 One seemingly easy solution is what 
we might call the summation strategy. This would hold that strictly speaking there is no 
“shared” intention. One says “we have decided to go for a walk” as a convenient short-hand 
for something like the following: “she and I have independently decided to go for a walk at 
the same point in time for the same duration of time and over the same route”. In other 
words, the phenomenon is really just a summation of separate individual intentions that 
coincide.  
This is conceivably true of some forms of joint-activity. Consider a group of passengers 
engaged in the joint-activity of riding an underground train. Suppose I, perhaps in the guise 
of an eccentric anthropologist, walk unto a London Underground train and ask one of the 
passengers “what are you doing?” One of the (probably puzzled) passengers might well 
decide to speak for both herself and the other passengers on the train and reply “we are 
riding the train”. Clearly, however, in this instance she is just summarising the distinct and 
independently-formed intentions of each passenger to ride the train in order to arrive at a 
particular destination. The destinations might well coincide, as on a hot day when many 
passengers might separately decide to visit the park. Still, an intelligible account of each 
passenger’s intentions does not require reference to the intentions of the other passengers. 
One passenger’s decision to visit the park on a hot day is intelligible regardless of why the 
other passengers happen to be on the same train. However, the summation strategy can’t 
account for cases where agents’ intentions are clearly coordinated. Consider a group of 
musicians playing a song. In this instance, we cannot give an intelligible account of each 
person’s actions without reference to the intentions of the other band members. Here we 
do have to offer an account of how intentions are mental states of discrete individuals and 
yet shared between them. This is the goal of the joint-intentional action literature.  
Michael Bratman’s theory is one of the leading such accounts. On his account, one cannot 
intelligibly say “I intend to J” if my J-ing is a joint-performance with other people.  I can only 
intend to perform those actions that are solely my own. However, we do speak of 
“intentions-that” in reference to our intentions to influence the actions of others – I intend 
that my child cleans up their room.273 It follows that I can speak of “my intention that we J” 
 
272 (Velleman 1997, 29) 
273 (Bratman 1999, 142)  
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despite my not being the sole author of that act. Assuming a group consisting of you and I, 
we intend to J iff 
1. I intend that we J and I intend to do my part in our J-ing if I know that you intend that 
we J and intend to do your part in our J-ing and 
2. I intend that the sub-plan according to which I will carry out my part meshes with 
your equivalent sub-plan. 
3. The equivalent is true of you.  
4. This is common knowledge between us.274  
The first clause renders my intention to perform my part of the joint-performance 
conditional on knowledge of your reciprocation. It is important to note that this is not a one-
off signal between the parties. In another formulation of the above, Bratman says that the 
“persistence” of my intention that we J depends on my “continued” knowledge of your 
reciprocal intention over the course of the activity.275 The second clause is of great 
importance. For Bratman it is insufficient that all parties continuously share – and per clause 
4 know that they all share - an abstract commitment to J.276 It also needs to be common 
knowledge between them that the sub-plans with which they intend to fulfil their parts in 
the collective act are compatible. In Bratman’s terminology, they need to mesh.  
Specifically, the parties need to have shared understandings as to how they (a) coordinate 
their intentional actions; (b) coordinate their planning; and (c) structure relevant bargaining. 
He illustrates this with the example of two people painting a house.  They need to coordinate 
their actions by, for example, ensuring that the scraping is performed before the new paint 
is applied. They need to coordinate their planning such that if one supplies the paints but not 
the brushes, the other knows to bring the brushes. They also need relevant bargaining 
methods to settle any disagreements such as when they disagree on which colour to use.277 
While Bratman does not specify this, the coordination of sub-plans would also need to be on 
a continuous basis. Thus we can add our own fourth desideratum. The parties need be able 
to (d) adjust to changing circumstances since not everything can be planned for or predicted 
 
274 (Bratman 1999, 121). I take the liberty here of modifying Bratman’s own formulation of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions. I hope this rendering, while still a fundamentally accurate 
interpretation, reads somewhat more intuitively if not quite as technically precise as Bratman’s 
original rendering. 
275 (Bratman 1999, 153) 
276 The fourth clause is designed to avoid a familiar problem of iteration. It is insufficient that I know 
that you intend to do your part and that our plans mesh. You need to know that I know this. In turn, I 
need to know that you know that. And so on ad infinitum. 
277 (Bratman 1999, 112) 
94 
 
in advance. If on the day our painters find they will need more paint than they anticipated or 
that impending rain has thrown a spanner in the works or that the job specifications change, 
they will need to re-coordinate, as it were, to a new settlement on how they are to proceed. 
To summarise, members of a group share an intention that they J iff each has continuous 
assurance that all others intend that they J and that their contribution is compatible with the 
contributions of others. When these conditions are in place, we can genuinely speak of an 
irreducibly shared intention rather than the ultimately individual intentions of the 
summation strategy.    
 
2. The Infeasibility of Joint-Intentional Action Under Large-Scale Settings 
 
It is evident from our review of it that the mutual knowledge requirements of Bratman’s 
model are quite demanding. They will be met only in small groups in which the parties have 
a high degree of proximate knowledge of one another. It is telling that Bratman’s own 
examples are of a handful of people performing very closely coordinated activities such as 
painting or singing a duet.278 Nor is he the exception in the literature. John Searle uses the 
examples of a football team and an orchestra. 279 Margaret Gilbert refers to two people going 
on a walk.280 Toumela speaks of a group of persons who clean a park.281  There are quite 
straightforward reasons to think that as the number of agents increase and their 
circumstances become more diverse, the capacity of a grouping to undertake joint-
intentional actions diminishes. If the counterparties are a handful of agents, I can obtain 
quite detailed knowledge of their willingness to participate in the group activity and how 
their sub-plans might mesh with mine. And vice-versa. As the group gets larger, this 
knowledge becomes ever more difficult to obtain. When the grouping-in-question is the 
number of individuals who comprise the typical liberal democratic nation-state, these 
mutual knowledge conditions are not met. One is barely aware of what intentions they might 
share with millions of fellow citizens. Even if we posit that all citizens share some abstract 
intention, remaining would be the byzantine task of ensuring that each individual’s proposed 
 
278 (Bratman 1999, 99, 103) 
279 (Searle 1990, 413) 
280 (Gilbert 1992, 362) 
281 (Tuomela 2005, 336) 
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contribution to the shared objective – their “sub-plan” in Bratman’s terminology – is suitably 
coordinated with those of all the others.282  
 
This returns us to the key claim of the emergence view. Joint-action in Bratman’s sense 
requires agents who have personal knowledge of one another. These knowledge conditions 
do not hold under impersonal settings. The function of liberal institutions is to facilitate 
coordination under such conditions where joint-intentional action is not feasible. Such 
coordination leads to emergent outcomes because it is composed of the interactions of very 
many agents acting upon their own idiosyncratic aims and knowledge. On the Hayekian 
score, to apply Bratman’s model to impersonal relations would constitute a category 
mistake. If we insist on saying that actors involved in impersonal coordination are 
undertaking “collective action,” we should do so only in the weak sense of the summation 
strategy. We shall look at her arguments in more detail below, but for now let us consider a 
specific objection Anna Stilz would raise against the claim we have just made. It is that there 
seem to be groupings that are large enough to be impersonal but which might still plausibly 
be described as capable of a joint-action. She writes:  
 
Even when an institution is too large for all its members to know one another, it can 
still feature significant levels of cooperation. Though I do not know most of the other 
students and employees at my university, still I “play my part” in it willingly. Many 
large groups—think of megachurches, or trade unions—do not exhibit close personal 
ties among the participants, yet their activity nonetheless counts as shared 
cooperation.283 
 
Now, whether cooperation is “shared” or “significant” is not the issue here. Impersonal and 
very large coordination on the market can also be so described. What is at stake is whether 
the cooperation is on the basis of jointly shared intentions. I take Stilz to argue that such is 
also the case here. Despite not knowing one another personally, the university students and 
employees can each say “I play my part” in a shared endeavour. There does seem to be a 
sense in which trade unions or universities can share participatory intentions towards shared 
goals despite their impersonal relations. How else do we account for the idea of strike action 
for instance? Many impersonally related union members manage to assure one another of 
their shared commitment to strike and indeed render compatible their sub-plans by, among 
other things, turning up to the picket line on the same day. If so, and pace our analysis above, 
 
282 Of course, Hayek’s point was that prices tacitly facilitate this kind of coordination within the 
context of a market economy. It cannot be facilitated consciously. 
283 (Stilz 2016, 107–8) 
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it seems that impersonal relations do not pose any categorical impediment to joint-
intentional action. If it is possible between thousands of impersonally related university 
members then it should also be possible between millions of impersonally related citizens.  
 
One difficulty with this objection is that it is far from obvious that an organisation such as a 
university indeed has a “shared goal” in relation to which all staff and students can say “I 
play my part”. Those who do think there is such a goal would be tempted to refer to a lofty 
academic ambition such as the dissemination of knowledge. Yet this is really true only of a 
subset of those that associate with the university. Many undergraduate and graduate 
students associate with the university as a means to gainful employment. Non-academic staff 
associate with the university as a means of gainful employment. It is arguably only 
permanent academic staff who associate with the university as a means to further a lofty 
academic goal. Even here matters are more fractured than they seem, since academics will 
have different understandings of what their “shared” academic goal might be.284 So one 
could push back against Stilz’s objection by saying that the members of a university are really 
closer to our train passengers in their relations than Bratman’s painters.  
 
In any case, even if we accept the premise that university members can and do coordinate 
their actions towards shared objectives, it does not necessarily follow that the same can be 
said of a group consisting of millions of liberal citizens. To see why, let us draw an analogy 
with the paradox of the heap. One or two grains of sand do not constitute a heap. A million 
do. We cannot specify the minimum number of grains necessary for a bona fide heap. Still 
this does not prevent us from identifying clear-cut cases on either side of this indeterminate 
threshold. We can think of the knowledge necessary for joint-action as a vague predicate in 
this way. We know for sure that a handful of persons do have sufficient mutual knowledge 
to undertake a joint-intentional action. We could also accept that some impersonal 
groupings of an intermediate size also have sufficient such knowledge. Let us grant that this 
is true of most universities. As the grouping-in-question grows in size and complexity, 
however, a point will be reached at which it no longer has the requisite knowledge.  Quite 
where this indeterminate threshold might be does not matter for our purposes. The question 
is whether the citizen grouping of the typical nation-state is of such size and complexity to 
 
284 These might range from discovering the truth to disseminating the truth to improving public policy 
to furthering social justice and so on. Even if we restrict ourselves to one such academic goal, they 
have different meanings in different disciplines. Consider what “discovering the truth” might entail in 
physics as opposed to political philosophy.  
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be definitively above this threshold such that we can also definitively say that they lack the 
knowledge necessary for joint-intentional action.285 What reasons might there be to answer 
this question in the affirmative? Three might be advanced. 
First, members of a university have chosen to join the university and we can identify at least 
some putative aims to which a university might be dedicated to upholding.286 It might then 
seem plausible to infer that the members of that university share the intention to uphold 
these putative aims. Neither condition seems to hold with respect to political associations. 
Most citizens have not opted to join the political associations of which they are a member. 
Nor can we identify even any putative aims uniting citizens of diverse countries such as the 
United Kingdom or United States.287 Second, we know from economic theory and practice 
that the knowledge necessary for conscious and centrally coordinated planning can be 
ascertained in the intermediate sized grouping of the corporation. We also know it cannot 
be ascertained by central planners attempting to direct the economy of whole societies. This 
fact alone suggests there is a qualitative difference between the ease with which information 
can flow within groupings of the size and complexity of the typical university or company 
compared with groupings the size of a nation state.  
 
The third reason is probably the most important and consequently deserves some 
elaboration. The oldest universities in the world do seem to exhibit continuity and unity of 
purpose over very long periods of time. Universities such as Oxford, Cambridge, Bologna, 
Padles or Al-Karaouine have been engaged in some form of scholarly activity for centuries 
and in some cases over a millennium. We are often tempted to ascribe this same continuity 
and unity of purpose to political associations. However, large-scale political institutions do 
not arise as the shared project of the liberal citizenry. They are indeed better described as 
emergent phenomena. They are the unintended result of strategic interactions between 
groups acting on the basis of their own knowledge and values. This does not mean that the 
 
285 One might wonder what is meant by a “typical” state given that the smallest state in the world, 
Vatican City, has less than a 1,000 residents while the largest state in the world, China, has nearly 1.4 
billion residents. By “typical” I mean states whose populations run at least into the millions. This is 
true of the majority of states in the world. Additionally, the vast majority of the world’s population 
live in such states. By way of some comparison, the London School of Economics has just under 13,000 
staff and students. Very small states such as those found in the Pacific Ocean or those that are better 
described as principalities, such as Monaco or Liechtenstein, might well be exempt from the argument 
offered here. At the same time, however, advocates of the associational model hardly restrict the 
application of their theories to such small states.   
286 Such as those identified above.  
287 Rawlsians might be tempted to refer to social justice as a shared aim. I respond to this in the section 
below.  
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actions of all agents are equally efficacious. We can expect some actors – e.g. political elites 
or those who are especially effective at political mobilisation – to have a greater impact on 
events. Still, the course of events often outrun even their intentions.  
 
Several considerations can be offered in support of this contention. Even the most 
paradigmatic examples of collective action for political ends, mass protests leading to 
revolutions, tend to involve at most a small minority of the population. The French 
Revolution of 1789, the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Romanian Revolution of 1989 
are estimated to have involved no more than one per cent of the population at the time. The 
1979 Iranian Revolution is claimed to have had the biggest turn-out but it was not more than 
ten per cent of the population.288 Further, those who do take part in these events do not 
always see themselves as taking part in a “Revolution”. Our terminology here is potentially 
misleading. The characterisation of these events is ex-post. The actors who took part in these 
events on-the-ground may not have seen themselves as contributing to a seismic historical 
event. As James Scott observes:  
 
Those who stormed the Bastille to free prisoners and seize arms could not possibly 
have known (much less intended) that they would bring down the monarchy and 
aristocracy, let alone that they were participating in what later would come to be 
known as "the French Revolution."289 
 
Nor do the disparate groups who take part in those events subsequently designated as 
“Revolutions” share the same objectives other than perhaps wanting to change the status 
quo. The Iranian Revolution, for instance, consisted of various groups ranging from 
secularists to Marxists to religious inspired groups. The religious groups themselves were 
heterogeneous, with some wanting to keep religion out of politics, others fusing their 
Islamism with Marxism and yet others following the doctrine of the figurehead of the 
Revolution, Ruhollah Khomeini.290 It is very safe to say that not all members of the 
revolutionary coalition intended the regime that Khomeini would subsequently set up after 
he and his faction won the post-revolutionary power struggle.  
 
Similarly, a historical survey of major constitutional moments, reveals that most of the 
population have not been involved. Rather these were elite-led projects in which the masses 
 
288 These figures were obtained from Kurzman (2005, 122–23). 
289 (Scott 2012, 137) 
290 On this see Kurzman (2005). 
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were swept up.  Hume famously wrote of the Glorious Revolution in Britain – “And it was 
only the majority of seven hundred, who determined that change for near ten millions”.291 
Russell Hardin notes that the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, out of 
which emerged the US constitution, were “essentially” a secret and remained so until the 
death of the conventioneers.292 When the French National Constituent Assembly issued the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789, the majority of French “citizens” 
didn’t speak French and were primarily loyal to their local village rather than the French 
state.293 None of this should be taken to imply that elites are puppet masters who manipulate 
and control events from behind the scenes as they wish. For one thing, “political elites” are 
typically a heterogeneous category of actors with distinct interests and aims. For another, 
political economy and political sociology suggest that not even elites planned or intended 
the rise of the contemporary state as we know it. It is best seen as the unintended by-product 
of strategic interactions occurring primarily between different elite groupings.  
 
This is the account offered by North, Wallis and Weingast in their documentation of the 
transition from “natural states” to “open access orders”. They use the latter term to describe 
the institutions of liberal democratic states. The hallmarks of such orders is impersonal 
governance, whereby rights and entitlements are distributed to citizens in a standardised 
and impartial manner. The aspect of open-access orders that are most important to the 
authors is universal access to perpetually lived organisations.294 The hallmark of natural 
states is governance on the basis of personal relationships – “who one is and who one knows, 
form the basis for social organization”.295 They designate natural states as limited access 
orders because the right to form organisations under them is limited to well-connected 
elites. These actors form a coalition who divide up privileges and rents between one another 
while excluding outsiders.296 They note that such elites “are not a unified group, but are 
 
291 (Hume 1777d) 
292 (Hardin 1999, 111); further the manner in which the US Constitution was ratified owed more to 
network and coordination affects then any joint-intentional action of US citizens. We shall return to 
this point in section five of chapter seven.  
293 These “peasants” would be turned into “Frenchmen” over the nineteenth century, as Eugen Weber 
(2007) famously documented. 
294 (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, 21–25); I refer here to Violence and Social Orders. There is some 
overlap between their understanding of an open-access order governed by impersonal law and 
Hayek’s understanding of the Great Society governed by purpose-independent rules of just conduct.  
295 (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, 2) 
296 (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, 18–21) 
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composed of disparate groups that compete and cooperate, and sometimes go to war 
against each other”.297  
 
They seek to uncover and explain the processes by which societies transition from natural 
states to liberal democratic open access orders. Using the historical case studies of France, 
the United States and Britain, they offer the following explanation. In the 18th century, many 
members of the elite coalition had the incentive to convert their privileges into more formal 
legal rights because they feared that “intra-elite political competition would inevitably lead 
to consolidated political control by a faction that maintained control through manipulation 
of the economy”.298 In other words, some groups in the elite coalition preferred to turn their 
privileges into more legally robust “rights” in order to prevent predation from other groups 
in the elite coalition. The creation of one set of elite rights created incentives for elite-actors 
to credibly extend such rights yet further: 
 
The privilege of owning shares in a joint-stock company, for example, may begin as 
a unique privilege. However, if that privilege becomes widespread and shares are 
transferable, then an elite interest in supporting impersonal exchange of shares may 
grow. Impersonal exchange in shares, in turn, may create an interest in impersonal 
formation of companies, forces that clearly came to the fore in all three countries in 
the nineteenth century.299 
 
The crucial point here being that these actors did not set out to create open-access and 
liberal political institutions. At each juncture, they were responding to incentives out of self-
interest. The emergence of liberal institutions was the cumulative and unintended effect of 
these changes.  
 
In his own famous account, Charles Tilly sees contemporary state institutions as the 
unintended outcome of the efforts of political elites to create a fiscal base for war. Tilly 
emphasises that states compose a system “to the extent that they interact, and to the degree 
that their interaction significantly affects each parties fate”.300  Within this system, state 
institutions were more effective than alternative institutions in gathering manpower to fight 
wars and accumulating debt finance to fund them.  The political elites who had such modes 
of political organisation at their disposal had a military advantage over those who did not. 
 
297 (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, 149) 
298 (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, 256) 
299 (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, 256) 
300 (Tilly 1992, 4) 
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State institutions as we know them arose through this evolutionary selection affect.301 The 
political elites did not anticipate this as the outcome of their actions. The state is better seen 
as the unintended result of a “mosaic of adaptations and improvisations”.302 Cardinal 
Richelieu, for example, did not intend to lay the foundations for the “French State” when he 
sent central government officials to collect tax funds rather than relying on local feudal 
authorities. He did so because the French crown was in desperate need of war finance and 
those local authorities had stopped cooperating financially.303  
 
Hendrik Spruyt also offers an evolutionary account similar in many respects to Tilly. For 
Spruyt there is no inevitable or necessary transition from the dispersed and polycentric mode 
of political authority in the Middle Ages to the contemporary state. The emerging Weberian 
state faced competition from other political forms, such as city states and city leagues.304 
Spruyt emphasises the superior organisational logic of the Weberian state as the selection 
mechanism rather than its sheer capacity for resource mobilisation. Such states were 
economically more efficient and were better placed to make credible commitments to 
external counterparts. Network affects are also part of Spruyt’s story. Once the number of 
Weberian states reached critical mass and became the standard mode of political 
organisation in the international system, other alternatives were de-legitimised.305 For 
Spruyt “we cannot simply deduce institutional outcomes from preferences or impute 
preferences from observed outcomes”.306 Instead, and like Tilly, he sees states institutions 
as arising within the context of strategic interactions between elites in an international 
system.307 In summary of this section, even if we grant that intermediate groups such as 
universities are capable of joint-intentional action, there are definitive reasons to think that 
large citizen groupings are not. Such intermediate associations have at least some putative 
purposes and their members join them voluntarily. The analogous statement cannot be 
made of citizen groupings. Economic theory and history suggest a qualitative difference 
between these kinds of groups in the degree to which information can be shared within 
them. Finally, as we have just seen, history does reveal a continuity of purpose in the world’s 
 
301 (Tilly 1992, 30–31) 
302 (Tilly 1992, 26) 
303 (Tilly 1992, 26) 
304 (Spruyt 1994, 18–21) 
305 (Spruyt 1994, 28) 
306 (Spruyt 1994, 26) 
307 For a wider review of the sociological literature consistent with this finding, see Cavanaugh (2011, 
12–18). 
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oldest universities but also shows state institutions to be emergent phenomena arising out 
of elite interactions rather than the creation of a civic-minded citizenry.  
 
4. Liberal Justice as the Object of Joint-Intentional Action  
We have completed our general critique of the claim that mass groupings of citizens are 
capable of joint-intentional action. We now turn to Stilz’s specific argument. As already 
mentioned, hers is the most explicit and elaborate version of this claim. Citing Bratman, Stilz 
says that I “share a participatory intention whenever I think of myself as doing something 
because we are doing something together”.308 The state itself, she claims, can be understood 
as just such joint-intentional activity but on a “grand scale”.309 On her Kantian account, liberal 
justice requires a unitary system of coercive law to enforce citizens’ right of person and 
property. These need to be “objectively” defined and enforced by the state if we are to avoid 
the conflicts that arise when private parties try to “subjectively” define and enforce their 
rights.310 The objective definition and enforcement of the law is the object of the joint-
intentional agency of liberal citizens. For laws cannot operate solely on the basis of state 
coercion, 
… they depend much more pervasively on large-scale patterns of behavior on the 
part of people who orient their actions to these laws, who take law to have a moral 
salience that affects their practical reasoning about what to do. By obeying the law, 
then, residents of a particular state help to make their acquired rights an affective 
reality… Likewise, by paying taxes, members actively contribute to sustaining the 
institutions that enforce those rights against those individuals who refuse to 
voluntarily comply.311 
In addition to obeying the law and paying our taxes, we share also the intention of 
participating in their formulation. Citizens act on this shared intention by voting in addition 
to “[taking] part in social movements, debating political issues, voting for representatives, 
and retaining a right of participation in the revision of their constitution”.312 Despite citizens 
not knowing one another personally, then, their complying with the law and their political 
activity can be seen as a form of joint-intentional activity with the aim of realising a common 
and just scheme of law. Stilz’s model has much in common with Rawls’ thought that just 
 
308 (Stilz 2015, 13) 
309 (Stilz 2015, 13) 
310 (Stilz 2009, chap. 2) 
311 (Stilz 2009, 193) 
312 (Stilz 2009, 194) 
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political institutions are appropriately secured when citizens act justly with one another 
rather than have justice imposed on them. 
Unlike Rawls, however, Stilz’ account is intended as a description of the relationship between 
actually-existing liberal citizens. It does not refer to an idealised well-ordered society. With 
this in mind, we can identify three difficulties with her account. First, as argued in chapter 
two, it is conceptually mistaken to hold that states produce a unitary system of law. State 
institutions do not speak with one voice because they consist of multiple legislative bodies 
and agencies.  To return to an example from that chapter, citizens of the United States can 
be subject to the laws of the United States Congress, State legislatures, City governments, 
municipal governments and county governments. It is implausible to think that the manifold 
laws and regulations issued by state institutions embody any overall shared intention, such 
as the upholding of liberal rights. Many of the laws issued by putatively liberal states, such 
as the prohibition of recreational drugs, are hard to reconcile with any liberal conception of 
justice. Second, not all state laws are seen as legitimate by the populace and are 
consequently disregarded by them. Widespread violation of laws banning drug use are but 
one example of this. Widespread efforts to minimise tax exposure are another. Third, 
political engagement is at best haphazard in most liberal democracies. Over the last twenty 
years, voter turnout in the United Kingdom has ranged from 58% to 68%. The turnout for the 
high profile Brexit Referendum, frequently commented upon as exceptionally high compared 
with general election turnouts, was 72%. The equivalent variance for United States 
Presidential elections ranges between 50% and 60%. In sum, Stilz exaggerates the coherence 
of states’ legislative output, the extent of citizens’ legal compliance and citizens’ 
commitment to political participation.  The biggest difficulty with this account, however, is 
that it is far from clear what coincidental motivations liberal citizens might have in obeying 
the law. Surely only few citizens affirm the explicitly Kantian reasons offered by Stilz. Others 
might have other kinds of philosophical justifications in mind and there is no reason to think 
that they will be commensurate or compatible with Kantianism. Many will presumably obey 
for conventional reasons. They will acquiesce to state authority without deeply reflecting on 
the matter because they have been socialised to do so. Still others will obey the law for the 
instrumental reason of avoiding state punishment and/or social censure if they are caught. 
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Many of us will have an ambiguous mixture of these and other conceivable kinds of 
motivation.313  
Anticipating this criticism, Stilz writes:  
… It is not necessary that each member who obeys the law and pays taxes actively 
intends the entire system of public coercion that the state puts into effect. The 
resident may simply be intending not to get himself punished, or to obey the law, 
and may not be in any way conscious of the acts of his compatriots and their overall 
connection to a system of [just] public coercion. Still, we can say that the residents 
are in fact contributing to the [just] public coercion of one another even though they 
don’t intend the entire project. Our resident’s actions are causally linked to an 
ongoing collective process – the public coercion of other people on a state’s territory 
in the name of justice – and he can be expected to be aware of this fact, if he reflects 
on it.314 
On the face of it, this passage just seems contradictory. Either the citizens participate in the 
shared intention or they don’t. If Stilz here concedes that many don’t share the relevant 
intention to realise an objective system of law, then she cannot simultaneously claim they 
are participants in the joint-intentional action to that end. This said, a more charitable 
interpretation can be gleaned from the last sentence of that passage. It would run as follows. 
Were someone to reflect on the effects of their legal compliance, they would realise how it 
is causally linked to the realisation of just laws and – though Stilz does not explicitly say this 
– would also endorse it. Thus, they can still be described as participating in a joint-intentional 
action insofar as their behaviour is casually connected to the realisation of an end that they 
would endorse upon reflection. The problem is that this just seems to beg the question. 
Perhaps after learning about and reflecting upon prevailing political institutions, a previously 
apathetic person would endorse them. Or perhaps they won’t. Perhaps intellectual reflection 
would even make them more sceptical about politics than they were previously.315 We 
cannot tell a priori.  Thus, Stilz’s description of actually-existing liberal citizens as sharing the 
objective of realising a unitary and “objective” – in the Kantian sense – scheme of law is 
 
313 The problem here, however, is not simply that our rationales for obeying the law might differ. On 
Bratman’s model, each intends to do their part in the collective action because they know the 
equivalent is true of all others. To act jointly we do not simply need to have the same intentions but 
each needs to know that all the others have the same intentions. Even if we assume full compliance 
in this scenario – i.e. posit that all citizens affirm Stilz’s Kantian rationale for obeying the law and are 
motivated to do so – they would still need to communicate this fact with one another and such 
assurance is very hard to come by between large groupings of liberal citizens. We shall develop this 
argument in the next chapter.  
314 (Stilz 2009, 193); emphases added. 
315 They might even flirt with anarchism if their intellectual reflection exposes them to philosophers 
such as Huemer (2013) and Simmons (1999).   
105 
 
mistaken. So concludes our critique of the joint-intentional action model. We now turn to 
what might initially seem like a more promising model, the principal-agent account.  
 
5. The Principal-Agent Model   
Perhaps the joint-intentional action model is just excessively demanding in its requirement 
that all members of the group share not only the relevant intention but also assure 
themselves that everyone else shares it. Surely, it might be objected, a plausible model of 
collective political agency does not have to meet such stringent criteria. The principal-agent 
account might be a better candidate. Citizens democratically elect governments. 
Governments make legislative decisions for the country and have the executive and judicial 
power to enforce them. Insofar as they are democratically accountable to the electorate the 
decisions and actions of the government can be ascribed to the citizenry as a whole. For the 
agent is authorised to act only on behalf of the principal to whom it is ultimately accountable 
via the ballot box.316 This model is popular too among liberal associationalists. As we saw 
earlier, David Miller says that the “policies pursued by the state can reasonably be seen as 
policies for whose effects the citizen body as a whole is collectively responsible, given that 
they have authorized the government to act on their behalf in a free election”.317 Paul Kelly 
refers to the collective will of citizens as expressed by “democratically legitimate legislative 
institutions”.318 Rawls too invokes this model rather than the joint-intentional action model 
in his international theory. When referring to the “rational conduct” of “peoples,” he says it 
is “organised and expressed in their elections and votes, and the laws and policies of their 
government”.319 
The plausibility of the principal-agent model rests on the ability of voters to communicate 
their preferences to the governing classes. There are two ways in which they might do this.  
 
316 The following example might help clarify the distinction between the joint-intentional and 
principal-agent models. The Apollo 11 moon landing could not at all plausibly be described as a joint-
intentional action by all American citizens. It was proposed as a national goal by President Kennedy in 
1961 and was discharged by a specialised state agency in NASA in 1969. The bulk of the United States’ 
citizens were involved neither in the formulation nor implementation of this goal. Still, the principal-
agent model would hold that it was a “national achievement” of the United States as a whole because 
it was undertaken by a government duly elected by and acting on behalf of the sovereign citizenry.  
317 (Miller 2007, 128) 
318 (Kelly 2005, 73) 
319 Rawls (2003, 25); again, though, Rawls is referring to idealised rather than actually-existing regimes. 
We are here considering the plausibility of the principal-agent model as a description of the 
relationship between actually-existing liberal citizens. 
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Ex-ante accountability – voters select a party or candidate on the basis of their 
professed policy manifesto or commitments. Voters thus signal their approval of a 
policy prior to its implementation. 
Ex-post accountability  – voters judge retrospectively the outcomes produced by a 
governing party. Their continuing to vote them into office signals their retrospective 
approval of their policies.  
The principal-agent model is undoubtedly more plausible than the joint-intentional action 
model. It takes much more seriously the circumstances of a large-scale society marked by 
the fragmentation of knowledge and an extensive division of labour. Government would 
inevitably be a specialist activity under such circumstances rather than a shared endeavour 
to which all citizens contribute. In focusing on how the governed can hold their rulers to 
account rather than how all citizens might act-in-unison, the principal-agent model is much 
more realistic than the joint-intentional alternative. However, we shall argue that it too 
ultimately fails. This is not to deny that the right to vote provides some mechanism of 
accountability between the government and the electorate. Democratic accountability, for 
instance, is famously effective at preventing famine.320 Effective democratic accountability, 
however, tends to be possible only when there are “clear, easy-to-recognize policy failures 
that can readily (and correctly) be ascribed to government officials”.321 For the most part, 
however, state and governmental institutions display significant autonomy from the 
intentions, beliefs and values of individual voters.322 
Three considerations will be advanced in defence of this claim. First, democratic choice is 
limited to options pre-selected by the political class and expressed in explicit propositional 
form. However, the bulk of voters’ preferences and values are tacit and embodied in their 
respective ways of life. This knowledge cannot be transmitted to the government via the 
ballot box. Second, even if we posited that voter beliefs were adequately expressed via their 
votes on propositional statements, we are still faced with the problem of indeterminacy. 
Abstract policies require interpretation to be implemented and interpretation is at the 
discretion of politicians. Voters do not authorise the concrete manner in which policies are 
implemented. Third, knowledge problems make it very difficult for voters to evaluate ex-post 
 
320 (Sen 1981) 
321 (Somin 2013, 192) 
322 Here we set aside chapter two’s claim that the state is more like a polycentric network than a 
unitary organisation. If successful, that argument by itself undermines the principal-agent model. For 
there would then be no unitary or coherent “agency” capable of “representing” the electorate. The 
argument presented in this section amounts instead to the following. Even if we did conceive of the 
state as a unitary agency, the principal-agent model would still not be plausible because of the 
autonomy such an agency would enjoy with respect to voter preferences.   
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the performance of governments. The first and second considerations are advanced to 
undermine the claim of ex-ante authorisation. The third undermines the claim of ex-post 
authorisation. 
  
6. Tacit Knowledge and the Limits of Preference Aggregation  
We can begin by noting the well-known aggregation problems of social choice theory. Arrow 
famously showed that in a choice between three or more options undertaken by two or more 
people, there is no decision procedure that produces a complete and transitive social ranking 
and does not violate one of several reasonable fairness constraints.323 Examples of the latter 
include universal admissibility of orderings – individuals may choose from any possible rank 
ordering of the three options; and non-dictatorship – there is no individual who unilaterally 
decides the social ranking.324 More recently, Christian List has shown that when three or 
more people are tasked with issuing “yes/no” answers to a set of logically connected 
propositions, there is no decision procedure that can produce a logically consistent set of 
collective answers and meet two fairness constraints. The latter two are robustness to 
pluralism – the procedure accepts as an input any individually rational set of answers to the 
propositions under consideration; and basic majoritarianism – the collective acceptance of 
any particular proposition on the agenda depends on majority acceptance.325 In both cases 
the dilemma is similar. If we are to avoid collectively irrational decisions – the violation of 
transitivity and completeness criteria for Arrow; the violation of a consistency criterion for 
List – we are forced to select among an array of decision procedures each of which violates 
a reasonable constraint of fairness. Any meta-decision procedure for deciding on the choice 
procedure will itself be subject to these kinds of difficulties. The content of the people’s will 
is thus arbitrarily contingent on the voting procedure.  
Such conventional aggregation problems refer to the difficulties of aggregating individual 
voter preferences with respect to binary judgements on pre-selected propositional 
statements. That is, voters are restricted to either accepting or rejecting such statements.326 
The great achievement of social choice theory is to show that the public may not speak with 
 
323 (Arrow 1950); I here follow Riker’s (1988, chp. 5) account in Liberalism Against Populism. 
324 (Riker 1988, 116–19) 
325 (List 2011, 272–74); this paper builds on his earlier work with Phillip Pettit: (List and Pettit 2006). 
326 For routine elections in representative democracies, citizens vote on explicit propositions 
contained in the manifestos or campaign pledges of different candidates. In referenda, they vote 
directly on the propositions themselves. 
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a coherent voice even when their opinion is elicited in this highly standardised and regulated 
manner. List’s contribution focuses on decision procedures with respect to propositions that 
take the logical form:  
P iff Q 
P  
.˙. Q  
He uses the following illustrative example:327 
1. We should invade country X if and only if it has weapons of mass destruction. 
2. Country X has weapons of mass destruction.  
3. We should invade country X. 
He shows that the aggregation of three individually consistent answers to these propositions 
leads to a collectively irrational result whereby the first proposition is affirmed, the second 
denied but the third still affirmed.328  
However, even if binary decision procedures with respect to pre-selected propositional 
statements were not prone to such aggregation problems, we would still have reasons to 
doubt the extent to which voting procedures effectively channel the views of voters to the 
government. With regard to a particular decision, one’s first preference may not be on the 
table. Classical liberals typically feel this way when choosing between the expressed policies 
of a socially conservative but economically liberal right-wing party and their mirror image in 
the left-wing alternative. There might also be issues that voters feel are important but over 
which they cannot express an opinion because they are not included in the manifestos of 
political parties or, in the case of a referendum, are not listed as an option. Finally, as we saw 
 
327 (List 2011, 275–76) 
328 The following table, reproduced from List (2011, 276), fleshes out the problem in detail. Persons 1-
3 individually provide rationally consistent answers to the above three propositions. However, when 
their individual answers to each proposition are aggregated using a majoritarian function, we arrive 
at a set of contradictory collective judgements i.e. we should invade iff there are WMDs, there are no 
WMDs and that we should invade nonetheless. 
 
 “We should invade 
iff 
 if there are WMD” 
“There are 
WMD” 
“We should 
invade”  
Person 1 YES YES YES 
Person 2 YES NO NO 
Person 3 NO NO YES 
Collective 
Judgements 
YES NO YES 
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in chapter one, voting is a poor measure of the strength of opinion that voters have over a 
particular issue. 
From a Hayekian perspective, the problem with such democratic procedures is that they 
exclude “the large body of social knowledge which cannot be put into words”.329 We already 
saw Hayek’s emphasis on such knowledge in chapter one. He was joined by many other 
twentieth century thinkers such as Wittgenstein, Michael Oakeshott and Michael Polanyi in 
arguing that tacit knowledge is foundational with respect to knowledge expressible in 
propositional form. For Wittgenstein, understanding the dictionary definitions of words is 
insufficient and often not even necessary to be proficient in a language. Rather one needs to 
understand the largely tacit “agreements-in-judgement” that make the use of a word 
appropriate in one context but not another.330 For Oakeshott, our explicit and formal 
knowledge is but a partial representation of a prior ensemble of tacit know-how revealed in 
action itself. The distinction can be illustrated by the difference between knowing the 
content of a cook book and knowing how to cook well.331 Similarly, and using the example of 
scientific practice, Polanyi argued that expertise in any advanced activity requires a form of 
connoisseurship irreducible to a formal method. Such knowledge is best gained by doing the 
activity itself as an apprentice under the tutelage of a master.332    
The substantive knowledge held by most is tacitly embedded in our practices, routines and 
forms of life. This extends both to our understandings of value and our understandings of 
justice. For many if not most of us our conception of the good life is something that we realise 
through action. It is not the implementation of a theoretically fleshed-out “rational life 
plan”.333 Very few of us, philosophers included, conduct our moral life on the basis of a 
systematic moral theory.334 Our beliefs as to how we should treat one another are exhibited 
as much in our conduct itself as in what we can verbally express. These tacit understandings 
of the good and the right cannot in principle be communicated to government officials via 
democratic procedures, limited as the latter are to issuing binary judgements on explicit 
propositional statements. We might imagine that this epistemic opacity would be alleviated 
 
329 (Pennington 2003, 731) 
330 (Wittgenstein 1958) 
331 (Oakeshott 1991) 
332 (Polanyi 2005) 
333 As Rawls assumes when he describes his understanding of a “conception of the good” in chapter 
seven of Theory.  
334 This is probably a good thing since every monist moral theory prescribes very unappealing 
courses of action in at least some cases. “Morality” is better seen as a complex territory of practices 
irreducible to a neat theory. On this see Schmidtz (2006). 
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in small polities or communities in which political leaders and the governed shared the same 
social practices and circumstance such that the tacit components of their knowledge would 
be relevantly shared. These conditions do not hold in large-scale social settings.  
 
7. The Inevitability of Political Discretion  
Even if one believes voters can adequately express their preferences by choosing between 
binary positions on propositional statements, such statements do not determine the actions 
of government officials. They are indeterminate as to their implementation, which is left to 
official discretion. One prominent and illustrative example is the 2016 referendum on the 
United Kingdom’s continuing membership of the European Union. The referendum result 
issued to the UK parliament the following deceptively simple instruction – “Leave the 
European Union”.335 This instruction has proven, however, to be notoriously indeterminate. 
Possible interpretations extend from sundering connections with the European Union almost 
entirely – a “No Deal” – to a host of other conceivable arrangements whereby the UK retains 
some parts of the existing relationship with the EU but ceases others. These more partial 
forms of exit admit of many possible permutations depending on the specifics of which 
arrangements continue and which cease. In other words, the substance of what it means for 
the UK to leave the European Union has been left to the UK government and Parliament.  
An example more familiar within political philosophy might prove useful here too. Suppose 
a political party wins an election on the pledge to implement Rawls’ difference principle or 
otherwise a policy along the same lines. Let us grant for the sake of argument that this means 
that the realisation of the difference principle is the “will of the people” which democratic 
representatives are discharged with carrying out. The difference principle states that social 
and economic inequalities are required and permitted only to the extent that they maximise 
benefits to the least-advantaged. Can we conclude that the government have clear 
instruction as to which policies to carry out? It is true that the difference principle is 
determinate in some respects. Patently exploitative economic systems, such as feudalism or 
apartheid, are ruled out. As are policies aiming for, say, a pareto improvement rather than 
maximising the prospects of the least-advantaged. Still, a great number of institutional 
possibilities and government policies to achieve them remain ruled in given the open-ended 
way in which the principle might be interpreted. Rawls and his followers believe that a 
 
335 That was the literal wording of the “Leave” option on the ballot paper. The other option was: 
“Remain a member of the European Union”.  
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radically egalitarian economic system such as “liberal socialism” or “property-owning 
democracy” best upholds the difference principle.336 Jason Brennan, however, demurs and 
argues that a free-market regime would best do so. Part of the disagreement here is simply 
due to different understandings of the time-frame over which the principle is to be realised. 
Brennan concedes that over the short-run, greater redistribution might maximise the 
position of the least-advantaged. However, he argues that a free market regime with 
comparatively less redistribution would maximise their position over the long-run. The 
difference stems from the higher long-run growth that Brennan believes is afforded by lower 
redistribution.337 Another source of the disagreement, of course, is that Brennan and 
orthodox Rawlsians espouse different economic theories.  
The point here is that the difference principle by itself doesn’t specify the economic theory 
most conducive to its implementation nor what might be the relevant time frame over which 
it should be realised. Rawls himself recognises this indeterminacy, writing that the 
judgement as to how the difference principle will be met "frequently depends upon 
speculative political and economic doctrines and upon social theory generally”.338 He leaves 
the task of implementing the difference principle to legislators. If the principle can be 
concretely interpreted in very many ways, potentially up to the point of advocating radically 
different economic systems, then our elected government have not received any clear 
instruction as to which policies to carry out. A great deal is left to their discretion. We can 
generalise this point. Recall from the prior chapter our combining Hayek’s theory of local 
knowledge with Schmitt’s emphasis on the unavoidability of a “decisionistic and 
personalistic” element in the implementation of law. It was argued that the “centre” of the 
state has limited control over the “periphery”. The substantive content of policy issued by 
the centre is determined by practitioners at the periphery using their in-situ knowledge.  That 
one interpretation of the central policy rather than another is selected is a function of the 
personality, characteristics, judgements, circumstances and so forth of the particular official-
in-question. We may think of these as the political equivalent of the particularistic time and 
place facts that Hayek identified as pertinent for economic analysis. Such facts are relevant 
for the phenomena we are trying to understand but which are too varied and idiosyncratic 
to be accounted for synoptically. We are now applying this notion to the relationship 
between state officials and citizens. Even if the citizenry unanimously vote for a policy or 
 
336 E.g. (Rawls 2001, 135–38) 
337 (Brennan 2007, 292–93) 
338 (Rawls 1999, 174) 
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series of policies, their concrete implementation will necessarily require state officials to 
exercise discretionary judgement on the basis of their “private” if not local knowledge not 
necessarily available to the demos as a whole.  
 
8. The Difficulty of Ex-Post Judgements 
One might raise a counter-objection. Even if the implementation of policy requires large 
degrees of discretionary private authority on the part of politicians, perhaps voters could 
judge their performance retrospectively. The problem with this objection is that it grossly 
exaggerates the knowledge of individual voters and their capacity to accurately judge the 
performance of political actors.  There is now an established literature on the prevalence of 
rational voter ignorance. These arguments typically focus on the incentives and motivation 
– or lack thereof – that voters have to acquire relevant and accurate information when 
deciding how to vote.339 The possibility of casting the decisive vote in an election is negligible 
while the costs of becoming informed are all too real. As a result “most citizens don’t invest 
effort to be rational about politics because rationality doesn’t pay”.340 It is not simply that 
voters are often ignorant of elementary political facts.341 Even worse, they are often 
“rationally irrational”. Since nothing is at stake with one’s personal vote, it might pay to 
engage in politics like a sports fan. Such a fan would rout for their own party or “team” and 
deride the opposition often regardless of the merits or otherwise of specific policies but 
because one gains intrinsic satisfaction from the tribal partisanship.342 The sentimental 
benefits of such “fandom” outweigh the cost of judging policy matters in an irrational way 
given the negligible impact one’s vote has on the overall result. If voters, then, tend not only 
to be rationally ignorant but also rationally irrational about politics, they are very poorly 
placed to retroactively judge elected governments, particularly once the scale and 
complexity of contemporary state activity is taken into account.  
We can also identify epistemic constraints rendering ex-post evaluation highly difficult even 
if voters were highly motivated.343 I think we can identify three such constraints. 
 
339 Articulations of this argument can be found in Brennan (2016), Caplan (2008), Somin (2013) and 
Pennington (2011, 65–60). 
340 (Brennan 2016, 49) 
341 For a review of the evidence in the US context, see Somin (2013, chap. 1). 
342  (Brennan 2016, chap. 2); (Caplan 2008); (Pennington 2011, 65–69); (Somin 2013, chap. 3) 
343 I write “highly difficult” rather than “infeasible” so as not to deny the earlier stated point that voters 
can hold governments to account to some limited extent, namely, with respect to clear and easy-to-
recognise policy failures. Thus, one would not be claiming that ex-post voter evaluation of 
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a) Time scarcity 
Chapter two emphasised the diversity of the activities undertaken by state institutions. 
Recall that even our partial list of these activities ranged from war-making to promoting 
cultural integration to the administration of the welfare state. Specialist knowledge is a 
necessary condition of properly evaluating state activity in each of these domains and the 
many others in which the contemporary state is active. One needs knowledge of economics, 
public finance and the comparative efficiency of different energy sources to properly 
evaluate the state’s energy policy. One needs to understand different pedagogical 
techniques to properly evaluate educational policy. One needs to understand international 
relations, international law as well as military strategy to properly evaluate a contemporary 
state’s decision to go to war. And so on and so forth. Gaining such specialist knowledge is 
not straightforward. Academics invest a career’s worth of time and effort to gain such 
knowledge. Even their specialisms are normally restricted to one field. The most well-
motivated of voters would lack time to gain the full range of specialist knowledge necessary 
to assess the full range of state activity. Even if they somehow had the knowledge to evaluate 
each and any aspect of state activity, they would still lack the time to evaluate all or even 
most aspects of state activity since they would have to choose which areas to monitor. We 
noted in the previous chapter that the UK state contains over 500 distinct bodies and 
departments. No single voter has sufficient time to monitor the activities of all these bodies 
and departments even if somehow they had adequate knowledge to monitor any of them in 
particular.  
b) Opportunity cost  
Mises and Hayek’s seminal contribution to the central planning debate hinged on the claim 
that the central planner would be ignorant of the opportunity costs of different production 
plans. This meant that they could not rationally decide between competing uses of the 
resources under their control. A parallel problem faces voters in assessing the performance 
of governments. A thought experiment recently advanced by Samuel Decanio is helpful in 
articulating this point.344 Imagine a scenario whereby voters have to assess the proposals of 
different parties for the production of a fuel efficient car. We can even posit, for the sake of 
 
governments is impossible in, say, the categorical sense that Hayek and Mises argued was the case 
with respect to economic central planning. Still, one would be claiming that voter evaluation beyond 
these easy-to-recognise cases is very difficult due to epistemic constraints that hold regardless of voter 
motivation. 
344 (DeCanio 2014); though I adapt DeCanio’s original proposal for my purposes here.  
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argument, that these voters have the engineering expertise required to assess whether the 
elected party actually succeeds in producing the car promised in their proposal. Suppose a 
party is elected, produces the car they promised and our exceedingly knowledgeable voters 
are aware of this. A problem still remains. They would not know whether the car was 
produced efficiently given the opportunity cost of resources used in its manufacture.345 The 
funds used to produce the car could have been put to countless other uses. They could, for 
instance, have been used to improve public healthcare or national defence or the education 
system or indeed been given back to the public in the form of a tax cut. Since the alternative 
uses for these resources are practically countless, even the most well-motivated and 
knowledgeable of voters would not be able to assess whether the car was produced 
efficiently or not.346  
c) Radical ignorance  
Following Sandy Ikeda and Jeffrey Friedman, we might distinguish radical from rational 
ignorance. I am rationally ignorant when I know how to acquire knowledge that would 
improve my state of affairs but do not do so because the expected cost of acquiring it exceeds 
the expected benefit.347 Such ignorance is chosen and reducible to incentives and 
motivation.348 Radical ignorance is not voluntary in this sense. I am radically ignorant if I am 
unware of the existence of relevant knowledge that could help improve my state of affairs.349 
Alternatively, I could be aware of the existence of such relevant knowledge but be unaware 
of how to obtain it.350 Another form of radical ignorance is interpretive. Facts do not speak 
for themselves but have to be interpreted via theories. However, the right theory with which 
to interpret complex social phenomena is rarely obvious. The experts themselves typically 
disagree on such matters. They are subject to Rawlsian burdens of judgement.  
When assessing government attempts at governing complex phenomena, even the most 
conscientious and well-informed voters might not know the most appropriate theoretical 
 
345 (DeCanio 2014, 641) 
346 What is the difference between this case and one where the actor spends their own money? There 
the countless alternative uses are not a problem because the actor just needs to determine which use 
of the resource they personally think is best. This is insufficient in the context of social choice on behalf 
of all citizens. There each citizen has to consider alternative uses that could be made of the resources-
in-question by a multitude of other agents of whose concrete preferences they are unaware.  
347 (Ikeda 2003, 67) 
348 (Friedman 2006, 29- 33); C.f. the aphorism attributed to Einstein: “You don’t have to know 
everything. You just have to know where to find it.” 
349 (Ikeda 2003, 67) 
350  A PhD student might have good reason to think that an out-of-print book would help with their 
project but be unaware of how to find it.  
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framework with which to base their evaluation. Take the example of diagnosing the cause of 
the 2008 financial crisis. Some experts think it was caused by implicit guarantees of 
government bail-outs.351 Some locate the problem in lax monetary policy.352 Some find it in 
legal privileges protecting large financial rating agencies from competition.353 Others in the 
1999 repeal of the 1932 United States Glass-Steagall Act, after which American banks no 
longer had to separate their commercial and investment banking divisions.354 Still others 
blame “market-to-market” accounting standards.355 The difficulty even experts face in 
obtaining a theoretical handle on phenomena as complex as the financial crisis is not 
surprising from a Hayekian perspective. The sheer number of actors combined with the 
interdependent nature of their behaviour makes it very difficult to properly understand the 
causal relationships between actor behaviour and outcomes. This is a key feature of 
emergent properties. By the same token, our inability to understand such phenomena inhibit 
our ability to evaluate the state agents who attempt to regulate them. 
So ends this chapter’s critique of the principal-agent model. To recap, we have argued 
against it on three grounds. First, tacit voter knowledge and values cannot be transmitted to 
the government. The transmission of public opinion is limited to a binary assessment of 
propositional statements. Second, even if we posit that the electorate affirm a policy as 
expressed in propositional terms, its implementation is subject to the discretion of state 
officials on the basis of their private knowledge. Third, various forms of radical voter 
ignorance and also incentive problems mean that ex-post evaluation on the part of voters 
cannot alleviate the problem of discretionary authority. We conclude that state actors 
cannot feasibly be understood as an agent of the citizenry.  
 
9. On the Value of Democracy  
This chapter and this thesis is critical of the idea of collective political agency, a concept 
naturally linked to democracy. It thus behoves this thesis to clarify the relation of its 
argument to the value of democracy. Such is the task of the final section of this chapter. 
While the arguments advanced in this work are in tension with claims as to democracy’s 
intrinsic value, they are quite compatible with claims as to its instrumental value and even 
 
351 (Roberts 2019) 
352 (Taylor 2009) 
353 (Friedman 2006) 
354 Including, perhaps surprisingly, the libertarian Loren Lomasky (2011). 
355 (Kothari and Lester 2011) 
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its epistemic value. One might think that democracy has intrinsic value because democratic 
participation constitutes the exercise of a powerful form of collective autonomy. Quite 
obviously, the arguments of this chapter and thesis run against this justification. Another 
distinct reason why democracy might have intrinsic value is that democratic procedures 
show equal respect to all citizens under circumstances of deep disagreement about both 
justice and the good. Given such disagreement, it is argued, granting each party an equal say 
in the determination of laws is required as a matter of procedural justice.356 This is distinct 
from the collective autonomy view because to say I was afforded equal consideration in a 
process is not necessarily to say that the outcome of that process would accord with my will. 
The arguments of this thesis and this chapter are also in tension with this understanding of 
democracy’s value, which presumes the validity of the associational view of political society.  
We argued in chapter one that liberal citizens are too ignorant of one another to be 
characterised as in deep and widespread disagreement. Furthermore, the idea of equal 
determination in the formulation of laws is a chimera if this chapter’s argument as to the 
inevitability of discretionary governmental authority is correct.  
Instrumental arguments for democracy locate its value in the outcomes it produces.357 On 
the instrumental view, democracy is desirable if it is better at producing these outcomes 
than alternative regimes. One powerful case for the instrumental value of democracy rests 
on its capacity to prevent domination. Samuel Bagg puts this point well: “[though] hardly 
realizing the classical dream of collective self-rule, elections provide some leverage over 
leaders, as well as non-violent means for overthrowing would-be tyrants”.358 The point here 
isn’t simply that democracy gives voters the capacity to, as it were, throw the rascals out.359 
The right to vote also provides some measure of protection against the state’s worst 
excesses, particularly for minorities or otherwise marginalised groups.360 Democratic 
institutions’ comparative advantage in avoiding calamities such as famines should, I think, be 
understood in this light. I do not see any incompatibility with the argument of this thesis and 
such instrumental justifications.  
 
356 Christano (2008), Waldron (2004) and Valentini (2013) defend versions of this position.   
357 Arneson (2004) and Brennan (2016, 10–14) defend this view, although Brennan believes that a 
limited suffrage restricted to more knowledgable voters, an “epistocracy,” might prove instrumentally 
superior to democracy.  
358 (Bagg 2018, 901–2) c.f. “Democracy is essentially a means, a utilitarian device for safeguarding 
internal peace and individual freedom.”(Hayek 2001 [1944], 73) 
359 This, for Hayek, was the chief value of democracy. See Kukathas (1998, 24). 
360 Jacob Levy (2017, 116–18) makes this very point in a paper otherwise strenuously criticising the 
idea of democratic unity.  
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Epistemic defences of democracy, meanwhile, present a case for it akin to the Hayekian case 
for the market economy. Drawing on the Hong and Page Theorem that diverse groups are 
better at problem solving than comparatively more intelligent but homogenous groups, 
Hélène Landemore argues that democratic decision-making can produce wise results even if 
individual voters are not well-informed about politics.361 Her model holds only under special 
conditions and it is doubtful that they are met in real-world elections.362 Still, supposing that 
the conditions were met, this would not be inconsistent with the arguments of this chapter 
and thesis. Democratic outcomes do not reflect any collective intention on Landemore’s 
theory. Rather they reveal independent truths by aggregating the discrete opinions of many 
voters. They are still emergent in the relevant sense of not being straightforwardly reducible 
to the individual opinions of the voters-in-question.363  
 
Conclusion 
 
Our critique of descriptive associationalism is now complete. The arguments presented here 
do not constitute a conclusive case against the associational account. They merely show that 
the associational model does not accurately describe actually-existing liberal democracies. 
Even if the associationalist accepted this, the possibility remains that collective political 
agency would be possible under more propitious circumstances. In the next chapter we will 
consider whether associationalism might be possible if we assumed that all citizens were 
committed to a Rawlsian understanding of justice. 
  
 
361 (Landemore 2017) 
362 As observed by Brennan (2014) and Bagg (2018, 894).   
363 If we already knew a priori the truths revealed by democratic procedures, than democracy would 
lose its raison d'être if justified solely on epistemic grounds. The truth “revealed” by democratic 
procedures have to be emergent then in this sense also.  
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Chapter Four: Aspirational Associationalism – The Well-Ordered Society 
 
Abstract 
The last chapter argued that mutual ignorance prevents citizens of actually-existing liberal 
democratic societies from carrying out joint-intentional action. This chapter argues that the 
problem would remain even if we assumed all liberal citizens individually affirmed Rawlsian 
justice. For they would still not be able to reliably signal this commitment to one another 
under impersonal conditions. This crucial condition necessary for joint-intentional action 
would still not be met. This is the case whether the signalling mechanism is deliberation or 
voting. The basic difficulty is that one needs reliable knowledge of the internal motivation of 
another agent to know if they are truly committed to liberal justice. We can gain that 
knowledge only of a small subset of our peers in an impersonal liberal society.   
 
Introduction 
 
The Rawlsian would likely be unmoved by the arguments of the prior chapter. Even if that 
argument succeeds, they might argue it does little to budge Rawls’ own view. The fact that 
collective political agency is infeasible under actually-existing liberal democratic societies 
does not show it to be infeasible under the idealised conditions of Rawls’ well-ordered 
society. This chapter then considers whether such a society is possible. Let us recall the two 
key desiderata to the well-ordered society: 
1. Everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice. 
2. The basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these 
principles.364 
We have already mustered arguments against the feasibility of the second desideratum. 
Chapter two argued that there is no agency who can redesign the social institutions 
according to a fixed blueprint. The authority to create and revise major institutional rules in 
liberal democratic societies is de facto polycentric. Just as no agency is suitably positioned to 
centrally plan economic production and distribution, none are suitably positioned to 
centrally plan the major institutional rules of society. If the arguments of chapter two are 
sound, there is no clear route from the status quo to a well-ordered society as conceptualised 
by Rawls. Our focus in this chapter, however, is on the first desideratum. The stability and 
maintenance of the well-ordered society is a function of the shared intentions of the liberal 
citizenry. When thinking about this issue, Rawls implicitly understood the claim of Bratman 
 
364 (Rawls 1999, 5) 
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and others that mutual assurance is a necessary condition of joint action. Rosie and Jim share 
an intention that they X iff each knows that the other intends that they X. Mutatis mutandis, 
liberal citizens intend that they give justice to one another iff each knows that all others 
intend that they give justice to one another. Rawls’ understanding of this mutual knowledge 
requirement expresses itself in the first desideratum of the well-ordered society. Each citizen 
must know that every other citizen affirms the principles of justice. If the ideal of a well-
ordered society governed by the shared will of liberal citizens is to be met, liberal citizens 
need to obtain assurance of one another’s intentions. This is Rawls’ assurance problem.  
This chapter will argue that this mutual assurance problem cannot be solved in a large-scale 
liberal society. The arguments and thought-experiments of this chapter are consistent with 
the possibility that liberal citizens are all individually committed to Rawlsian justice. What 
they demonstrate is the difficulty facing any particular citizen in trying to assure themselves 
of this. The problem is that it is very hard to gain credible assurance of the intentions of the 
mass of our peers in an impersonal society. Even if we grant to Rawls the idealising 
assumption that all citizens individually affirm Rawlsian principles, then, their inability to 
credibly communicate this fact to one another prevents them from coordinating their actions 
on the basis of his conception of justice. We thus demonstrate that the epistemic constraints 
on collective action remain even if we idealise away the motivational ones.  
The argument to follow is divided into five sections. The first details Rawls’ assurance 
problem. It lays great stress on the legislative nature of this assurance problem. Since citizen 
compliance with laws is coercively enforced, it is only with respect to their freely-made 
decisions to vote that they can gauge their respective intentions to maintain just institutions.  
This fact has not been sufficiently appreciated in the secondary literature. There are two 
possible signalling mechanisms whereby citizens can make clear to one another whether 
they intend to vote justly. The first is deliberation. Citizens try to assure one another of their 
commitment to voting on just terms by using only the discourse of justice in political 
deliberation. The second is the act of voting itself.  The fact of voting for a just party might 
itself be indicative of one’s commitment to liberal justice. Sections two and three consider 
both these mechanisms and find them wanting. Sections four and five consider and rebut 
respectively two objections to the chapter’s argument.  
 
 
1. The Rawlsian Assurance Problem as a Legislative Assurance Problem   
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Rawls assumes individuals have two powers.365 Their “rational” power is to advance their 
personal but partisan conception of the good. Their other power is a sense of justice such 
that they are willing to comply with fair terms of cooperation with their peers. In the well-
ordered society, all liberal citizens have a sense of justice strong enough not to be over-
ridden by their partisan understandings of the good.  Suppose I am a dutiful citizen of such a 
society. Faced with a choice between a theocratic party that will impose on all the demands 
of what I consider to be the true religion and a Rawlsian party that will secure religious 
freedom for all, my sense of justice will direct me to vote for the latter. Citizen motivation to 
comply with liberal justice, however, is contingent upon reciprocation. For when “any one 
person knows or reasonably supposes that others will not do their part, it will be worth his 
while to be the first, or among the first, not to do his, or even dangerous for him not to be”.366 
Our participation is contingent upon reciprocation because we desire not to be taken 
advantage of.  I will dutifully pay my taxes if I know everyone else will but not if I am the only 
“sucker” who pays while others free-ride; I will dutifully endorse legal toleration of views I 
find abhorrent but not if adherents of those views refuse to endorse legal toleration of my 
views; and so on. Just as Bratman’s painters have to assure one another that they will show 
up on the day and are not shirking during the painting process, Rawlsian citizens have to 
assure one another that that they won’t defect from doing their part in fulfilling the common 
objectives of their political association. It is now common to model Rawls’ reciprocity 
requirement as an assurance game from game theory.367 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
365 E.g. (Rawls 1999, 18–25) 
366 (Rawls 1963, 290) 
367 This interpretation was pioneered by Paul Weithman (2011, chap. 2) c.f. (Kogelmann and Stich 
2016, 717–20); (Thrasher and Vallier 2013); (Gaus 2011a) 
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Figure 4.1 –  Rawlsian Mutual Assurance Game 
Rosie and Jim are Rawlsian citizens with a well-established sense of justice. Their pay-offs are 
numbered ordinally with the 1st being the highest and the 4th the lowest. Each gains the 
highest pay-off when both comply.368 Their lowest pay-off arises when they comply but the 
counter-party defects i.e. they are the “sucker” who is taken advantage of. Unlike in the 
prisoner’s dilemma, each party does not have a dominant strategy regardless of what the 
counterparty does.369 If the counterparty complies, their best strategy is to do likewise. If 
they defect, their best strategy is also to do likewise. There are, then, two Nash equilibria: 
the risk dominant one whereby both defect and the pay-off dominant one whereby both 
comply. The challenge for liberal citizens is to assure one another of their commitment to 
liberal justice so as to reach the pay-off dominant equilibrium. The assurance problem of the 
well-ordered society might be considered as a (very high) N-person version of this simple 
model.  
At this juncture, however, we face a complication. For on my reading Rawls posits two 
different kinds of assurance games for liberal citizens to solve and only one of them stands a 
chance of supplying the information required to meet the first desideratum of the well-
ordered society. There are two distinct ways to be just in a Rawlsian society. One can comply 
with just laws and one can vote for just laws. The compliance assurance problem arises 
because citizens render their compliance with just laws contingent on reciprocation. I will 
dutifully pay my taxes but only if I know that my peers will do likewise. Rawls’ solution to this 
assurance problem is Hobbesian. Citizens in a large-scale community have no effective 
 
368 Note that ordinal utility rankings in this context simply mean that the agent-in-question ranks one 
state of affairs higher than another.  A utility function need not presume that agents are egoistic or 
utilitarian, as is often assumed. On this see Gaus (2012a, 158–60).  
369 In the prisoner’s dilemma, the dominant strategy of both players would be to defect. The 
prisoner’s dilemma is displayed in figure 7.1 of chapter seven.  
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means of signalling to their peers their willingness to pay tax, since “the degree of mutual 
confidence in one another’s integrity that renders enforcement superfluous is not be 
expected”.370 However, the “mere existence of an effective sovereign” believed to be 
capable of detecting and punishing defectors is enough to create confidence that one is not 
going to be a sucker when they pay their taxes.371 Note, however, that if Rosie’s compliance 
with justice is coercively enforced, it is not clear whether Rosie complies to be just or simply 
to avoid punishment. Thus, this assurance mechanism fails to transmit the information 
necessary to satisfy the first desideratum.   
The legislative assurance problem arises because citizens render their willingness to vote 
justly contingent on reciprocation. This is exemplified in the voter who would vote for liberal 
toleration over a theocratic party that favoured his religion so long as other voters would be 
similarly restrained in their voting behaviour. On my reading, this is the primary assurance 
problem with which Rawls is concerned. There is exegetical evidence for this claim. In a 
significant passage in Political Liberalism, Rawls refers to the importance of liberal citizens 
“acting willingly so as to give one another justice over time”. It is in this passage where Rawls 
explicitly argues that stable liberal institutions should result from the willed actions of liberal 
citizens rather than dictatorial imposition. Crucially, he writes that this kind of stability 
“connects” with the idea that sovereign political power in a liberal society “is the power of 
equal citizens as a collective body”.372 In his 1997 paper, “The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited,” he says outright that the “ideal of public reason” is realised by liberal citizens in 
their voting conduct.373 This textual evidence suggests that for Rawls citizens show their 
willingness to give justice to one another primarily in their capacity as legislators of the law 
rather than in their capacity as subjects obligated to comply with the law. 
However, the main argument for this claim is conceptual. Only this assurance mechanism is 
a viable candidate for meeting the first desideratum of the well-ordered society. If the latter 
is to be met, citizens need credible knowledge of one another’s sincere commitment to 
liberal justice and such knowledge can come only from freely exercised actions rather than 
coerced ones. The right to vote is by definition freely exercised. Jim’s best chance, then, of 
inferring whether Rosie really shares his commitment to realising or maintaining a just 
society is by observing her uncoerced voting activity. If he could satisfy himself that she did 
 
370 (Rawls 1999, 237) 
371 (Rawls 1999, 237) 
372 (Rawls 1996, 143) 
373 (Rawls 1997, 769) 
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vote justly, then we have a mechanism that could meet the first desideratum of the well-
ordered society. The trouble, as we shall see, is that there is no straightforward way of 
inferring whether someone has defected from liberal justice by observing which candidate 
or what policy they voted for. One has to know why they voted for that person or policy. 
However, in a large-scale society, we can only gain knowledge of the motives of a small 
subset of our peers. A couple clarificatory points are in order before we commence with the 
substantive argument.  
What is the relevant content of liberal justice that citizens are united in realising? Rawls gave 
two answers to this at different points in his career. The Rawls of Theory and the Rawls of 
the initial phase of his political turn assumed that all members of the well-ordered society 
would share the intention to realise justice as fairness. However, in the later, paperback 
edition of Political Liberalism and subsequent papers, Rawls begins to think this too much to 
hope for. Reasonable disagreement would extend to questions of justice as well as the good. 
The later works exhibits a thinner understanding of the shared intentions binding liberal 
citizens. The well-ordered society can no longer be one where citizens are united by the joint-
intention to realise justice as fairness. They are still united by the joint-intention to manage 
their political association on the basis of a “reasonable” conception of justice though they 
can now legitimately disagree as to which is the best conception. A reasonable conception 
of justice has to contain the following three features: 
First, a list of certain basic rights, liberties, and opportunities (such as those familiar 
from constitutional regimes); 
 
Second, an assignment of special priority to those rights, liberties, and 
opportunities, especially with respect to the claims of the general good and 
perfectionist values. 
 
Third, measures ensuring for all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make 
effective use of their freedoms.374  
 
The key idea is that a reasonable conception of justice constitutes reasons at least in principle 
justifiable to all. I do not invoke a partisan reason when I invoke such a conception in political 
discourse, in contrast to when I invoke, say, my personal religious values. Still, according to 
the later Rawls, we disagree on which conception of justice is most reasonable in this regard. 
Justice-as-fairness is but one of a family of conceptions of justice that citizens might affirm.375 
A law is just if its rationale is consistent with any of these reasonable conceptions. Such a 
 
374 (Rawls 1997, 774) 
375 (Rawls 1997, 774 fn27) 
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rationale is what Rawls calls a “public reason”. Citizens, then, are just when they vote on the 
basis of public reasons but there is no expectation that all will vote on the basis of public 
reasons derived from the same conception of justice. I will, for the most part, assume this 
view of liberal justice in the analysis to follow since it is Rawls’ considered view. Putting all 
this together, the question remaining before us is whether impersonally related liberal 
citizens can assure one another of their shared intentions to govern their shared political 
association the basis of public reason. 
We should note an exegetical difference between my reading of Rawls and that of 
Kogelmann and Stich, who also interpret Rawls as conceiving of two assurance problems.376 
Though this chapter’s account of the two assurance problems differ from theirs. On their 
interpretation, there is a citizen assurance problem analogous to the above compliance 
assurance problem. This holds that each citizen will comply with just laws so long as penal 
institutions exist to assure them that their peers will do the same. However, Kogelmann and 
Stich also claim that normal citizens have no obligation to comply with the norms of public 
reason other than obeying just laws. On their reading, only elected politicians and judicial 
officials need do so. The norms of public reason solve a public official assurance problem. 
Elected politicians and judicial officials have to assure one another that they will legislate or 
issue legal decrees in accordance with public reason. They send this assurance by using public 
reason in legislative debates, justifying legal rulings with public reason, and so forth. 
Kogelmann and Stich’s account of Rawls’ view may be summarised as one whereby 
politicians and judges deliberate upon and produce just laws while citizens obey those laws. 
This assumption allows them to say some interesting things about the conditions under 
which assurance problems might be solved. However, this is unlikely to be Rawls’ position. 
For if it is only public officials who show their commitment to public reason, while the rest 
of us are coerced into it, again no assurance is gained that the citizenry as a whole have a 
commitment to liberal justice. As such, if Kogelmann and Stich’s reading is correct, it is left 
unclear how Rawls intended the first desideratum of the well-ordered society to be met. 
Furthermore, already cited earlier was Rawls’ own explicit statement that the norm of public 
reason does apply in the voting booth.377  
 
 
 
376 (Kogelmann and Stich 2016, 719) 
377 (Rawls 1997, 769) 
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2. Deliberation as a Signalling Mechanism  
The first signalling mechanism is a deliberative one whereby citizens use only public reasons 
when advocating public policies. If Jim presents arguments in favour of a public policy using 
public reasons then his fellow citizens could conceivably interpret this as a signal that he 
intends to vote on such a basis. The existing literature has focused on this as the signalling 
mechanism, and many have already argued that it is ineffective.378 One difficulty here is that 
even if it were an effective mechanism, it is hard to see how it would solve the assurance 
problem unless public deliberation was a very popular activity among liberal citizens. This, as 
Rawls himself believed, seems an unrealistic expectation in large-scale democracies.379 Be 
this as it may, and in keeping with focus of this thesis on epistemic rather than motivational 
problems, let us grant the widespread use of deliberation to see why it is an ineffective voting 
mechanism.  This section will review and expand upon some of the arguments already 
developed in the secondary literature. There are three key problems.  
(i) The problem of cheap talk  
This criticism is raised by Gerald Gaus.380 We can state his criticism with extra perspicuity if 
we bear in mind the legislative nature of the assurance problem, which Gaus himself does 
not consider. Rosie looks for assurance that Jim intends to vote on the basis of public reasons 
rather than his own partisan reasons. Jim tries to reassure Rosie by invoking only public 
reasons during their political deliberations. However, this constitutes a weak signal for the 
following thought might well strike Rosie. If Jim did lack civic virtue, he would happily benefit 
from others exercising their vote in accordance with the restraints of public reason while 
himself voting according to his own partisan reasons. Further, he would be incentivised to 
merely deliberate according to public reasons to falsely signal his commitment to it. If the 
false signal worked, Rosie would be mistakenly assured to vote on the basis of public reasons 
but Jim could still vote on the basis of his own partisan reasons in the privacy of the voting 
booth. He is incentivised to send this signal because talk is cheap. Rosie, being aware of this, 
is thus not reassured by Jim’s invocation of public reasons during deliberation.  
(ii) The problem of reflexivity 
 
378 (Thrasher and Vallier 2013, 941); (Gaus 2011a, 316); (Kogelmann 2019) 
379 (Rawls 2001, 143) 
380 (Gaus 2011a, 317) 
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Suppose Rosie does believe Jim’s signal to be credible. Another problem remains. Gaus also 
observes that signalling mechanisms need also overcome the problem of reflexivity.381 It is 
not enough that Rosie accepts Jim’s signal. Jim additionally needs to know that she has 
received and interpreted the signal appropriately. She, in turn, needs to know that he knows 
she has received and appropriately interpreted the signal. The problem can go on ad 
infinitum.  We saw in the previous chapter that this issue also arises with Bratman’s model. 
Successful solutions to assurance problems require a great deal of common knowledge 
between the participants. Familiarity and iterative reactions can overcome this problem at a 
small-scale.382 If Rosie and Jim meet regularly, then it will soon become common knowledge 
between them that they have received one another’s signals. These conditions do not hold 
in large-scale settings where most of our deliberative partners are strangers. 
 
(iii) Noise 
Thrasher and Vallier identify noise as another problem afflicting deliberation in a large-scale 
setting – “Noise is the problem of distinguishing between communication by citizens that 
signal allegiance to the public conception, and hence assurance, and forms of 
communication that do not”.383 Thrasher and Vallier stress that that the permissive nature 
of the public reason makes it very prone to the problem of noise. For example, Rawls says 
citizens are allowed to invoke non-public reasons in deliberative public reason so long as they 
meet the following proviso, “that in due course proper political reasons – and not reasons 
given solely by comprehensive doctrines [i.e. non-public reasons] – are presented that are 
sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to 
support”.384 Rawls is deliberately vague about the specifics: “the details about how to satisfy 
this proviso must be worked out in practice and cannot feasibly be governed by a clear family 
of rules given in advance”.385 However, if this is allowed, it is very difficult in the “cacophony 
of the public sphere” to distinguish genuine defections from those speech-acts where the 
public reasons are eventually forthcoming.386  
 
381 (Gaus 2011a, 318) 
382 (Gaus 2011a, 318) 
383 (Thrasher and Vallier 2013, 942) 
384 (Rawls 1997, 784); Rawls was forced to make this concession to avoid the rather embarrassing 
implication that his theory would otherwise cast the abolitionist and civil rights movements as 
“unreasonable” for their decidedly theological discourse.  
385 (Rawls 1997, 784) 
386 (Thrasher and Vallier 2013, 942) 
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One might be tempted to think that Thrasher and Vallier’s noise problem afflicts only the 
later more permissive understanding of liberal justice. This would be incorrect. For even in 
Theory Rawls allows for disagreement in the interpretation of justice as fairness.387 This 
would cause noise problems even on the much more restrictive view of liberal justice found 
in that early work. Let us take the difference principle again. A diagrammatical 
representation of it, figure 3, is reproduced from A Theory of Justice.388  
 
        X2 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  O              B          X1 
Figure 4.2 – The Difference Principle Contribution Curve 
The axis X1 denotes the income of the most advantaged and X2 correspondingly the least 
advantaged. As is very well known, the difference principle holds that departures from the 
initial point of equality O are justified so long as they make X2 better off. Hence, in this highly 
stylised example, the principle would determine that the income of X1 should be allowed to 
rise up to point B, at which the corresponding come of X2 is maximised. Any further marginal 
increase in the income of X1 will lead to corresponding marginal reductions in the income of 
X2. Now, of course, this model is highly simplified. It holds all other factors constant, which 
is not true of actual economies.  All manner of other variables can affect the income of X2 
apart from the income of X1. Additionally, in the real world we will not know for certain 
where we are on the contribution curve OP. This means that it will not always be obvious 
 
387 (Rawls 1999, 170) 
388 (Rawls 1999, 67) 
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which policies will best realise the difference principle. This question is subject to the 
burdens of judgement.389 
Suppose now that in a deliberative forum one group of citizens argues for a tax cut. They 
argue that the economy is currently positioned to the left of B on the contribution curve.  
Their argument is that tax cuts will incentivise more economic activity on the part of the most 
advantaged and, through a resulting combination of Laffer curve affects and higher economic 
growth, move us closer to B thus improving the position of the least advantaged. Suppose 
also that many of these citizens are themselves in the most advantaged group. It is not clear 
in such cases how one distinguishes sincere views as to how to further Rawlsian justice from 
more self-serving claims. These citizens could have a genuine sense of Rawlsian justice and 
sincerely believe we are to the left of B on the contribution curve. Or they could just want to 
reduce their personal tax bills. In which case they are taking advantage of our uncertainty as 
to where we are on the contribution curve to generate a convenient justification. Thus, the 
problem of noise cannot be solved by merely making the requirements of liberal justice or 
public reason stricter. For even if public reason is restricted to a unitary conception of justice, 
ambiguities in its application would create noise. Note again, as with the reflexivity problem, 
it is not difficult to imagine how the noise problem might be overcome in small groups where 
the deliberators get to know one another well and there are many recurring opportunities 
for deliberation. Local knowledge of one another might build trust in such settings. However, 
such local knowledge is lacking in impersonal settings.   
 
3. Voting as a Signalling Mechanism  
If deliberation fails to signal our commitment to public reason, perhaps the act of voting itself 
can do the trick. By voting for candidates that govern on the basis of public reason or 
punishing those candidates that fail to do so, I signal to my peers that I participate in our 
joint-intention to realise a well-ordered liberal society. Unlike deliberation, the established 
literature has focused little on the act of voting itself as a signalling mechanism. Thus here 
we stake out a more independent path with our analysis. Unfortunately, the act of voting 
itself is, if anything, an even worse signalling mechanism than deliberation. It is much harder 
than it appears to gauge voter intentions from their voting behaviour. Consider the following 
hypothetical case of an elected politician.  
 
389 As we already saw in the prior chapter.  
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Yesterday was Election Day. A candidate was running for office on the promise of 
restricting abortion rights. This campaign pledge was announced a month ago and 
it was backed by theological rather than public reasons. Today the results have been 
announced and the candidate has won her seat by a healthy majority. She has not 
thus far made any effort to satisfy the Rawlsian proviso.390   
Suppose Rosie voted for our politician and that our good Rawlsian citizen Jim considers this 
to be clear-and-cut case of defection on Rosie’s part. He might think that a month must be 
more than enough time to meet the proviso. It can’t take that much time for our politician 
to come up with bona fide public reasons for that policy. If she hasn’t met the proviso in the 
month between the day of the pledge and Election Day, then it is clear to Jim that she has 
no intention of doing so. He expects Rosie to have reached the same conclusion about the 
politician’s intentions regarding the proviso. Therefore, thinks Jim, Rosie’s vote for the 
politician signals her defection from public reason.  
Jim’s conclusion, however, would be too hasty.  Note that Rawls himself says that the specific 
details of the proviso – “when does it need to be satisfied? On the same day or some later 
day? Also, on whom does the obligation to honor it fall?” – cannot be worked out in advance 
but need to be left to the “good faith” of the parties.391 This seems sensible. Further, upon 
some more reflection it is not obvious that a month is too long to meet the proviso. One 
might take the view that the proviso is an important but technical matter to be dealt with at 
a later stage. Perhaps, on this alternative view, the most appropriate time to offer public 
justification is when policy is turned into explicit legislation rather than during pre-election 
campaigning. If one could reasonably take this alternative view of the proviso’s requirement, 
then Rosie’s voting behaviour does not straightforwardly speak for itself as Jim might have 
initially assumed. It could be the case that she has voted for the politician simply because 
she has defected from public reason. It could also be the case that Rosie has not defected 
but takes this alternative view of what the proviso requires and has voted for the politician 
in good faith that the proviso (as Rosie understands it) will be fulfilled at a later date. The 
bare fact of her voting decision is indeterminate with respect to these two conclusions. 
 
390 Note that Rawls (1996, 243 fn. 32) says public reason itself doesn’t pre-judge the abortion issue 
one way or another but stipulates that any policy position with respect to it should be justified on the 
basis of three “reasonable” values: respect for human life, the ordered reproduction of political 
society and the legal equality of women. Kogelmann (2019, 205–8), in a different paper to his 
aforementioned one, observes that depending on how these three values are ranked, one could arrive 
at the full gamut of positions with respect to abortion ranging from complete prohibition to no or very 
limited restrictions.  
391 (Rawls 1997, 784) 
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These interpretive difficulties are only compounded the more realism we introduce into our 
analysis. The complexity of voting systems adds one layer of interpretive difficulty. Under 
complex voting systems, strategic voting may be worthwhile. Citizens voting under such 
complex systems may knowingly vote for parties whose policies may be deemed 
unambiguously unjust from a public reason perspective. Still, the intentions of the voters 
may credibly be to realise Rawlsian justice. Under the UK’s first-past-the-post system, for 
instance, votes count only insofar as they contribute to that party’s tally in the constituency 
in question. The party that gains a majority of the votes in each constituency will represent 
that constituency in the House of Commons, with the other votes having no other input in 
the democratic procedure to decide the government. The party that wins a majority of 
constituencies is entitled to form the national government. 
Suppose Rosie and Jim are British citizens. We might also suppose, as one might imagine 
Rawls would, that the policies of the British Labour Party are most consistent with public 
reason. Further, that the British Conservative Party is the second most consistent with public 
reason, and (if I am allowed some uncreative licence) the newly-formed Unreasonable Party 
the third and least most consistent. Rosie lives in a constituency where Labour have no 
chance of winning. It is, instead, a two-horse race between the Conservative Party and the 
Unreasonable Party. The national election, however, is a two-horse race between the 
Conservative and Labour parties, such that the Unreasonable Party have next-to-no chance 
of winning enough constituencies to form the next government. Rosie votes for the 
Unreasonable Party in her constituency. This fact alone, however, doesn’t mean she has 
defected from public reason.  For under such conditions, it is rational for a supporter of the 
Labour Party to vote for the Unreasonable Party to reduce the possibility of the Conservative 
Party winning that constituency and in turn increasing the chances of the Labour Party 
forming the next government nationally. So the input of voting for the most unjust party 
locally might reasonably be intended to realise the output of realising public reason 
nationally. As far as Jim is concerned, Rosie has defected from public reason if she voted for 
the Unreasonable party out of approval for their policies but not if she voted for this strategic 
reason. Again, he cannot infer either way from the act of voting itself.  
Another complication is the fact that parties campaign on and indeed enact bundles of 
policies rather than singular policies. Some of these may be just and some unjust. The fact of 
bundling heightens the interpretative problem in two respects. The first stems from non-
culpable voter ignorance. Even if we posit Rawlsian citizens with a strong sense of liberal 
justice, it seems unrealistic to expect them all, for instance, to take graduate degrees in social 
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science to help them better evaluate government performance. It also seems unrealistic to 
expect them all to spend endless hours reading campaign manifestos or endless hours 
monitoring the activities of their legislature. Voters might reasonably make their decisions 
only on the basis of the party’s headline policies or on the basis of issues that they are most 
knowledgeable about. They might vote, then, on the basis of what economists call imperfect 
information. Under such conditions, they might well be reasonably unaware of the 
unreasonable policies of the party who they vote for or otherwise the unreasonable 
implications of some policies. To the extent that this is true, Jim cannot infer from Rosie’s 
voting for a party whose bundle of policies is not completely reasonable the conclusion that 
her commitment to public reason is flagging. For she may have decided to vote for that party 
only on the basis of their more reasonable policies of which she is aware.392  
A second interpretive difficulty arises if voters have to make trade-offs of “reasonability” 
between parties whose bundles of policies are at most partially just. Imagine two parties. 
The policies of party A unambiguously increase justice on one dimension – say foreign policy 
– but also unambiguously increase injustice on another dimension – say penal law. The 
policies of party B maintain the status quo. Rosie votes for party A. Does Jim infer from this 
that she has defected from public reason? Perhaps if she has no interest in foreign policy and 
actively favours the unreasonable penal policy. But she could also be a good Rawlsian who 
simply thinks the gains in foreign policy outweigh the losses in penal law. There is also a 
further complication here, akin to the proviso, of what the Rawlsian might consider to be 
reasonable trade-offs when these values are at stake. There seems no obvious way to strike 
these trade-offs. What might seem to Jim a very unreasonable way of doing so might appear 
differently to Rosie.  
Finally, citizens may vote to realise aims other than affecting legislation, such as 
communicating their sentiments and concerns.393 This is a popular explanation for the recent 
 
392 I have been, for the sake of argument, assuming that it is relatively easy to establish which policies 
are in line with public reason and which not. Of course this is not true in real life. I submit that even in 
the well-ordered society, citizens might reasonably misunderstand the nuances and complexities of 
what counts as public reason. This concept, like the rest of Rawls’ ideas, is complicated. Certainly, the 
voluminous commentary his work has inspired indicates how, despite the perspicuity with which 
Rawls tries to summarise his ideas, they are not straightforward to political philosophers, let alone the 
average voter who has other concerns in life. A voting decision that looks like a sure fire defection to 
the committed Rawlsian might just be an honest mistake on the part of the ordinary citizen. 
393 An observation made by Gaus (2009, 15). The Rawlsian might be tempted to say it is unreasonable 
to vote on the basis of motivations other than enacting legislation. But, as Gaus points out, this seems 
to “truncate the political, conferring sole legitimacy on one of its functions” (2009, 16). Plus, it is 
arguably the denial of expressive voting as legitimate that seems unreasonable. Given the minimal 
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electoral successes of populist parties in liberal democracies. Voters are less interested in 
the concrete policy platforms of these parties, which are often quite vague, and more so in 
expressing discontent and sending a message to “The Establishment”.394 This kind of voter 
motivation creates further interpretive difficulties. Let us grant that the policies of Donald 
Trump are inconsistent with Public Reason. Suppose now that our good Rawlsian Jim is 
aghast that so many of his fellow citizens are voting for Trump. Rosie votes for Trump. Can 
he infer from Rosie’s decision to vote for Trump that she is unreasonable? Again, matters are 
not nearly as obvious as they might appear. It could be that Rosie has voted for Trump 
because she wants his policies realised. In that case she would have defected. It could also 
be that Rosie voted for Trump to try and communicate her dissatisfaction with the economic 
policies of the Federal Government. It is not difficult to imagine messages that Rosie might 
wish to communicate which are consistent with public reason and pleasing to Rawlsians.395 
For example, she might vote for Trump to communicate her belief that the major social 
institutions of the US are rigged to benefit the most advantaged at the expense of the least 
advantaged, and that the political class are complicit in this exploitative process. Given the 
complicity of the established parties in this process, one way Rosie might express her (by 
hypothesis) reasonable concerns is by voting for an outsider.  If this was her primary if not 
sole reason for voting for Trump, then it is far less clear that she has defected from public 
reason. If her aim is not so much to have Trump’s policy’s enacted but simply to try and 
“shock” the establishment into adopting more reasonable public policies, then one might 
even conclude she is trying to further public reason under difficult circumstances.  
Our analysis has proceeded using the simple two-person example for analytical clarity. Of 
course, if these interpretive problems arose between only a handful of persons, they might 
well be resolved. Suppose Rosie and Jim are close friends who know each other well and 
meet regularly to discuss politics. Familiarity might in that case overcome the epistemic 
deficit between them. That deficit would remain, however, between the mass of liberal 
citizens who do not enjoy face-to-face relations. This returns us to the main contention of 
 
chance of one’s vote being decisive and actually affecting legislation, it seems inevitable that citizens 
will draw upon other motivations when voting.  
394 On such “expressive voting” see Brennan and Lomasky (1997). 
395 Of course, that Rosie wishes to communicate this does not mean that her vote act is interpreted 
by others in this way. The difficulty of inferring intention from voting behaviour is the very problem 
we are considering here. 
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this thesis: that large-scale social coordination cannot presume degrees of mutual 
knowledge that obtain only in small groups.396  
 
4. Outward behaviour Versus Internal Motives 
Let us summarise the argument thus far. In the well-ordered society, citizens share the 
intention of governing their political association on the basis of a reasonable conception of 
justice. A grouping of persons can relevantly share an intention iff each party to the intention 
knows that all others share the intention. The well-ordered society is thus possible only if 
citizens can assure one another that each shares the intention to realise a just society. The 
knowledge that one’s fellow citizens have complied with the law does not provide such 
assurance since such behaviour is coercively enforced. The knowledge that one’s fellow 
citizens have voted on the basis of liberal justice does provide such assurance because such 
actions are freely undertaken. The question, then, became whether impersonally related 
liberal citizens could reliably signal to one another their intention to vote on the basis of 
liberal justice. Two mechanisms for signalling one’s intention to their fellow voters were 
considered, deliberation and the act of voting itself. Both were found wanting. The intentions 
of our peers in a large-scale society are to a large degree opaque to us. The first desideratum 
of the well-ordered society cannot be met.  
It might be objected that the argument presented here proves too much. If impersonally 
related liberal citizens are as inscrutable to one another as I have implied, then it seems hard 
to imagine how any sort of large-scale social cooperation can get off the ground. This includes 
cooperation in Hayek’s Great Society, the members of which need to assure one another of 
their intention to respect the rules of just conduct. If the arguments presented thus far are 
sound, then by the same token neither could this Hayekian assurance problem be solved. 
The remainder of this chapter responds to this objection, which is indeed correct in assuming 
that members of the Great Society face an assurance problem. However, the epistemic 
demands it places on them are much less than those placed on liberal citizens tasked with 
establishing whether or not their peers affirm public reason. Therefore, the prospects for a 
successful resolution of the “Hayekian” assurance problem seem much better.  
 
396 Rousseau, I believe, was much more sensitive to these epistemic concerns than Rawls. It was one 
of the reasons the former thought republican government as he understood it would be possible only 
in small states “where the people can assemble easily and where it’s not hard for each citizen to know 
all the rest” (Rousseau 1968 [1762], 34) . 
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The difference stems from the object of assurance. In the Hayekian great society this is 
outward behaviour. Does this person refrain from using my possessions? Did they keep their 
promise and pay me on time? And so forth. These behaviours are comparatively easy to 
perform and recognise, which reduces the interpretive difficulty. Indeed, economising on 
such interpretive labour is one of the functions of Hayekian rules of conduct, as we saw in 
chapter one.  A foreigner would find it exceedingly hard to join the gift economy of the Kula 
Ring where interactions are mediated by elaborate and culturally specific understandings. 
Before they can know what counts as a credible compliance with the elaborate rules, they 
would have to spend time learning those rules. By contrast, standardised and abstract rules 
of exchange can often be easily learnt by individuals and communities from a wide variety of 
backgrounds. It is comparatively easy to learn what the rule consists in and whether one’s 
counterparty has complied with it. Either the goods arrived at the allotted time or they did 
not. Either the workers received their pay rise or they did not. Thus, the transaction costs to 
finding out if my counter-parties are committed to the rule or convention in question are 
kept relatively low.  
Crucially, I do not need to know why my counter-parties, say, reliably fulfil their part of a 
contract. Perhaps they are deeply committed libertarians; perhaps they place intrinsic value 
on obeying the law and contractual law is enforced by the state; perhaps they wish to avoid 
punishment and there is a credible sanction against breaking contracts in place; perhaps they 
comply out of sheer habit and tradition. Their souls can remain inscrutable to me. As we have 
seen, the position of those faced with the legislative assurance problem is exactly the 
reverse. The object of assurance is not easily identifiable outward behaviour but the internal 
motives underlying such actions. In the various examples we looked at above, Jim could not 
straightforwardly infer from the fact that Rosie voted for a party or a policy that she had 
complied with public reason. In each case Jim also needed to know Rosie’s internal 
motivations for voting one way or another.  
The Rawlsian might be tempted to say that the distinction between assurance as to outward 
behaviour and assurance as to internal reasons is ultimately a false one for the following kind 
of reason. I can only gain reliable assurance that the cooperative outward behaviour of 
another agent will continue if I have knowledge that they behave in that way for the 
appropriate reasons. There is a world of difference between knowing that Rosie complies 
with a rule because it deeply accords with her normative and evaluative standards and 
knowing that Rosie complies with a rule only contingently when the cost-benefit analysis is 
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in her favour.397 The second example suggests that Rosie’s outward compliance with the rule 
is not robust and liable to change as soon as the cost-benefit analysis points towards non-
compliance. Only knowledge that Rosie is internally committed to the rule can assure us that 
her outward compliance is robust and reliable. We shall offer an elaborate critique of this 
Rawlsian claim in section five of chapter seven, which looks more closely at the question of 
institutional stability.  
For now, we can just say the following. Seeking assurance deeper than outward compliance 
can just as easily undermine social cooperation as strengthen it. Consider how actually-
existing liberal democracies contain within them many individuals whose deepest normative 
ideals may not be liberal and indeed radically diverge from liberal norms. Actually-existing 
liberal democracies contain communists, ethnic nationalists, communitarians and deep 
greens among others. The great majority of these persons, the great majority of the time, 
comply with the law. They respect persons and property, pay their taxes, comply with state 
officials and so on. They do so despite the existing institutional structure being inconsistent 
with their first-best ideals. One reason why they might do so is that there is no expectation 
on their part of such a consistency. In other words, they take an implicitly Augustinian 
approach to political and social institutions. They take as normal a disjuncture between their 
deepest normative ideals and the political institutions under which they live.398 Enter the 
political philosopher who tells them it is right and proper to expect the political and legal 
institutions that coerce them to accord with their most deeply held normative aspirations. 
The philosopher’s eloquence persuades them to discard the Augustinian realism they 
previously held implicitly. The problem, however, is that a liberal society evidently cannot 
meet these newly ignited normative demands. The basic tenets of, say, communism or ethnic 
nationalism are incompatible both with one another and the basic tenets of a liberal order. 
 
397 On this see Rawls’ distinction between a modus vivendi and what he sees as the more 
normatively secure “overlapping consensus” in Rawls (1996, chap. 4).  
398 I here follow Jacob Levy’s (2017) secular reinterpretation of Augustine’s political theology. On 
Levy’s interpretation, an Augustinian approach to politics means that one accepts that the ideal 
political system – the “City of God” – is unavailable to us in the profane and sinful “City of Man”. In 
the latter one has to make do with a political settlement that falls far short of the City of God but still 
has enough worth to merit one’s allegiance. Only in the afterlife can the ideal of the City of God be 
attained. Levy argues that one can adopt a secular version of this Augustinian political attitude if they 
substitute Augustine’s City of God for their own normative ideal and set aside the possibility of arriving 
at their ideal in the afterlife. I think many liberal citizens with distinctly non-liberal political views adopt 
something like this approach to their political institutions. Though I write that they do so “implicitly” 
because they are unlikely to express this sentiment in the explicit terms of Augustine’s political 
philosophy.  
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The generation of such unrealisable expectations could itself be a recipe for institutional 
stability.  
 
5. The Necessity of Population-Level Judgements  
Another objection to the argument might run as follows.399 The objection would question a 
key premise of the argument presented thus far, namely, that a population-level judgement, 
as to what proportion of the nation as a whole is committed to liberal justice, is required. On 
the basis of this assumption we have inferred that Rawlsian citizens cannot assure one 
another of their commitment to liberal justice whether via the mechanism of deliberation or 
voting. The objection would argue that our argument has exaggerated the epistemic 
demands involved. It is not true that each citizen needs to make such a population-level 
judgement. They can simply take stock of the people around them, of whom they do have 
direct or intimate knowledge, and then render their decision to comply with public reason 
contingent on assurance from this much more tractable local sample.  By analogy, this is how 
social norms operate. As Christina Bicchieri has shown, mundane and everyday social norms 
such as promise-keeping have the same characteristics of Rawls’ assurance problem. On her 
account, a social norm holds in a network if each member (a) believes all other members 
follow the norm; (b) believes all other members expect them personally to follow the norm 
and (c) compliance with the norm at least sometimes goes against self-interest narrowly 
understood.400 Compliance with public reason can be understood as a social norm in 
Bicchieri’s sense. It clashes with self-interest per (c). Compliance with it is a legitimate 
expectation we can have of others per (b). The compliance of each member is contingent on 
their belief that others reciprocate per (a). 
Consider how the norm of promise-keeping takes hold in a population as large as the United 
Kingdom. No one does or indeed could gauge what proportion of the total UK population 
complies with the norm. Rather, each just keeps track of whether those they interact with 
keep their promises. If enough do, they keep their promises. Crucially, one tends to have 
enough concrete knowledge of their immediate peers to know whether they comply or not. 
The problem of opacity does not arise as it does with population-level judgements. As long 
as each party in even a very large network gains this more tractable, local form of assurance, 
the norm of promise-keeping can become entrenched among a high number of people 
 
399 I thank Temi Ogunye for advancing this objection.  
400 (Bicchieri 2006, chap. 1) 
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simply due to network affects. The objector would simply ask why Rawlsian assurance could 
not operate on the same mechanism. Each individual citizen just needs to know that the 
voters in her neighbourhood or work place or family, of whom she has concrete knowledge, 
exercise their right to vote in accordance with public reason. If enough citizens gain this local 
form of assurance the commitment to public reason too could spread through such network 
affects. The objection provides a plausible account of how most norms and conventions, 
including Hayekian rules of just conduct, might spread through a large population. It is 
mistaken, however, in assuming that this local form of assurance is adequate for the 
entrenchment of the norm of public reason. For when an agent is seeking assurance as to 
how the mass of their fellow citizens will use their right to vote, they necessarily have to 
make population-level judgements. 
A thought experiment might illustrate why. Let us further consider the norm of promise-
keeping. If I may be allowed yet more uncreative licence, imagine a fictional country with 
two small towns – Trustinium and Untrustinium. As one might guess, promise-keeping is a 
strong norm in the former but not the latter. Suppose I live in Trustinium and I have learnt 
to keep my promises because those around me generally do so. This seems rational because 
for the most part I only deal with fellow residents of Trustinium. When it comes to promise-
keeping, all I need to know is whether those I actually interact with or am likely to interact 
with follow the norm. I do not need to make population-level judgements since I do not 
regularly interact with each and every single other member of the population.  Since I rarely 
have interactions with members of Untrustinium, for instance, it is of little consequence to 
me that they are untrustworthy. I can safely limit the scope of my concern to my local 
circumstances. The equivalent can be said for a resident of Untrustinium who has learnt not 
to keep her promises. This seems rational given who she interacts with. The fact that people 
might be trustworthy elsewhere is not relevant.  
Now let us now consider the same scenario save for the norm requiring assurance being that 
of voting according to public reason. Citizens of Trustinium are committed Rawlsians while 
Untrustinium is full of defectors from Rawlsian justice. The two scenarios are disanalogous 
in this sense: when the assurance model is about the legislative power of the state that is 
held equally with all citizens, population-level judgements are required. The scope of my 
concern would now rationally extend to how all of my fellow voters behaved. They each have 
an equal sovereign stake in political power and so unlike the promise-keeping case, the 
behaviour of all directly affects me.  I cannot rationally limit my concern to whether those I 
regularly interact with comply with public reason. If I am a resident of Trustinium and I take 
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my local experience as representative of the whole population, I will likely overstate the 
latter’s commitment to public reason. Conversely, if I am a resident of Untrustinium and I do 
the equivalent, I will likely understate their commitment to public reason. By necessity I have 
to cast a wider net to gain the assurance I seek. And so for this reason, population-level 
judgements, while not necessary for the assurance apropos of most norms, including 
Hayekian rules of just conduct, are necessary in the Rawlsian model.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Even if we grant Rawls’ the idealised assumption that all citizens affirm public reason, they 
cannot credibly signal this fact to one another. Perhaps, however, the difficulty is that Rawls 
asks too little of liberal citizens. Collective political agency doesn’t simply require citizens to 
show their commitment to liberal justice in the voting booth. It requires them also to engage 
in regular and sustained political deliberation on the common good. Only then can citizens 
can form a genuine consensus as to how their political association should be governed. We 
already cast some doubt on this claim earlier in this chapter. We observed that deliberation 
performs poorly as a signalling mechanism in solving Rawls’ assurance problem. In the next 
chapter we will develop further our critique of deliberative democracy.  
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Chapter Five: Aspirational Associationalism – Deliberative Democracy 
 
Abstract 
This chapter considers whether collective political agency would be possible in a society 
characterised by widespread subscription to deliberative democratic practices. It makes 
three arguments. First, the very conditions that deliberative democrats deem necessary for 
collective will-formation are possible only in face-to-face settings. Second, various attempts 
to scale up deliberative democracy fail to solve this problem. At most they will lead to a 
proliferation of “mini-publics” each of whom internally meet the necessary conditions for 
collective will-formation. However, these “collective wills” will be shared only by members 
of the mini-public in question and not society as a whole. Third, it draws on Alexis De 
Tocqueville to argue that the tendency to centralise and collectivise decision-making 
undermines those very civil society associations in which the deliberative ideal might be 
possible.   
 
Introduction  
 
Deliberative democrats are all too aware that citizens of actually-existing liberal democracies 
do not exercise meaningful collective agency. However, they propose a more robust 
commitment to deliberation as the antidote to this problem. It is hoped that such 
deliberation will lead to genuine collective will-formation in contrast to the status quo. James 
Fishkin and Bruce Ackerman propose a national “Deliberation Day” to rectify the apathy and 
ignorance of the mass of regular voters.401 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue that 
Rawls should adopt a more robust commitment to deliberative democracy because 
otherwise the consensus of liberal citizens would be limited to only the abstract content of 
justice as fairness. It would not extend to the concrete details of its application.402 Joshua 
Cohen argues that widespread deliberation will encourage in citizens an attachment to the 
common good, unlike actually-existing liberal democratic practice in which citizens vote on 
the basis of their private and self-centred concerns.403 Jürgen Habermas has long seen his 
theory of discursive will-formation as completing the promise of popular sovereignty that 
has been only partially realised since the French Revolution.404 Rawls himself had an 
ambivalent attitude towards deliberative democracy. He was famously criticised by 
Habermas for his “monological” original position which lacked any real deliberation.405 As we 
 
401 (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004) 
402 (Gutmann and Thompson 1998) 
403 (Cohen 1997)  
404 E.g. See “Popular Sovereignty as Procedure” in Habermas (1996, 463-491). 
405 (Jurgen Habermas 1995)  
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noted in the previous chapter, he sometimes says it is unrealistic to expect most citizens to 
dedicate substantive portions of their lives to political deliberation.406 In other places, 
however, he explicitly describes the well-ordered society as a form of deliberative democracy 
and suggests that the aim of public reason is to encourage as much deliberation as might be 
possible, citing favourably his former student Joshua Cohen.407  
This chapter critiques deliberative democracy on the grounds that it does not scale up in a 
large society. The argument to follow is divided into five sections. The first outlines 
deliberative democracy’s scale problem. According to deliberative theorists such as 
Habermas and Cohen, the epistemic presuppositions for genuine collective will-formation 
are met only in small face-to-face groupings. Sections 2-4 consider and critique three 
attempts to overcome the scale problem. Some think we can treat the deliberative 
conclusions arrived at by a group of persons randomly chosen from the population-at-large 
as representative of the conclusions the latter grouping would arrive at were they all to 
somehow deliberate together. Section two argues that this representation thesis lacks 
foundation. Ackerman and Fishkin propose “Deliberation Day,” an official public holiday 
taking place before a major national election and during which eligible voters are given the 
opportunity to engage in political deliberation. Section three argues that, at most, this might 
lead to better informed voters but not to the formation of a society-wide collective will. 
Section four considers “systemic” approaches to deliberative democracy. These approaches 
acknowledge that a large-scale society will inevitably consist of pluralistic and polycentric 
deliberative fora and try to re-formulate deliberative theory to be more realistic as a result. 
It is argued that such approaches are in the end difficult to distinguish from the aggregative 
status quo that deliberative democracy is supposed to replace. Section five takes a slightly 
different tack. It argues that deliberative democrats lack a robust account of the conditions 
under which agents will have sufficient knowledge and motivation to undertake deliberation. 
Drawing on Alexis De Tocqueville in particular, it argues that these conditions are best 
satisfied in a decentralised social order where deliberation can aid communities in solving 
 
406 E.g. (Rawls 2001, 143) 
407 (Rawls 1997, 772–73); still, Rawls (1997, 769) also thinks the responsibility to use public reason in 
deliberation falls primarily on politicians and judicial officials rather than regular citizens, on whom 
falls the responsibility of voting according to public reason. His overtures to deliberative democracy 
notwithstanding, this suggests that he envisages much less deliberation by regular citizens in his ideal 
regime than Habermas and Cohen do in theirs.  
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local problems. Extensive welfare guarantees, of the sort often favoured by deliberative 
democrats, may undermine the conditions in which the deliberative virtues flourish.  
 
1. Small-Scale Limitations of Deliberative Democracy 
Deliberative democracy aims to rectify a defect of aggregative democratic procedures. These 
treat voter preferences as exogenously given inputs and use them to generate a collective 
“decision” using an aggregation rule, most typically a majoritarian function. For deliberative 
democrats, the problem with aggregative democracy is not simply that voters’ pre-existing 
preferences might be ill-formed, prejudiced or even non-existent.408 It is that the “output” 
of such aggregation rules often fall short of a coherent or consistent general will, as evinced 
by the familiar aggregation problems that we covered in chapter three. The confused 
“outputs” of these democratic procedures reflect the inputs received from voters. Under 
aggregative democracy, voters act on their disparate and idiosyncratic preferences rather 
than a shared understanding of the common good. For the deliberative democrat, it is little 
surprise then that existing democratic practice does not always reveal the people to have a 
rational will. Deliberative democracy, on the other hand, emphases the importance of 
building deliberative consensus before voting. Democratic deliberation should follow 
procedures that respect the freedom and equality of all participants. It would not take voter 
preferences as given exogenously to the democratic process but offer voters the opportunity 
to change and revise them. The deliberative process of revising voters’ initial preferences 
should also facilitate a convergence of their views towards a rational consensus. This 
consensus would then inform their voting decisions. 409    
Deliberative theorists have identified necessary conditions for the formation of such a 
consensus. Joshua Cohen’s account of the formal presuppositions of deliberative democracy 
is representative of the literature.410  These suppositions are four in number:  
1. The participants see themselves as bound only by the results of their deliberation 
and treat as action-guiding the results of the deliberation. 
2. The participants back-up their views with reasons.  
3. Each participant has an equal voice in the deliberation.  
4. The participants aim for a “rationally-motivated consensus”. 
 
408 The last was Phillip Converse’s (2006) famous claim.  
409 (Cohen 1997); (Jürgen Habermas 1996, 2001); (Gutmann and Thompson 1998); (Mansbridge et. 
al. 2012)  
410 (Cohen 1997, 74–75) c.f. Habermas (1983) 
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The first condition invokes the kind of stipulations on discourse that one might find in a jury 
setting. The second condition stipulates that deliberation should be reasoned.  It insists that 
only reason, not force or manipulation, can be used to gain support for a proposal. Cohen 
explicitly cites Habermas’ requirement that “no force except that of the better argument is 
exercised”.411 The reasons should be formulated in such a way as to be acceptable to the 
other participants given the “diverse preferences, convictions, and ideals concerning the 
conduct of their own lives”.412 The third condition of an equal voice in deliberation means 
that “[each] can put issues on the agenda, propose solutions, and offer reasons in support of 
or in criticism of proposals. And each has an equal voice in the decision”.413 The fourth 
condition of a rationally-motivated consensus is achieved when reasons are found that are 
persuasive to all deliberators in the group.  
These very demanding criteria could be reasonably approximated only in small groups 
characterised by face-to-face contact. Supposing the deliberative process is to be at all a 
practical affair, then the third requirement of equal voice alone seems to dictate small 
numbers. When considering Cohen’s proposal, Michael Huemer notes that the US 
population is over 300 million. He asks sardonically: “[what] would society be like if every 
one of those individuals could call a press conference to discuss their latest policy idea?”414 
The epistemic hurdles to meeting these demanding discursive conditions on a large-scale do 
not end there. If I am to propose reasons that are acceptable to all the other deliberators, 
given their diverse “preferences, convictions, and ideals,” I need to be cognisant of what 
these might be. I might be able to get some traction on the personal ideals of my fellow 
deliberators if we were a handful of persons. I will not be able to get any traction on such 
ideals if my fellow deliberators are, say, 327 million fellow citizens of the United States. If I 
am to enjoy a rationally-motivated consensus with my deliberative peers, it is insufficient to 
merely convince them of my proposal. I also need to know that they are in reasoned 
agreement with it. That is, I need to know that all others are in agreement for the right 
reasons that I have offered them. I have not arrived at a rationally-motivated consensus with 
them if they have simply misunderstood the nature of my proposal or agreed for 
inappropriate reasons.415 Nor is knowing that they have accepted my proposal for the right 
 
411 (Cohen 1997, 75) 
412 (Cohen 1997, 72) 
413 (Cohen 1997, 74) 
414 (Huemer 2013, 63) 
415 Perhaps, for instance, they are expeditiously agreeing with me so they can go home after a long, 
tiring day of deliberation. Having performed jury service in the UK, I offer this as more than a 
hypothetical scenario.  
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reasons sufficient. They have to know that I know this. In turn, I need to know that they know 
that—ad infinitum. It is implausible to think that such thick intersubjective understanding 
can be gained amongst any but face-to-face deliberative groupings.  
Cohen’s requirements for deliberative will-formation, then, are similar to Bratman’s 
requirements for the formation of a joint-intentional action. Bratman outlines the conditions 
under which a group shares an intention to act. A group shares an intention that they 
perform an act if each member intends that they perform that act, intends to do their part 
in the performance and knows the equivalent to be true of all other members of the group. 
Cohen outlines the conditions under which a group shares an intention to act for the same 
reasons. A group shares a rationally-motivated intention that they perform an act if each 
intends the act for a reason or set of reasons accepted by all in the group and knows the 
equivalent to be true of all other members of the group.416 The demanding mutual 
knowledge requirements of both limit their applicability to small, face-to-face groups. It 
follows that the conditions necessary for genuine deliberative will-formation are readily met 
only in miniscule subsets of the population of a large-scale society. Thus, even if all members 
of such a society were highly motivated to engage in regular political deliberation, it would 
be insufficient to form a society-wide deliberative consensus. The most we can expect, then, 
from such widespread adoption of deliberative practices is the creation of a mass of mini-
publics each of which internally meets the requirements for deliberative will-formation. 
Deliberative theorists are more than aware of this scale problem and have made various 
proposals to overcome it. The sections to follow will review three such proposals and will 
argue all fail to solve the scale problem. At most, they might help voters to be slightly more 
informed about politics, but none will lead to a large-scale deliberative consensus.  
 
2. Scaling Up Deliberative Democracy – The Representation Approach 
The first proposal to be considered is Robert Dahl’s famous proposal for a “minipopulus”.417 
Dahl proposed that a thousand citizens be selected randomly from the entire population. 
This grouping would deliberate on an issue for an extended period of time and deliver its 
verdict. Dahl claims that their verdict would 
 
416 The difference is that on Bratman’s account, a group could share an intention to perform an act 
but each individual member of the group might have different reasons for performing it.  
417 (Dahl 1991, 238–41) 
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… “represent” the judgment of the demos [as a whole]. Its verdict would be the 
verdict of the demos itself, if the demos were able to take advantage of the best 
available knowledge to decide what policies were most likely to achieve the ends it 
sought. The judgments of the minipopulus would thus derive their authority from 
the legitimacy of democracy.418 
In more recent years, James Fishkin has advanced a close variant of Dahl’s idea. Fishkin has 
tested deliberative democracy empirically by organising deliberative groupings for 
experimental purposes.419  Each experiment consists of random and statistically 
representative samples of 100-200 citizens tasked with systematically deliberating a public 
policy matter.  The pre- and post-deliberation opinions of the participants are polled. Fishkin 
has conducted such experiments all around the world. He finds that citizen opinions often 
change to a large degree throughout the process and that they are better informed at the 
end of the process compared with the beginning.420 His experimental work constitutes some 
evidence that deliberative democracy at the small, face-to-face level works as deliberative 
theorists predict. Dahl also thinks, like Fishkin, that the conclusions arrived at by these small-
scale groupings somehow track wider public opinion. He calls these experiments 
“deliberative polls”. In contrast to normal polling, which ascertains the untutored opinions 
of a sample of the public, deliberative polling ascertains the considered opinion of a sample 
that have deliberated the matter at hand with one another. The hope is that their conclusions 
“represent what the public [as a whole] would think about the issue if it were motivated to 
become more informed and to consider competing arguments”.421  
In evaluating Dahl and Fishkin’s proposal, we need to distinguish deliberative polling from 
“lottocracy”. The latter is a term coined by Alexander Guerrero for a system whereby political 
officials are chosen by lot rather than elected. Guerrero argues that lottocracy is preferable 
to elective systems on the ground of several considerations. These include it being less 
susceptible to corruption and selecting for officials with longer time horizons than elected 
ones.422 If lottocracy is a form of governance, deliberative polling is the utilisation of 
lottocracy for one particular objective, namely, to arrive at a decision representative of public 
opinion at large.  It is this particular rationale for lottocracy that is subjected to critique in 
this section.423 Neither Fishkin nor Dahl, to my knowledge, provides any reason why the 
 
418 (Dahl 1991, 340) 
419 (Fishkin 2003) 
420 (Fishkin 2003, 129–30) 
421 (Fishkin 2003, 129) 
422 (Guerrero 2014, 165–70) 
423 Thus leaving open the possibility that lottocracy might still be desirable on some of the other 
grounds listed by Guerrero.  This chapter is agnostic on that wider question. 
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conclusions of a group selected by lot would represent the considered opinion of the whole 
population. One possibility is that they subscribe to a convergence thesis about human 
reasoning. It would run as follows:  
If a deliberative group meets or comes reasonably close to meeting appropriate 
deliberative conditions – e.g. conditions (1)-(4) above – then the conclusion they 
reach with respect to a particular proposal – i.e. whether to accept or reject it – and 
the reason on which they reach that conclusion will be the same as those reached 
by any other deliberative group meeting or coming reasonably close to meeting 
those same conditions.  
In other words, the convergence thesis states that the free use of reason by different 
deliberative groupings would lead to the same conclusion. If so, the conclusion reached by 
members of a randomly selected group would track that reached by the population as a 
whole if the latter could all somehow deliberate with one another.  
Now, one would not want to dismiss the convergence thesis tout court. There might well be 
some conclusions that we would expect (or at least hope) that any deliberative group would 
reach if they considered the matter-at-hand under appropriate conditions. One would hope 
that demonstrably unwarranted beliefs – flat-earth theory for instance – will be rejected by 
any competent group of deliberators. Still, if we accept even a mild dose of Rawls’ reasonable 
pluralism, the convergence thesis will not be true of a whole host of proposals.424 These are 
proposals the evaluation of which is subject to burdens of judgement. The evidence might 
be complex and difficult to evaluate, their evaluation might be contingent on multiple 
considerations the weighing of which might not be obvious, there might be powerful 
normative considerations both in favour and against the proposal, and so on.425 Following 
Rawls’ cue, we might say that each person will judge such proposals according to his or her 
personal evaluative standards.426 These differing evaluative standards mean that competent 
reasoners will non-culpably come to divergent conclusions when deliberating complex 
subject matter.427 
This Rawlsian thesis was originally intended to apply to individual deliberation. We can, 
however, straightforwardly apply it to deliberative groups. The conclusions arrived at by the 
 
424 Recall that section three of chapter one did not deny that the free use of human reason leads to 
divergent conclusions. The claim was that we have limited knowledge as to what our peers think in an 
impersonal society. This ignorance greatly limits the extent to which we can be described as being in 
a state of agreement or disagreement with them.  
425 (Rawls 1996, 56–57) 
426 Though I take the term from Gaus (2012a, 276). 
427 I write that they “come to divergent conclusions” rather than “disagree” for the reasons outlined 
in section three of chapter one.  
147 
 
members of a deliberative group will be contingent on its members’ particular array of 
evaluative standards. Imagine two deliberative groups considering abortion law. Group A 
contains only deliberators with conservative Christian beliefs. Group B only atheists. If both 
groups were to settle on a conclusion and a reason for that conclusion, it seems highly 
unlikely that they would be the same. Common sense suggests A will arrive at a much more 
restrictive policy than B. Deliberative democrats often hope that the educative function of 
deliberation will narrow down differences in evaluative standards. Even if this were the case, 
it would be of little use in rescuing the convergence thesis here. While Deliberation might 
narrow evaluative standards within group A or B, there is no guarantee it will narrow the 
differences between them. Indeed, it seems just as possible, if not more so, that it would 
exacerbate the latter differences. Post-deliberation, members of A could have converged in 
their evaluative standards such that the average member of A now adopts a more restrictive 
stance towards abortion than they did pre-deliberation.  Likewise but conversely, the 
average member of B would adopt an even less restrictive stance. Where the education 
function takes the members of the deliberative group depends on where those members 
begin. There is no guarantee that the final destination is the same for all groups given their 
cognitive diversity. The convergence thesis, then, fails to substantiate the representation 
approach.  
Perhaps the representation claim is grounded on another thesis. Fishkin’s deliberative polls 
are based on a statistically representative sample. If so, Fishkin might affirm something like 
the following: 
If a statistically representative sample of a larger grouping arrives at a rationally-
motivated consensus with respect to a particular proposal(s), that consensus is 
either the same as or otherwise reasonably tracks the rationally-motivated 
consensus the larger grouping would arrive at if its members were all capable of 
deliberating together.  
We can read this view as a modification of the convergence claim. It does not claim that the 
conclusions of a group selected purely by lot will track those of the demos as a whole. It 
claims that the conclusions of a statistically representative sample would do so. This modified 
form of the convergence claim, however, still seems mistaken, particularly for a large and 
diverse population. It falls foul of the fallacy of composition. The sampled categories will 
internally admit of great variation. For example, 3.3% of the British population is black. It 
hardly follows that the opinions of three black Britons chosen at random for a deliberative 
poll of, say, 100 people will adequately track the diversity of opinion in the British black 
community. Even if they somehow did, the whole point of deliberation is that it might lead 
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to the revision of one’s initial views. If after deliberation these three individuals change their 
opinion in a certain manner, it would surely be presumptuous to assume that other members 
of the black community would have also shifted their views in this manner had they 
deliberated the proposal under discussion. The modified convergence thesis also fails to 
substantiate the representation approach. We conclude, then, that the representation 
approach fails to scale up deliberative democracy.  
 
3. Scaling Up Deliberative Democracy – Deliberation Day 
Along with Bruce Ackerman, Fishkin has another proposal called “deliberation day”. I here 
draw on their book of the same name.428 Unlike deliberative polling, this proposal involves 
participation on a mass scale. The authors propose a very concrete and detailed institutional 
proposal for how deliberation day may be implemented in the United States. It will be a 
national holiday held two weeks before every presidential election. Despite the name it will 
actually be a two-day affair. All citizens are eligible to take one day off to participate for which 
they are paid an honorarium.429 Participation is voluntary. Deliberation day events will 
happen all across the country. On the day, there will be two kinds of deliberative formats. In 
the morning, the participants first convene in small groups of 15 and then convene for a 
second set of larger debates in “citizens’ assemblies” of 500 persons. The participants in the 
first debates formulate and vote on a list of questions to be put forth to representatives of 
the presidential candidates in the second debates, during which they listen to the 
representatives’ answers. This process is repeated in the afternoon.430  
Ackerman and Fishkin are distressed by the apathy and ignorance of the average voter, which 
renders the democratic process vulnerable to capture by special interests. Their proposal is 
intended to show that talk of popular sovereignty is not “hot air”. Citizens “have the 
fundamental right to determine the broad direction of public policy through electoral 
decisions made on the basis of popular deliberation”.431 Deliberation day is offered as the 
institutional mechanism through which such popular sovereignty might be exercised. The 
hope is that it will generate a substantive and informed public opinion that can hold 
presidential candidates to account. As before, in our assessment we should distinguish 
 
428 Deliberation Day (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004) 
429 (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004, 3) 
430 (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004, 27–37) 
431 (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004, 11–12) 
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between the all-things-considered case for an institution and a particular rationale. Perhaps 
deliberation day is a good idea because it would, say, improve voter knowledge of basic 
political facts.432 This chapter takes no position either way on that empirical question. Our 
question is whether deliberation day will facilitate the emergence of a large-scale 
deliberative consensus that can, in the authors’ own words, “determine the broad direction 
of public policy”. The answer is negative. It is hard to see how any such consensus would 
arise from these debates. At most, the small groupings of 15 persons might internally 
converge on a considered group opinion with respect to some issues.433 These agreements, 
however, would not extend beyond their small groupings. So we still have just a plethora of 
mini-publics at best. Deliberation day also fails to scale up deliberative democracy.  
 
4. Scaling Up Deliberative Democracy – Systemic Approaches 
In recent years, deliberative democrats have shifted towards so-called systemic 
approaches.434 Systemic deliberative democrats aspire towards sociological realism. They 
recognise that actually-existing liberal democracies have multiple and distributed centres of 
democratic deliberation and contestation, ranging from the courts to various legislative 
chambers to civil society organisations. In the terminology of the literature, democratic 
authority in large and complex societies is “decentered”.435 Rather than conceive of a singular 
public whose will is expressed by a legislative centre, we should model a pluralistic and 
differentiated public sphere consisting of many “nodes” of deliberation.436 The focus should 
not be on face-to-face deliberation in just one arena but on providing an account of how 
these various deliberative fora interact with one another. The systemic approach is often 
presented as an explicit solution to deliberative democracy’s scale problem. This section 
argues it is not. Rather than showing how deliberative will-formation is possible on a large-
scale, systemic approaches are an implicit concession that the scale problem can’t be solved. 
Such theories look little different from actually-existing democratic practice, the radical 
reform of which was the original aim of deliberative theory. For once we recognise that 
 
432 Though it would do little to rectify the more radical forms of voter ignorance we identified in 
chapter three.  
433 It is only in these smaller groupings that the participants actually deliberate with one another, in 
order to formulate questions for the larger citizen assemblies. In the latter, they only listen to 
representatives of the presidential candidates.  
434 (Habermas 1996); (Mansbridge et. al. 2012); (Bohman 2005); (Dryzek 2010)  
435 (Bohman 2005, 296–97); (Habermas 1996, 298–302) 
436 (Mansbridge et. al. 2012, 10) 
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democratic opinion is pluralistic and decentred, there is no reason to expect the multiple 
voices of the public sphere to cohere into any deliberative consensus. We will show how this 
is the case with respect to Habermas’ version of the systemic approach, as outlined in his 
Between Facts and Norms.437 
Habermas distinguishes between an “anarchic”, “weak” and “wild” public sphere that 
operates in the periphery of society and the formal legislative and judicial centre – a 
“subsystem specialized for collectively binding decisions”.438 He proposes a model of 
deliberative politics based on a division of labour between these two spheres. Only the 
political centre is capable of action in the sense of promulgating coercively-binding laws. 
However, reasons for action are supplied by public opinion generated in a deliberative but 
polycentric public sphere. The model is explicitly presented as a third way between a more 
communitarian model of deliberative democracy in which the state is seen as a vehicle for 
the undifferentiated and unified common will of the populace, and a liberal model 
emphasising the institutionally mediated form that the expression of people’s sovereignty 
need take in a complex society.439 In his own words, his theory “depends not on a collectively 
acting citizenry but on the institutionalisation of … procedures and conditions of 
communication”.440 
It is difficult to properly evaluate Habermas’ proposal. His arguments are pitched at a high 
level of abstraction and it is not quite clear what the interaction between the anarchic public 
sphere and the centre is supposed to look like. He does offer suggestive metaphors. The 
public sphere “programs” or “supplies” the centre or otherwise provides it with “political 
potentials”.441 It acts as a “sounding board for problems” or “warning system”.442 It seems 
that communicating new ideas or concerns to the legislative centre is one of the public 
sphere’s core functions. Habermas refers positively, for instance, to the effectiveness of civil 
society associations in bringing a range of issues into public consciousness, ranging from the 
problems of nuclear proliferation to the demands of the feminist movement.443  He also 
emphasises repeatedly the dynamic, open-ended and polycentric nature of the public 
sphere. It consists of “an open and inclusive network of overlapping, subcultural publics 
 
437 (Habermas 1996) 
438 (Habermas 1996, 307, 300) 
439 (Habermas 1996, 297–98) 
440 (Habermas 1996, 298) 
441 (Habermas 1996, 300, 352, 363) 
442 (Habermas 1996, 359) 
443 (Habermas 1996, 381) 
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having fluid temporal, social, and substantive boundaries”.444 It also “represents a highly 
complex network that branches out into a multitude of overlapping international, national, 
regional, local, and subcultural arenas”.445  
Habermas’ notion of the public sphere, then, appears to have a strong family resemblance 
to Hayek’s idea of an emergent social order.446 Indeed, Habermas sounds positively Hayekian 
when he says that the public cannot occupy “the position of a macrosubject supposed to 
bring society as a whole under control and simultaneously act for it”.447 The public opinion 
emanating from this public sphere is not a singular, unitary or consistent phenomenon. 
Instead, we can see the public sphere as a network through which information is transmitted 
between very many focal points - “the streams of communication are, in the process, filtered 
and synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public 
opinions”.448 The question, then, is how these diverse public opinions interact with the formal 
law-making centre. Drawing on Bernard Peters’ work, Habermas offers the metaphor of 
“sluices” through which these streams of public opinion are transmitted to the centre.449  
However, if we take this metaphor seriously, the resulting picture is hard to distinguish from 
the relationship between legislative law-making bodies and wider civil society that we 
already find in large-scale democracies. It is quite clear that the political centre is going to 
receive a cacophony of discrete and “topically specified public opinions,” many of which will 
issue incompatible directives. Certain familiar difficulties crop up. The ideas emanating from 
the public sphere that meet Habermas’ approval – ranging from nuclear disarmament to 
environmentalism to feminism – tend toward the “left-” or “progressive-“ side of the political 
spectrum. We can imagine rather different ideas stemming from more “conservative” parties 
of the public sphere. Which among these and many other voices, which will often be in 
tension with one another, should the legislative centre heed? It is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that those with access to political power will listen to some amongst the 
cacophony of voices but also ignore very many others.  
 
444 (Habermas 1996, 307) 
445 (Habermas 1996, 373) 
446 Hayek (1982c, 140–41) also offers a description of society as a complex network of relations in 
the  
third volume of his Law, Legislation and Liberty.  
447 (Habermas 1996, 372); original emphasis. 
448 (Habermas 1996, 360); emphasis added.  
449 (Habermas 1996, 300) 
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We need not even posit self-interested motives amongst the political class to reach this 
conclusion.450 Given the quantity, diversity and frequently contradictory nature of the 
“topically specified opinions” in the public sphere, even the most virtuous and impartial of 
political officials would be unable to learn about and act upon all of them. They would be 
forced to exercise discretion in selecting those among the many “public opinions” with which 
they are familiar and/or find important. As a result, many parts of the public sphere will find 
their views and opinions overlooked by the political class. This is a phenomena already 
prevalent in established democratic practice. Carolyn Hendriks has documented an example 
of it in some empirical research. Her case study is of a citizens’ conference held in Germany 
on the topic of “genetic diagnostics”.451 The conference had a mixture of formal discussions 
dominated by experts and more informal ones open to participation from the wider public. 
She observes that against the “hyperactive discursive setting” of the large-scale public 
sphere, “the citizens’ conference struggled to gain any attention in the political and public 
domain”.452  The fact that many if not most citizens do not exercise a meaningful say in the 
formulation of democratic laws is what motivated the deliberative turn in the first instance. 
This fact appears unchanged in Habermas’ model of the relationship between a deliberative 
yet highly fragmented public sphere and a unitary legislative centre forced to select which 
bits of the public sphere it should listen to. Habermas’ theory purchases sociological realism 
but only by demonstrating the infeasibility of a society-wide deliberative consensus.  
Some other advocates of the systemic approach have criticised Habermas for his dichotomy 
between centralised legislative authority at the core and the anarchic and pluralistic public 
sphere at the periphery. They argue that decision-making authority is just as decentred and 
polycentric as the sources of public opinion.453 They might object, then, that their construal 
of deliberative systems is not vulnerable to the critique just presented, since it does not posit 
one monocentric pole of decision-making that all the heterogeneous voices of the 
polycentric public sphere try to influence. Thus Mansbridge et al argue that our 
understanding of deliberative systems should extend to include both informal centres of 
decision-making in civil society and formal centres of decision-making in international and 
transnational institutions.454 They then claim that a rational deliberative consensus, at least 
 
450 Such that politicians would heed only those amongst the many deliberative voices that would 
help them win elections or who emanate from agents who fund their campaigns.  
451 That is, how public policy should respond to the prospective emergence of gene-editing 
technology.  
452 (Hendriks 2006, 498) 
453 This is similar to the diverse model of rule-making authority that I defended in chapter three.  
454 (Mansbridge et. al. 2012, 9) 
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with respect to some issues, can be seen as an outcome emerging from the interaction of 
multiple discursive and decision-making nodes. They call these outcomes “societal choices” 
or “societal conclusions”. For instance, they write:  
… The widespread societal conclusion that discrimination in hiring by race and gender is 
unjust is reasonably described as a collective decision, resulting in part from certain 
binding state decisions but also in large part from hundreds of millions of individual and 
institutional decisions based on widespread collective discussion and interaction.455 
I believe there to be an error in this passage similar to that we identified in chapter two with 
Gaus’ The Order of Public Reason. It ascribes too much intentionality to emergent outcomes. 
The passage implies that all these individuals and institutions consciously deliberated on the 
rights and wrongs of discrimination, concluded it was wrong, and then changed their 
practices. Steadily the argument against discrimination spread across the social space until 
all become convinced of its validity. Now, no doubt some such direct persuasion and 
argument did play a role in the entrenchment of these anti-discrimination norms. But 
another significant factor leading different individuals and institutions to adopt anti-
discrimination practices are the dynamics of social norm-following. Per Christina Bicchieri’s 
aforementioned account, norms are default rules of behaviour to which we conform because 
we believe that a sufficiently large number of our peers follow the norm and that a 
sufficiently large number of them expect us to follow it.456 Bicchieri’s account implies a 
complex relationship between the norms that members of a group follow and their personal 
beliefs. A norm of which no member of a group personally approves could still be 
unanimously subscribed to if each believes sufficient other members of the group approve 
the norm and expect them to follow it. 
This is an extreme case, but it highlights how norms can spread spontaneously without 
anyone strongly approving or disapproving of them but simply through the power of mutual 
expectations in a large network. Once the emergent norm against discrimination hits critical 
mass, even those who have doubts about it have incentives to comply.457 Of course, personal 
normative beliefs are not irrelevant to the emergence of norms. One can reject a norm or try 
entrepreneurially to reform it if they feel strongly enough about the matter. But the spread 
of a norm is never solely dependent on individuals being personally satisfied as to its value. 
Each agent (individual or institutional) has to consider both their personal moral attitude to 
 
455 (Mansbridge et. al. 2012, 8) 
456 (Bicchieri 2006, 5) 
457 Much, as we saw, was the same with the emergence of an equilibrium rule in Gaus’ Kantian 
coordination game.   
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the norm and also what they believe to be the expectations of other agents in their networks. 
Thus, I might consider a norm much less than ideal but follow it because I believe I am 
expected to.458 If this analysis is sound, we cannot straightforwardly infer widespread ethical 
agreement on the worthiness of a norm from the empirical fact of widespread conformity to 
it. As with Gaus’ Kantian coordination game, in so doing there is a danger of mistaking 
acquiescence to fundamentally emergent phenomena with deeper forms of endorsement. 
Emergent “societal conclusions” are not a rationally-motivated consensus. We conclude that 
systems approaches also fail to scale up deliberative democracy.  
 
5. Tocqueville’s Worry: the Deliberative Virtues and the Perils of Centralisation  
A summary of the argument thus far is in order. The first section outlined the scale problem 
of deliberative democracy. The necessary conditions for deliberative will-formation can be 
met only in small face-to-face groups. Widespread adoption of deliberative practices will lead 
at best to the creation of a mass of mini-publics each of which might internally form or come 
close to forming a rationally-motivated consensus. It will not lead to any society-wide 
deliberative consensus. Sections 2-4 considered and critiqued various attempts of 
deliberative theorists to overcome the scale problem. This section takes a different tack. If 
the chapter thus far has highlighted the limits to deliberative democracy, the aim of this 
section is to say something about the conditions under which it might be possible.  One does 
not have to see it as a regulative ideal for all people in all places to see the normative 
attraction of participatory democracy in social life. On the Tocquevillian view advanced in 
this section, contemporary deliberative theorists lack an adequate account of the conditions 
under which agents are motivated to engage in democratic deliberation. The view advanced 
here is that agents are normally motivated to create deliberative associations in order to 
solve prosaic and quotidian local problems. Extensive state activity, however, undermines 
the propensity for deliberative association insofar as it relieves communities of the burden 
of resolving these problems themselves. Thus far in this chapter we have scoped out 
motivational concerns and taken for granted that citizens would want to engage in active 
deliberation. In this section we relax that assumption and try to identify the conditions under 
which citizens would have both sufficient knowledge and motivation to deliberate. Our 
 
458 Hence many might grudgingly follow anti-discrimination norms in their workplaces but elsewhere 
complain about excessive “political correctness”.  
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contention is that deliberative theorists do not provide a satisfactory account on either of 
these two fronts.  
They are typically concerned with deliberation about the major political topics of the day. 
Consider the following list of deliberative polls conducted by Fishkin: 
Nine of these have been national – five in Britain (on crime, Britain's future in Europe, 
the monarchy, the 1997 British general election, and the future of the National 
Health Service on its 50th anniversary in 1998), one in Denmark (on the Euro right 
before the referendum in 2000), two in Australia (one before the republic 
referendum in 1999 and one on reconciliation with the aboriginals in 2001).459 
He is not the only one. Deliberative democrats are overwhelmingly focused on agents 
debating in their role as citizens the merits of different proposals for state legislation. 
However, a cursory knowledge of the literature on voter ignorance and apathy, already 
mentioned in chapter three, should engender scepticism about whether most citizens would 
have sufficient motivation to engage in regular political deliberation. If many are already 
disincentivised to vote or to conduct basic research to inform their decision when they do 
vote, it is hard to imagine them giving up too many evenings to political deliberation.460  
The problem though is not simply that voters might lack the motivation to discuss these 
grand issues of state legislation. There is an epistemic issue too. Determining, say, whether 
or not a country should join a currency arrangement or the future of a state-run health 
system or how to combat crime are very complex and difficult matters. The scale and 
complexity of such issues mean that even the putative experts struggle to understand them 
properly or diagnose the correct solutions. Non-experts stand even less of a chance of 
debating these matters in an informed manner. By contrast, let us imagine the residents of 
Swiss village deliberating on an amendment to the rules governing their communally owned 
land and roads.461 They certainly have a rational choice incentive to do so, since the rules will 
affect resources that are important for their livelihood. They also are epistemically well 
placed to do so on the basis of their extensive local knowledge.462 Rules governing 
communally owned land are certainly a more prosaic and “day-to-day” topic of deliberation 
than a discussion of how to best instantiate the difference principle. However, it is precisely 
 
459 (Fishkin 2003, 129) 
460 It is telling the degree to which Fishkin is a deliberative theorist who effectively has to contrive 
opportunities for political deliberation, be these through experimental deliberative polls or the more 
extensive deliberation day.  
461 The Swiss village is based, of course, on a case study of Elinor Ostrom (1990, 61–65). It is one of 
many examples she has found of communities working together to solve common problems.  
462 Local knowledge that is in some cases passed on through the generations.  
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these more prosaic issues about which real citizens will likely be motivated and informed 
enough to associate over and deliberate. If we wish to inculcate the deliberative virtues, our 
main concern should be giving citizens more control over such day-to-day matters.  
This, I believe, is the great lesson of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, to which we will 
now turn. If the propensity to deliberate democratically is less pronounced then one might 
like, Tocqueville teaches us that this could stem from the scale and scope of contemporary 
state activity. He shares with contemporary deliberative democrats the general view that 
associational participation has the salutary effect of extending individual objectives beyond 
their own immediate interest to a wider sense of the common good.463 He believes that such 
participation is necessary for a healthy society and to prevent social atomism. He thus 
distinguishes between individualism and self-interest properly understood. His attitude 
toward the former is cautious. Individualism is the 
[Calm] and considered feeling which persuades each citizen to cut himself off from 
his fellows and to withdraw into the circle of his family and friends in such a way that 
he thus creates a small group of his own and willingly abandons society at large to 
its own devices.464  
It is distinct from the vice of egoism – “an ardent and excessive love of oneself” – but acts as, 
one might say, a gateway to it.465 On Tocqueville’s score, an individual learns their self-
interest properly understood when the distinction they make between their own welfare 
and that of others becomes porous. They would then sacrifice for others not on the basis of 
pure benevolence but under the awareness “that such sacrifices are as necessary to him who 
imposes them upon himself as to him for whose sake they are made”.466 Like deliberative 
democrats, Tocqueville’s inquiry is into the conditions under which citizens develop a 
genuine motivation to associate with their peers to further the common good.  His answer, 
however, was local associational life. He greatly admired both the sheer quantity and variety 
of the associations he found in the 19th century United States, writing of the Americans that 
“not only do they have commercial and industrial associations to which all belong but also a 
thousand other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very specialised, large 
and small”.467 
 
463 Indeed, he is often an influence on more “communitarian” deliberative democrats e.g. (Sandel 
1998). 
464 (Tocqueville 2003 [1840], 587) 
465 (Tocqueville 2003 [1840], 588) 
466  See the chapter entitled “How the Americans Combat Individualism by the Principle of Self-Interest 
Rightly Understood”. (Tocqueville 2003 [1840], 609–13) 
467 (Tocqueville 2003 [1840], 596) 
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Associational participation teaches citizens their self-interest properly understood. For a 
commitment to the general welfare does not come automatically but has to be nurtured. 
The nurturing process, however, must be grounded in the immediate interests of citizens: 
“[you] first get involved in the general interest by necessity, and then by choice; what was 
calculation becomes instinct; and by working for the good of your fellow citizens, you finally 
acquire the habit and taste of serving them”.468 In other words, one is motivated to 
collaborate with others initially for self-interested reasons which only later develops into an 
intrinsic commitment to the welfare of others. Associational life also teaches citizens how to 
work together and solve problems. Robert Putnam famously transmuted this Tocquevillian 
notion into the parlance of contemporary social science with the term “social capital”.469 
Elinor Ostrom, already cited above, documented many examples of communities 
collaborating in a Tocquevillian manner to provide themselves with communal goods.470  
Conventional political assumptions associate doctrines of limited government with a self-
interested individualism and an activist state with the expression of other-regarding 
communal values. Tocqueville turns this dichotomy on its head. He thinks an activist state 
undermines associational life and promotes an undesirable form of atomistic individualism. 
For Tocqueville, necessity is the mother of both invention and sociability. Local association 
loses its raison d'être once state bureaucracies displace its role.471 Quite simply, there is no 
need for individuals to solve a problem through free association if the state will do it instead. 
Once this incentive to collaborate is diminished, individuals are less likely to develop their 
self-interest properly understood and communities less likely their social capital. One might 
object that the central state provides its own avenue for public participation and 
collaboration. The displacement of more localised associations merely replaces one avenue 
for meaningful collaboration with another. However, on the view of Tocqueville and this 
thesis, such an objection fails because of an asymmetry between collaboration via the state 
and collaboration via local associations. As this chapter and thesis have argued, democratic 
citizens lack sufficient mutual knowledge to meaningfully collaborate with one another. By 
contrast, members of local associations often do have sufficient such knowledge. 
Tocqueville saw a particular danger when this asymmetry is overlooked and the state 
wrongly seen as a vehicle for the common good. Citizens would be liable to a particular form 
 
468 (Tocqueville 2003 [1840], 893) 
469 (Putnam 2001) 
470 (Ostrom 1990) 
471 For a 20th century articulation of this Tocquevillian concern, see Nisbet (1953). 
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of “soft despotism”. The despotism of the contemporary state stems from the sheer scope 
of the activities undertaken by it. It claims the right “to a monopoly of all the force within the 
community, to make war, to make peace, to conscript life, to tax, to establish and dis-
establish property, to define crime, to punish disobedience, to control education, to 
supervise the family, to regulate personal habits, and to censor opinions”.472 As the state 
takes over so many swathes of life, the scope for autonomous democratic action decreases. 
Hence his famous lament:  
It provides their security, anticipates and guarantees their needs, supplies their 
pleasures, directs their principal concerns, manages their industry, regulates their 
estates, divides their inheritances. Why can it not remove from them entirely the 
bother of thinking and the troubles of life?473 
The despotism would be of a soft nature insofar as democratic citizens believe that the 
exercise of state power is nothing more than the expression of their own will.  Indeed, insofar 
as the expansion of state power involves the application of uniform laws that appear to 
constrain all equally, citizens are likely to acquiesce and even promote it since “each citizen 
thinks that he is depriving all his fellow men of these powers that he grants to the crown”.474 
In a passage that seemingly anticipates the later thought of Michel Foucault, he writes: 
I have always believed that this type of organised, gentle, and peaceful enslavement 
just described could link up more easily than imagined with some external forms of 
freedom and that it would not be impossible for it to take hold in the very shadow 
of the sovereignty of the people.475  
Deliberative theorists today, by and large, have lost sight of these Tocquevillian concerns.  
They tend to favour welfare states that are more active and extensive then the status quo.  
The oft stated concern is that deliberative equality would not be possible save for radical 
state intervention to guarantee much greater socio-economic equality.476 The overlooking of 
 
472 The citation belongs to Walter Lippmann. He is cited by Cavanaugh (2011, 28). This section 
discusses the state as if it were a singular entity as a shorthand. This is not to overlook, of course, the 
point made in chapter two that the state is better understood as a network rather than a unitary 
organisation.  
473 (Tocqueville 2003 [1840], 805–6) 
474 (Tocqueville 2003 [1840], 782) 
475 (Tocqueville 2003 [1840], 806) 
476 A clear statement of this view is offered by Bohman (1997). As David Schmidtz (1997) observes, it 
is often thought that state intervention is needed to “guarantee” a desired outcome whose 
attainment would otherwise be precarious. Thus, a deliberative democrat like Bohman thinks that we 
need the state to guarantee socio-economic equality, without which deliberative practices will not 
flourish. Schmidtz, however, observes that the “politics of guarantees” (my term) often has 
unintended consequences. One is that the interventions might, in fact, fail to provide guarantees. 
Another is that they strip citizens of the responsibility to try and solve problems themselves. It might 
be that citizens are motivated to deliberate only when there is a felt need. If this is right, attempted 
state guarantees of socio-economic equality might be in tension and not complementary with the aim 
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these Tocquevillian concerns is unfortunate. There is evidence to support the displacement 
thesis, suggesting that deliberative theorists have overlooked the costs of the rise of welfare 
bureaucracies.   
A good historical example of the displacement with which Tocqueville is concerned is the 
decline of friendly societies in the United States and the United Kingdom following the 
expansion of state welfare in the twentieth century.477 Friendly societies were voluntary 
associations formed by men and women for a whole range of welfare purposes, from 
insurance in cases of infirmity and sickness to the care of the elderly to providing funding for 
burials. They also provided medical services. They were distinct from charities since all 
members paid contributions to the society and could claim funds when the need arose as a 
matter of entitlement. They emerged and developed in the nineteenth century. And they 
were popular. The 1911 National Insurance Act mandated social insurance in the United 
Kingdom. However, David Green estimates that at least 9 of the 12 million people covered 
by the Act were already members of friendly societies.478 These societies weren’t simply 
insurance schemes. These were self-governing democratic associations created by their 
predominantly working class members. 
The constitution of the typical friendly society treated all members as equal under the rules 
of the society and all were expected to contribute to its governance.479 Indeed, both the day-
to-day governance and the rules of the association themselves were determined 
democratically by their members.480 New members particularly were encouraged to take 
part in these democratic processes and not view their participation solely instrumentally as 
means to secure insurance.481 A local branch would have various elected positions, ranging 
from warden to financial secretary. The member of a typical branch was eligible and indeed 
expected to seek to occupy these positions. Green describes them as “training grounds for 
democracy,” particularly so for manual workers whose day jobs may have been mundane.482 
These were associations in which deliberative ideals were met and were done so on a mass 
 
of promoting deliberative practices. The example of the friendly societies, wherein working men and 
women organised in deliberative associations to provide themselves with welfare in the absence of 
guaranteed state provision, analysed further below, will provide some substantiation for this claim.  
 
477 (Green 1993); (Beito 2000); (Davies 1997). What follows draws primarily upon Green’s account of 
the rise and fall of UK friendly societies.  
478 (Green 1993, 26) 
479 (Green 1993, 31)  
480 (Green 1993, 34) 
481 (Green 1993, 30) 
482 (Green 1993, 33) 
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scale. The workers had a strong material incentive to participate insofar as their livelihoods 
were at stake. They were also well placed epistemically to deliberate about these matters. 
They would know the risks facing persons in their social class and occupation. This would 
inform their deliberation and decision-making as to the appropriate rules for their 
association. The important point here is that such deliberations were embedded in concrete 
social practices. The objects of discussion were not abstract matters removed from day-to-
day concerns. Relatedly, the motivation to join these associations, at least initially, did not 
come from an abstract commitment to civic virtue. It came from a concrete concern to 
protect themselves and their families from misfortune and hardship. This provides 
substantiation for Tocqueville’s view that the motivation to engage in deliberative practices 
is best built on top of such “mundane” and “prosaic” concerns.483  
The deliberative democrat might be tempted to dismiss the friendly societies as insufficiently 
political. These were not citizens deliberating about major matters of state. Indeed, many of 
their nineteenth century members would not have had the right to vote in political elections. 
However, this response would beg the question as to what counts as “political”. The welfare 
functions performed by the friendly societies are a large if not the main bulk of state activities 
today. Though the friendly societies did not directly influence state legislation, they fulfilled 
many functions that we now think of as political. Arguably they gave their members much 
more control over how these services were received than do contemporary state welfare 
institutions.484 Green locates the decline of friendly societies in rent seeking by the medical 
profession and for-profit insurance companies, who lobbied so that the 1911 legislation 
would favour their prospects over those of the societies.485 However, and consistent with 
Tocqueville’s displacement thesis, the subsequent rise of the welfare state is surely also an 
important factor. There is no point in self-organising to provide oneself with unemployment 
insurance or healthcare if these are guaranteed by state provision. Thus, institutions that 
enabled and motivated agents to take part in deliberative self-governance on a mass scale 
were likely undermined by expansive state activity.486  
 
483 The scare quotes are inserted because these concerns are not mundane for those who are first-
personally affected by them. They are mundane from the perspective of the political philosopher who 
wants to ask what the just society looks like from some Archimedean perspective.  
484 Many friendly societies provided their members with medical services by contracting directly with 
doctors. The British Medical Association complained that the societies “underpaid” their doctors, 
suggesting their bargaining power was significant. (Green 1993, 62) 
485 (Green 1993, chap. 9) 
486 One may believe, as I do, that some of the shift to a more centralised welfare system was justified 
on an all-things-considered evaluation. But the point here is that a diminishment of participatory 
democracy and associational life are to be considered significant costs in that evaluation. 
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Conclusion  
 
This chapter has argued that deliberative democracy’s scale problem cannot be solved. 
Consequently, a large-scale deliberative demos is not a feasible prospect. The deliberative 
ideal is best met in a decentralised social order characterised by comparatively restrained 
central state intervention. So concludes the second part of this thesis and its epistemic 
critique of descriptive and aspirational associationalism. This and the previous chapter have 
emphasised that it is mutual ignorance rather than a lack of motivation to engage in politics, 
or a lack of consensus on the right principles, that inhibits collective political agency. Per the 
emergent view defended in this thesis, the latter is the prime cause of alienation among 
liberal citizens. In the final part of this thesis we will consider the implications of this 
argument for the liberal self. Collective political agency is attractive in part because it 
promises social unity to the individual. She can see her life-plan as at least partly a 
contribution to a grand project she shares with all her fellow citizens. The potential anomie 
of an impersonal liberal order is thereby alleviated. The thought that political participation 
contextualises individual achievements as a contribution to a greater whole dates back to 
Hegel. Rawls gives this idea a contemporary construal when claiming that the well-ordered 
society is a “social union” whose citizens participate in one another’s achievements. Focusing 
on Rawls’ account, chapter six will argue that this desire for social unity cannot be met. The 
liberal self cannot see her own life as a contribution to a greater project. She is too ignorant 
of the circumstances of her fellow citizens. Epistemic alienation is the price we pay for living 
in large-scale orders. In chapter 7 we turn to alleviate Hayek’s worry that liberal agents will 
be unable to accept a liberal order because they consider this price too high to pay and that 
the stability of a liberal order will be cast into doubt as a consequence.  
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Chapter Six: Social Unity and the Well-Ordered Society 
 
Abstract 
This chapter considers the claim that membership of political association can reconcile 
subjective freedom with community. This claim, dating back to Hegel, manifests itself in 
various ways in contemporary political theory. Rawls gives it the most elaborate and explicit 
formulation. He characterises a well-ordered society as a preeminent social union. Members 
of a social union gain recognition for their expression of human excellence and enjoy the 
expression of excellence by others. Rawls oscillates between two different conceptions of a 
social union and in turn two different explanations of why the well-ordered society is the 
preeminent social union. While not denying that social union is possible in civil society 
associations, this chapter critiques both versions of Rawls’ claim that the well-ordered 
society is the preeminent social union or indeed a plausible social union of any sort.  
 
Introduction  
 
Weber’s distinction between the communal and face-to-face Gemeinschaft and the 
impersonal and bureaucratic Gesellschaft is well established in Western thought. We can 
read Hayek as arguing that socialism and social justice constitute the erroneous application 
to the Gesellschaft of the ethics the Gemeinschaft. One way of understanding the shift from 
small-scale community to impersonal relations is in terms of a trade-off of communal bonds 
for individual freedom. Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right is predicated on this 
claim.487 For Hegel, Plato’s Republic exemplified a communal social order with little room for 
individuality. Each person occupies a fixed and ascriptive social role. The function of each 
social role – the producers, the auxiliaries, and the guardians – harmonise with one another. 
There is no notion of a private interest distinct from one’s socially recognised function within 
the community. Hegel compares-and-contrasts this social world of the Republic with the 
impersonality of commercial society. Social coordination there is facilitated by contract and 
exchange between individuals pursuing private aims. The situation here is the reverse of 
Greek life for Hegel. Subjective individuality flourishes but seemingly at the expense of the 
social harmony found in the communal grouping.  
Assuming there is no going back to the old social order, even if that was thought desirable, 
the questions remaining are whether we must make do with this loss of community or 
whether we can reconcile community with the Gesellschaft. Hegel famously thought the 
latter was possible and indeed necessary. While his favourable attitude towards individual 
 
487 (Hegel 2011 [1896]) 
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or – in his parlance – “subjective” freedom is not to be doubted, he was concerned about 
the alienation it caused. The issue for Hegel is that individuals do not simply want to express 
their idiosyncratic individuality. They wish to express that freedom in a manner that 
harmonises with the equivalent expression of their peers. This is the crucial good provided 
by one’s membership of a state. Hegel here distinguishes between the institutional 
manifestations of the state, such as the judiciary or the civil service – “the political state 
proper” – from the state as a manifestation of society as one integrated ethical community 
– Sittlichkeit. Political institutions should be rationally designed and structured such that 
otherwise disaggregated individual decision-making coheres into a purposeful and 
meaningful harmony. In his own constitutional proposals Hegel espouses the creation of 
guild-like corporations. On this corporatist model, our individual freedom to join any kind of 
guild is assured but the interactions between them are subject to centralised coordination 
to ensure that each guild contributes to the universal good.  The end result is that the 
exercise of subjective freedom by each harmonises with the universal good of all. The 
individual experiences not only subjective freedom but participation in this wider and 
integrated Sittlichkeit. Individuality and community are secured.  
Now, the precise details of Hegel’s proposal need not detain us. It is the underlying idea that 
matters. The Hegelian claim that political membership is a surrogate for community in an 
impersonal social order remains influential. Recall the claim by Margaret Moore that people 
who “exercise collective self-government” thereby “shape the conditions of their existence, 
and their future together”. They achieve a “collective” dimension of autonomy not available 
to those whose freedom is restricted solely to the “individual private sphere”. 488 Yael Tamir 
argues that membership of a nation-state can elevate one’s personal achievements. 
Assuming that one has a strong national identity, then their writing a good novel is not 
merely an isolated act of creativity. It is a contribution to, say, American literature. Indeed, 
in popular parlance we find nationalist references to “our” playwrights or singers or athletes 
and so on. In Tamir’s words, such national identification: 
[Contextualises] human actions, no matter how mundane, making them part of a 
continuous creative effort whereby culture is made and remade. Insofar as every 
action within a national entity is endowed with this additional dimension, individuals 
living within national frameworks enjoy options unavailable to those outside 
them.489  
 
488 (Moore 2015, 66) 
489 (Tamir 1993, 85) 
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In a similar vein, various political philosophers have argued that the effective exercise of 
autonomy requires membership of a wider “national” or “societal” culture.490 John Rawls in 
particular has tried to update this Hegelian idea with his characterisation of a well-ordered 
liberal society as a social union. He invokes this idea to show that the well-ordered society 
can account for the value of community. The basic idea is that we can arrange liberal 
institutions so that each citizen feels that their exercise of liberty coheres into a greater unity. 
Their private plans being experienced as “a plan within a plan, this superordinate plan being 
realized in the public institutions of society”.491 The hope of reconciliation between 
individuality and community comes naturally to the associational view. If citizens are indeed 
capable of acting together in the pursuit of shared ends, then each can contextualise their 
personal actions as a contribution to this wider endeavour. On the emergent view, however, 
the mutual ignorance of our respective goals and circumstances renders this too much to 
hope for. One can, of course, find community in the epistemically tractable context of civil 
society associations but not within the context of impersonal cooperation with millions of 
fellow strangers. This chapter offers an immanent critique of Rawls’ characterisation of the 
well-ordered society as a social union.  
As we shall see, Rawls’ discussion is not without its exegetical difficulties. It is articulated in 
the third part of A Theory of Justice, a section of the book in which Rawls displays an 
“uncharacteristic lack of clarity” according to Samuel Freeman.492 Accordingly, any reading 
of the social union argument will have to engage in some exegesis to make up for the 
ambiguities in Rawls’ own presentation. This chapter argues that Rawls oscillates between 
two distinct models of what a social union is, though he does not render the distinction 
between them explicit. This has to be reconstructed from his various remarks on the matter. 
Depending on the passage-in-question, he draws on both models when claiming the well-
ordered society is a social union. This chapter will argue that on neither of these two 
interpretations can the well-ordered society be understood as such. The textual ambiguities 
notwithstanding, Rawls arguments here deserve consideration because they are an 
elaborate if not always fully clear attempt at showing how liberal individuality and large-scale 
community might be reconciled. The argument to follow is divided into four sections. Section 
one outlines in general terms Rawls’ understanding of a social union and the conception of 
the good on which it is based. Section two outlines the two interpretations of a social union 
 
490 (Kymlicka 1996, chap. 5); (Margalit and Raz 1990) 
491 (Rawls 1999, 463) 
492 (Freeman 2007, 277); the bulk of the analysis to follow will draw on Rawls’ discussion of social 
unions in that last third of Theory. 
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to be found in Theory. These are the completeness and emulation interpretations. Section 
three critiques the claim that the well-ordered society can be understood as an emulation 
social union. Section four critiques the claim that it can be understood as a completeness 
social union. The chapter concludes by contrasting Rawls’ characterisation of a liberal order 
as a social union with Hayek’s markedly different vision of a liberal order. The argument to 
follow takes for granted Rawls’ claim that the desire for social union is widespread and that 
such unions can be found in civil society. It questions whether the well-ordered society as a 
whole can be modelled as such on the basis of the epistemic concerns of this thesis. 
 
1. Goodness as Rationality  
Rawls’ understanding of a social union is based on his conception of “goodness as 
rationality”. This is the same broad but thin account of the good life from which his theory 
of primary goods is derived. If, for Rawls, primary goods are goods one wants whatever else 
one wants, goodness as rationality is the structure one’s conception of the good would take 
whatever else is its content. It is outlined in chapter 7, part III of Theory. It assumes that a 
worthy life is a planned one. Following the idealist philosopher James Royce, Rawls assumes 
that a “person may be regarded as a human life lived according to a plan”.493 A rational life 
plan would be consistent with two formal criteria. It would be consistent with basic principles 
of rational choice and it would be selected “with full awareness of the relevant facts and 
after a careful consideration of the consequences”.494 Though these two formal criteria do 
not tell us anything about the kind of plans rational agents might choose. Rawls tries to meet 
this desideratum with the following claim about human motivation. Individuals tend to pick 
those life plans that accord with the Aristotelian principle: 
Other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities 
(their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity 
is realized, or the greater its complexity. The intuitive idea here is that human beings 
take more pleasure in doing something as they become more proficient at it, and of 
two activities they do equally well, they prefer the one calling on a larger repertoire 
of more intricate and subtle discriminations.495  
 
493 (Rawls 1999, 358); there is little room for serendipity and surprise in this theory of the good life. 
For an excellent critique of Rawls on this score, see Larmore (1999).   
494 (Rawls 1999, 358–59) 
495 (Rawls 1999, 373) 
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According to the principle, then, chess would be preferred to checkers and algebra to basic 
arithmetic.496 The proof of the principle is allegedly to be found in common sense 
observation. Rawls notes that it “seems to be borne out by the many facts of everyday life, 
and by the behaviour of children and some animals”.497 Rawls does not overlook the obvious 
objection that many appear to lead lives that are not in accordance with the principle. He is 
careful to formulate it as a “tendency and not an invariable pattern of choice” and one that 
can be over-ridden by “countervailing inclinations”.498 As a principle of motivation, it seems 
quite reminiscent of Mill’s distinction between the higher and lower pleasures.499  
Now, if there is an objection to be made against the principle, it is that it seems to be an 
excessively inward-looking account of motivation. One can readily point to examples of 
plausible and reasonable life-plans that place at best instrumental value on the development 
of one’s talents. A nurse’s principal motivation, surely, is not to develop their nursing 
capacities to ever higher forms of complexity and nuance for their own sake but, quite 
simply, to help the sick recover their health. A scientist might well take intrinsic pleasure 
from improving their capacities of observation, testing, and so forth. But suppose their 
primary goal is to help cure cancer, in which case they might prefer to work in that field even 
if a less socially pressing field of scientific inquiry would allow them to express or develop 
their scientific skills to a higher degree of complexity. Many opt for a mundane job that does 
not optimise their capacities but does help them to meet other goals such as supporting their 
family. Indeed, we can think of occupations or activities in which it would seem socially 
irresponsible for one to be motivated by the Aristotelian principle. Imagine a surgeon who, 
all other things equal, preferred to perform technically challenging but medically non-
essential operations over mundane but life-saving ones. The principle taken on its own, then, 
appears to conjure an image of individualists who take pleasure only in the realisation of 
their own capacities but place little weight on social bonds with others.  
Rawls is aware of this potential objection and attempts to avoid it at the outset by pairing 
the principle with an account of community. Our self-respect, he writes, is dependent on 
having a rational plan of life in accordance with the Aristotelian principle and “finding our 
person and deeds appreciated and confirmed by others who are likewise esteemed and their 
 
496 (Rawls 1999, 375) 
497 (Rawls 1999, 376) 
498 (Rawls 1999, 376) 
499 Indeed, other than Aristotle himself, Rawls cites Mill’s discussion of the distinction between lower 
and higher pleasures in chapter 2 of Utilitarianism as influencing his thinking here. He claims that in 
that discussion Mill “comes very close” to stating the Aristotelian principle. (1999, 374 fn 24)  
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association enjoyed”.500 We don’t simply want to exercise our capacities to a high degree of 
complexity but be socially recognised for doing so. It is impossible to maintain one’s 
commitment that one’s rational-life plan is worthwhile unless one gains such recognition.501 
The development of only certain kinds of capacities engenders such recognition however. 
These capacities will not be what Rawls calls exclusive capacities that are good primarily for 
the capacity-bearer but excellences that are good both for the bearer and other members of 
the community.502 What makes a capacity an excellence as opposed to a mere exclusive 
good? An answer can be gleaned from Rawls’ “companion affect” to the Aristotelian 
principle:  
[As] we witness the exercise of well-trained abilities by others, these displays are 
enjoyed by us and arouse a desire that we should be able to do the same things 
ourselves. We want to be like those persons who can exercise the abilities that we 
find latent in our nature.503 
I achieve an excellence when I manifest a capacity that is latent in other members of the 
community. In turn I enjoy seeing others exercise capacities latent in my own nature. Putting 
this all together, we can say that individuals motivated by the Aristotelian principle and the 
related need for social recognition will seek to develop those latent capacities that they share 
with others. They will associate for this purpose and Rawls, following Wilhelm von Humboldt, 
calls these associations “social unions”. These associations come in very many forms. The 
associations of “art and science, of religion and culture of all kinds, high and low” can be 
thought of as social unions, the “essential thing is that there be a shared final end and 
accepted ways of advancing it which allow for public recognition of the attainments of 
everyone”.504 Rawls is at pains to distinguish the motivation of agents in a social union from 
that of agents in commercial exchange. Purportedly, agents in a social union are solely 
intrinsically motivated to realise the shared end of the union whereas agents in commercial 
exchange are solely extrinsically motivated to maximise monetary income.505  
 
 
 
 
500 (Rawls 1999, 386) 
501 (Rawls 1999, 387) 
502 (Rawls 1999, 387) 
503 (Rawls 1999, 375–76); emphasis added  
504 (Rawls 1999, 461) 
505 (Rawls 1999, 457–59) 
169 
 
2. Two Models of a Social Union  
As already mentioned, Rawls’ discussion of a social union is not quite as pellucid one might 
like. On this chapter’s reading, there are two distinct definitions of what a social union is and 
by extension the manner in which the well-ordered society is a social union. The first is the 
completeness model. This model is the most prominent in Rawls’ writing. Indeed, when 
formally defining a social union, Rawls opts for this model. The other is the emulation model. 
Both will now be outlined in turn. The completion model takes its inspiration from Wilhelm 
von Humboldt. Like Rawls, von Humboldt is a liberal individualist who values the 
development of individual capacities but also wishes to provide an account of how such 
individuality can be reconciled with community and sociability. In his landmark essay The 
Sphere and Duties of Government (sometimes translated as The Limits of State Action), von 
Humboldt observes that for want of time individuals can develop only a subset of the full 
range of their latent capacities. This is undesirable because it represents a “partial 
cultivation” of the self.506 
 Von Humboldt proposes two solutions to this problem. One is the harmonious development 
of a person’s talents over a life time, such that different powers are developed at different 
stages. The other is to collaborate with individuals who have developed different talents, 
such that each individual can derive enjoyment from a greater array of talents than they 
could have developed on their own.507 Rawls is interested in the second solution. He writes 
that “it is through social union founded upon the needs and potentialities of its members 
that each person can participate in the total sum of realized natural assets of the others”.508 
As a “pure form” of a social union he gives the example of an orchestra, in which “each have 
by a kind of tacit agreement set out to perfect their skills on the one [instrument] they have 
chosen so as to realise the powers of all in their joint performances”.509 The core idea is that 
“persons need one another since it is only in active cooperation with others that one’s 
 
506 (Humboldt 1854, 13). The partial cultivation of one’s capacities is only really a problem if we 
presume the validity of something like the Aristotelian principle. If one thinks that cultivation of one’s 
talents is intrinsically good, then talents left uncultivated might be a problem. They are a missed 
opportunity to realise goodness. It is also more likely that one will experience the peril of uncultivated 
talents if one also thinks that the cultivation of one’s talents to a high degree of sophistication is 
intrinsically good. For leaving many talents uncultivated will probably be the opportunity cost of 
developing some talents to a high degree of sophistication. (Someone who thinks that cultivating their 
talents but only to a moderate degree is intrinsically good will less likely have the problem of partial 
cultivation. Since they might have more time to develop the full range of their talents to a satisfactory 
degree.)  
507 (Humboldt 1854, 13) 
508 (Rawls 1999, 459) 
509 (Rawls 1999, 459n4) 
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powers reach fruition. Only in a social union is the individual complete”.510 Hence, our 
terming it the completeness model. The following scenario captures, I believe, what Rawls 
has in mind here: 
Rosie and Jim are members of a world class heavy metal band. Each had the talent 
to either be an excellent drummer or bassist. As it happens, Jim dedicates himself to 
drumming and Rosie to bass guitar. They take great pleasure in playing together. 
When Jim performs with Rosie, he feels that he is actively expressing his latent talent 
for playing the bass guitar as well as his manifest talent for drumming. The vice-versa 
applies to Rosie. It is as if each completes the other by allowing them to express 
through the jointly-executed performance those latent talents they forewent 
developing as the opportunity cost of those they did develop and manifest. 
On the completion model, members of the social union manifest different capacities that are 
latent in all of them. Social union is experienced as good because it completes the self by 
realising one’s otherwise uncultivated talents. Though we should note an important 
necessary condition. When Rawls says that “persons need one another since it is only in 
active cooperation with others that one’s powers reach fruition,” I take him to mean that 
one participates in the expression of one’s latent talents by others iff they share causal 
responsibility for its expression.  In other words, Jim would not be participating in Rosie’s 
expression of her actual (and his latent) talent for bass playing if he was just a spectator in 
the crowd and Rosie was playing with a different drummer. Jim participates in her playing 
the bass guitar insofar as they play a song together. Or to return to Rawls’ own example, it is 
insufficient to just watch the orchestra play. One has to play in it. We can also express this 
point using Bratman’s notion of a joint-intentional action. Rosie and Jim share the intention 
that they play “Master of Puppets” iff each knows that the other intends that they play the 
song and intends to play their part in playing the song and that this is common knowledge 
between them. Under such a scenario, each would know that they are part-authors of the 
contribution of the other. It is under such conditions where the phenomenological 
experience of participating in one another’s talents seems to take place. We shall return to 
this all-important point below.  
Rawls has other passages in which his description of the social union is inconsistent with the 
completion model. Recall that in the aforementioned citation describing the Aristotelian 
principle’s “companion affect,” Rawls writes that “as we witness the exercise of well-trained 
abilities by others, these displays are enjoyed by us and arouse a desire that we should be 
able to do the same things ourselves”.511 Members of an orchestra do not wish to do the 
 
510 (Rawls 1999, 460 n4); emphasis added. 
511 (Rawls 1999, 375); emphasis added.  
171 
 
same thing. They play different instruments after all. Similarly, he writes that competitive 
games can also be seen as social unions since the “public desire to execute a good and fair 
play of the game must be regulative and effective if everyone’s zest and pleasure are not to 
languish”.512 But in many competitive games, such as chess or boxing, the agents develop 
and cultivate broadly the same set of capacities rather than different ones. If they are social 
unions, then, they do not appear to be of the same sort as an orchestra or a band. For this 
reason, we can read Rawls as invoking a different understanding of a social union in these 
passages, the emulation model. The following scenario captures, I believe, what Rawls has in 
mind here: 
Alf and Bettie are professional chess players. They compete in a national chess 
tournament. Bettie beats Alf by making a surprise and highly creative series of 
moves. Alf, however, is magnanimous in defeat. He is impressed by Bettie’s display 
of excellence in the activity to which they are both dedicated. He feels that playing 
against someone of her capability makes him a better chess player. Bettie, for her 
part, is grateful for having a challenging opponent in Alf, without whom she would 
not have exhibited the creative play that she did.  
On the emulation model, the parties manifest broadly the same capacities. Social union is 
experienced as good because seeing others excel in an activity to which one is dedicated is 
joyful – even perhaps when they are competing against you – and potentially provides a 
model for emulation. A good practical example might be Roger Bannister’s achievement of 
being the first to run a sub-four-minute mile, soon after which many followed in his wake. 
Both of these models of social union serve the same purpose of showing why individualists 
dedicated to cultivating their own capacities would have strong reasons to enter a social 
union. On the completion account, social union allows me to participate in the expression of 
those capacities that I forewent developing as the opportunity cost of developing my own. 
On the emulation account, social union allows me to further develop and refine those 
capacities I did choose to develop by emulating the exemplars.  
This chapter accepts for the sake of argument Rawls’ account of goodness as rationality and 
the attendant claim that we desire social union.513 Supposing all persons had conceptions of 
 
512 (Rawls 1999, 461) 
513 This is not to say it is without its problems. It exaggerates the importance of planning and overlooks 
the importance of serendipity to the good life. It is also implausibly monistic in assuming that the 
realisation of our inherent capacities is central if not primary to any reasonable conception of the good 
life. As I suggested in some counter-examples above, this just seems mistaken. A more plausible 
account of human motivation would treat as reasonable a wider range of motivations, including 
extrinsic ones. I personally believe that Deirdre McCloskey (2011) is a surer guide than Rawls here. 
Still, and in keeping with the methodology of this thesis, we imagine a society where all do subscribe 
to such a conception of the good to be able to isolate the epistemic rather than motivational barriers 
to social union.  
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the good consistent with goodness as rationality, the question then is whether the well-
ordered society can plausibly be regarded as a social union. Rawls not only answers in the 
affirmative but also claims it to be the “social union of social unions” that “realizes to a 
preeminent degree the various forms of human activity”.514 In some passages of Theory Rawls 
describes the well-ordered society as a social union along the completion model and in 
others as one along the emulation model. There are, then, two accounts of the kind of social 
union the well-ordered society is and why it is preeminent. We shall outline both of these in 
the remainder of this section before subjecting them to critique in the following section.  
The well-ordered society is described as a completion social union in §86, “The Good of the 
Sense of Justice”. Rawls writes:  
Because such a society [i.e. The WOS] is a social union of social unions, it realizes to 
a preeminent degree the various forms of human activity; and given the social nature 
of mankind, the fact that our potentialities and inclinations surpass what can be 
expressed in any one life, we depend upon the cooperative endeavours of others not 
only for the means of well-being but to bring to fruition our latent powers. And with 
a certain success all round, each enjoys the greater richness and diversity of the 
collective activity.515  
Similarly in §85, “The Unity of The Self”, he writes  
… [A]s shown by the notion of society as a social union of social unions, the members 
of a community participate in one another’s nature: we appreciate what others do 
as things we might have done but which they do for us, and what we do is similarly 
done for them.516  
The well-ordered society is in these passages clearly described as a completion social union. 
Participation in it is good because it allows us to participate in the expression of our 
otherwise uncultivated talents. In Political Liberalism Rawls also speaks of a social union in 
this manner.517 One might ask how Rawls squares this view with liberal neutrality. Rawls 
addresses this question in Political Liberalism by suggesting that one’s conception of the 
good will be enlarged by participation in the well-ordered society, provided it is consistent 
with justice and within a “certain wide range” of conceptions.518 Why might the well-ordered 
 
514 (Rawls 1999, 500); emphasis added. 
515 (Rawls 1999, 500); emphasis added. 
516 (Rawls 1999, 495); emphasis added. 
517 (Rawls 1996, 320–23) 
518 (Rawls 1996, 323); the above qualification of a “wide range” of conceptions suggests an 
equivocation on Rawls’ part. We can easily imagine persons who will not benefit from the “social union 
of social unions” but whose conceptions of the good are otherwise “reasonable” from a Rawlsian 
perspective. Say persons who are willing to abide by liberal justice but who have a hermitic conception 
of the good or who regard the ways of life of mainstream society as depraved. It is hard to see persons 
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society be the preeminent completion social union? The clearest answer is to be found also 
in Political liberalism. There he argues that participation in the well-ordered society allows 
each to take part in a more “comprehensive good than the determinate good of individuals 
when left to their own devices or limited to smaller associations. Participation in this more 
comprehensive good can greatly enlarge and sustain each person’s good”.519 Participation 
in, say, an orchestra allows me to participate in the expression of my uncultivated talents 
with respect to only one human activity in classical music. Participation in the well-ordered 
society, however, allows me to participate in the expression of my uncultivated talents in 
any number of altogether different disciplines, such as sport or art or philosophy.  
Other passages describe the well-ordered society as an emulation social union. These are to 
be found in §79 “The Idea of a Social Union” and Rawls’ preliminary discussion of social 
unions in §67 “Self-respect, Excellences and Shame”. In §79 Rawls writes that in the well-
ordered society “the successful carrying out of just institutions is the shared final end of all 
the members of society”.520 He had earlier written in §67 that acting justly is intrinsically 
valuable per the Aristotelian principle. Such moral virtues are “excellences” in that they are 
“good from the standpoint of ourselves as well as from that of others”. 521 This discussion is 
referred back to in §79 where Rawls writes: 
Now it is clear that these excellences are displayed in the public life of a well-ordered 
society. Therefore the companion principle to the Aristotelian principle implies that 
men appreciate and enjoy these attributes in one another as they are manifested in 
cooperating to affirm just institutions. It follows that the collective activity of justice 
is the preeminent form of human flourishing.522  
The well-ordered society is here described as an emulation social union insofar as each 
citizen expresses the same capacity, i.e. for just conduct. Each takes pleasure from seeing 
the just conduct of the others and the just conduct of each is potentially a source of 
emulation for the others.  
Why might the well-ordered society be the preeminent completion social union? Even if we 
hold that (a) justice is the relevant capacity to be realised and (b) liberal citizens want to 
express their capacity for justice and see others doing the same, participation in civil society 
associations or even being just in one’s day-to-day conduct seems sufficient. The need for 
 
of either type having their conception of the good “enlarged” by participation in the well-ordered 
society. But I set this objection to one side.  
519 (Rawls 1996, 320) 
520 (Rawls 1999, 462) 
521 (Rawls 1999, 390) 
522 (Rawls 1999, 463); emphasis added.  
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the well-ordered society is unclear. Rawls’ response here draws on his Kantian premises. For 
Rawls, just conduct is a good of excellence per the Aristotelian principle insofar as it express 
our nature as free and equal moral beings.523 In §79 he writes: “Human beings have a desire 
to express their nature as free and equal moral persons, and this they do most adequately 
by acting from the principles that they would acknowledge in the original position”.524 Why 
does Rawls think this? Earlier in Theory he writes: 
The description of the Original Position resembles the point of view of noumenal 
selves,  of what it means to be a free and equal rational being. Our nature as such 
beings is displayed when we act from the principles we would choose when this 
nature is reflected in the conditions determining the choice.525  
Since those principles govern the well-ordered society, we can only act from those principles 
and by extension express our free and equal nature by participating in it. A formal 
reconstruction of Rawls’ somewhat obscure position might run as follows: 
1. Persons wish to express their nature as a free and equal beings.  
2. Persons express that nature when acting on the basis of an autonomously affirmed 
principle. 
3. Persons act on an autonomously affirmed principle when the principle they act upon 
is justifiable to all persons understood as free and equal. 
4. Persons act upon principles justifiable to all understood as free and equal iff they act 
upon principles derived from the original position.526 
∴ 
5. Persons wish to express their nature as free and equal by acting upon principles 
derived from the original position. 
6. One can act on the principles derived from the original position only by participating 
in the well-ordered society and complying with its regulative rules.527  
∴ 
 
523 (Rawls 1999, 390–91, 462) 
524 (Rawls 1999, 462–63); emphasis added.  
525(Rawls 1999, 225); emphasis added. In Political Liberalism, Rawls (1996, 73) similarly writes that  
persons attain  their “full autonomy. . . when they act from principles of justice that specify fair terms 
of cooperation they would give to themselves when fairly represented as free and equal persons”. 
526 The veil of ignorance is designed to model the condition under which all are free and equal agents.  
527 Since the rules governing the basic structure of that society is the subject of the conception of 
justice derived from the original position.  
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7. Persons wish to express their nature as free and equal by participating in the well-
ordered society.  
The well-ordered society is the preeminent emulation union because can we express our 
nature as free and equal only by subscription to its rules of justice. Why might Rawls think 
this is not the case when we comply with rules of justice regulating civil society associations? 
Presumably because premise 3 is not met. In such settings one might be motivated to act 
justly because of fraternal links with one’s peers rather than an abstract commitment to act 
on principles justifiable to all free and equal persons. Relatedly, the content of such principles 
often cannot be affirmed by all rational agents because they are based on partisan 
understandings of value. The principles of justice regulating a religious association, for 
instance, might be based on scriptural premises that not all agents can accept.  
Note that these two conceptions of a social union are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but 
they are independent arguments. If one is found wanting, Rawls can turn to the other. We 
will treat them in turn. The basic argument in both cases is that our relationship as citizens 
is dubiously modelled as any kind of social union, let alone as the preeminent sort.  
 
3. The Critique of the Emulation Interpretation 
Even if we grant Rawls these contentious Kantian premises, it does not actually follow that 
participation in the well-ordered society is the preeminent emulation social union. Per Rawls’ 
Kantianism, we wish to express our nature as free and equal beings by acting on principles 
that are justifiable to all. In Kant’s terms, the relevant test here is whether the maxim one 
acts upon meets the categorical imperative. As Rawls himself notes however, Kant intended 
the imperative to apply to quotidian contexts of everyday life:  
… Kant's account of the Categorical Imperative applies to the personal maxims of 
sincere and conscientious individuals in everyday life. To be sure, in the course of 
testing such maxims we are to compare social worlds, that is, the social world that 
results when everyone follows the proposed maxim, as if by a law of nature, with 
the social world in which the contradictory maxim is followed. But this comparison 
of social worlds is undertaken singly by each person and for the purpose of judging 
a given personal maxim.528 
In other words, there are good Kantian reasons to think premise 4 from above is not correct. 
Acting upon principles justifiable to all as free and equal does not necessarily entail acting 
 
528 (Rawls 1980, 552) 
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upon principles that are derived from the original position and consequently intended to 
regulate the basic structure of a political society. One can act upon universally justifiable 
principles and so express their nature as a free and equal being by, say, simply keeping their 
promises.  If so, being a citizen of a well-ordered society is not necessary to expressing one’s 
nature as a free and equal being. A stateless person or an immigrant residing in a country 
where they lack citizenship could just as easily express their nature so understood.   
There are also reasons to think that compared with civil society associations, the well-
ordered society fares quite poorly as an emulation social union on Rawls’ own terms. He 
writes that we admire and wish to emulate “moral exemplars” because they “display skills 
and abilities, and virtues of character and temperament, that attract our fancy”. He goes on 
to say that this desire to emulate “is also a companion affect to the Aristotelian Principle, 
since we enjoy the display of more complex and subtle activities and these displays tend to 
elicit a desire in us to do these things ourselves”.529 In other words, we enjoy seeing and want 
to emulate the expression of just conduct to a “complex and subtle” degree. What might it 
mean to display just conduct in a complex and subtle manner? Rawls does not tell us directly 
but elsewhere he says that one pre-requisite to just conduct is seeing things from the 
perspective of other agents: 
[W]e must recognize that these different points of view exist, that the perspectives 
of others are not the same as ours. But we must not only learn that things look 
different to them, but that they have different wants and ends, and different plans 
and motives; and we must learn how to gather these facts from their speech, 
conduct and countenance… finally, having understood another’s situation, it still 
remains for us to regulate our own conduct in the appropriate way by reference to 
it.530 
Rawls here refers to the ability to see things from another’s perspective in order to discern 
how to treat them. The term “interpretive labour,” which we first used in chapter one, is a 
good label for this capacity. It seems plausible that it could be continuously developed to call 
upon an ever “larger repertoire of more intricate and subtle discriminations” i.e. developed 
to a complex and subtle degree. If interpretive labour is necessary to just conduct and the 
capacity for it can be developed to a complex and subtle degree, then it seems to follow that 
the complexity and subtlety of just conduct is a function of the degree of interpretive labour 
involved in its performance.531  
 
529 (Rawls 1999, 413) 
530 (Rawls 1999, 410–11) 
531 There is, of course, more to being just than seeing things from another’s point of view. There are 
other dimensions along which we could judge (and admire) the justness of a person’s conduct.  One 
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Action contexts in which discerning how one should treat others is straightforward would 
presumably not need a high degree of interpretive labour. One just acts according to a simple 
rule or convention. For example, it is surely just to give up one’s train seat for someone who 
is clearly physically infirm. But neither does one have to think too deeply about that person’s 
needs to realise that that is the right thing to do. Such just conduct does not appear to be to 
a subtle or complex degree. Higher degrees of interpretive labour would be required in those 
action contexts where discerning how one should treat others is not straightforward. Here 
are two examples of such contexts. We can imagine a teacher who gives appropriate 
dispensation to the special needs of some of his students. Perhaps, for instance, some 
children have a condition which means they find it more difficult to keep quiet in class 
compared with others. In light of this our teacher is comparatively more lenient with them if 
they have outbursts in class. There is a complex judgement call here because departures 
from uniform rules for all students arguably require justification. The teacher has to be able 
to discern when the particular needs of some students are pressing enough to justify such a 
departure. We might imagine also a senior figure in an organisation who has to decide how 
funding will be allocated between different groups within it. Each group within the 
organisation has competing demands. She determines a financial settlement all groups 
consider fair or at least fair enough. In so doing she has to consider the expectations of the 
different groups and the reasonableness of their demands in light of the overall aims of the 
organisation.  
These are both situations in which individuals exhibit high degrees of interpretive labour 
because they have to make intricate and subtle discriminations between the needs of 
different parties when determining how to treat them. In such action contexts, then, it does 
seem appropriate to think of just conduct being expressed in a subtle and complex manner 
in virtue of the high degree of interpretive labour they call for. By extension, on Rawls’ score, 
it is these forms of just conduct that are likely to elicit the admiration of others. However, 
this raises the following question: under what conditions are other agents suitably positioned 
to recognise such forms of moral conduct? For surely we have to first recognise instances of 
exemplary just conduct before we can try to emulate them. It seems that, at the very least, 
we need to know of the person in question, the circumstances in which their moral conduct 
 
might be their willingness to comply with duty regardless of the personal cost. A person who is 
comparatively more willing to do so than another person can also be described as comparatively more 
just than that person. However, such a willingness to bear the burden of duty is not necessarily the 
same thing as exhibiting just conduct in a complex or subtle way. It is the latter dimension of evaluation 
that matters for one who desires social union with others.  
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was called for and the details of their response to it. Such knowledge seems straightforwardly 
to be particularistic knowledge of local time and place in the Hayekian sense.532 The persons 
best able to recognise and appreciate the exemplary behaviour of our teacher are his 
colleagues and students, of our organisation manager her colleagues, and so on. In other 
words, only in the proximate contexts of civil society associations will we have sufficient local 
knowledge to recognise – and emulate – exemplary just conduct.   
Indeed, as we have argued throughout this thesis, a desideratum of the rules of justice in a 
complex society is that they economise on the need for interpretive labour. When I meet an 
inevitably opaque fellow citizen in a liberal society, we should both know how to interact 
with one another without too much interpretive labour. The basic rules of justice should be 
comparatively straightforward to learn and applicable to a wide range of otherwise discrete 
cases. Their application should not require “exemplary” conduct to high degrees of 
interpretive nuance and complexity. Rawls’ own emphasis on the value of publicity and one 
of his own critiques of utilitarianism are predicated on this idea. When he criticises 
utilitarianism, Rawls emphasises that his conception of justice is easy to understand and 
apply whereas the utilitarian calculus inevitably requires complex and highly speculative 
calculations.533 If the rules of justice regulating the well-ordered society are easy to 
understand and apply, then its members might appreciate it when they see their fellow 
citizens complying. They would also be aware that such compliance does not require a high 
degree of interpretive labour and by extension does not constitute the expression of just 
conduct to a complex or subtle degree. Hence, they would not see their fellow citizens as 
moral exemplars worthy of especial emulation.  
Rawls might object that political leaders and activists might constitute moral exemplars who, 
in the context of political association, exhibit very high degrees of interpretive labour in their 
just conduct and whose achievements are readily apparent to their citizens. In the Law of 
Peoples he places great emphasis on the role of the “Statesman” in bringing about just 
outcomes under difficult and highly complex circumstances. Such figures “guide their people 
in turbulent and dangerous times”.534 His later emphasis on the Supreme Court as the 
“exemplar of public reason” suggests that he believes they too might be moral exemplars in 
this sense.535 Suppose, for the sake of argument, such exemplars do abound among the 
 
532 Though the content of the knowledge here differs. It is rather knowledge of a particular person’s 
conduct rather than, say, how a piece of machinery may be better used.  
533 (Rawls 1999, 277–85); (Rawls 1996, 160–12) 
534 (Rawls 2003, 97) 
535 (Rawls 1996, 231–40) 
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political and judicial class and that this is transparent to the citizenry at large.536 The problem 
remains that only a small subset of the population will be in the position display this 
sophisticated form of just conduct. The vast majority of us will not be statesmen or sit on a 
Supreme Court. In a representative democracy the vast majority of us are not even engaged 
in political or judicial activity on a day-to-day basis. So even if these moral exemplars exist, 
most of us are not in a position to emulate them. In their role as citizens, the just conduct of 
most residents of the well-ordered society will be limited to legal compliance with 
standardised rules and will not rise to such heights of moral complexity. In summary of this 
section, we have argued that the well-ordered society is not the preeminent emulation social 
union. There is no reason to think that we cannot express our free and equal nature, in the 
Kantian sense valued by Rawls, by acting justly in domains of life other than the political. 
Participation in the well-ordered society is not necessary for such expression. Further, the 
well-ordered society is actually a poor candidate for an emulation social union when 
compared with civil society associations. For the recognition of exemplary just conduct 
requires local knowledge that members of the latter would have of one another but 
members of the well-ordered society would not.  
 
4. The Critique of the Completion Interpretation 
In section two we saw that the well-ordered society is supposed to be the preeminent 
completion social union because it allows each to participate in a more “comprehensive good 
than the determinate good of individuals left to their own devices or limited to smaller 
associations”.537 While participation in a civil society association allows me to participate in 
the expression of my uncultivated talents only with respect to one activity, participation in 
the well-ordered society allows me to participate in their expression with respect to a whole 
range of activities. This section will offer three points in criticism of this claim.  
Beginning with the first, recall the above observation from section two that being a mere 
spectator does not allow one to participate in the expression of one’s latent talents by others. 
One has to play a causal role in that expression. That is what allows one to relevantly 
participate in the expression of the other person’s talent. The first criticism is that in an 
 
536 As opposed to adopting, say, Lord Acton’s rather more critical stance on the idea of “Great Men” 
in politics and ascribing the admiration of the population to false consciousness.  
537 (Rawls 1996, 390) 
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impersonal society, one’s causal responsibility for the achievements of another citizen is very 
tenuous. Consider the following scenario: 
Asif is a citizen of the well-ordered society of Great Britain. Asif was born and lives in 
Glasgow. When he was young, Asif showed great prospective talent in both tennis 
and painting. As it happens, he opted to pursue a career in painting. He remains a 
great fan of tennis as an adult and every year attends the Wimbledon tennis 
tournament in London. Sarah is also a citizen of Great Britain. She was born and 
raised in Cardiff. She is a professional tennis player. When he sees her compete at 
Wimbledon, Asif is impressed by her prowess at the game. It gives him a glimpse of 
what could have been. Asif and Sarah are not personal acquaintances. He had not 
known of her before she became a tennis player. She still does not know of him. 
For sure, Sarah is expressing to a high degree Asif’s latent talent for tennis which he had to 
forego when he opted to become a painter. Can we say, then, that Asif and Sarah are two 
participants in the completion social union of the well-ordered society as might be two 
musicians in the completion social union of a band or orchestra? The answer is negative 
because the disanology between this case and that of our heavy metallers Rosie and Jim 
seem quite clear. Rosie and Jim play causal roles in the expression of one another’s talents 
because they play in the same band. We shall return to this point below. Asif, on the other 
hand, does not appear to play any causal role in Sarah’s expression of her talents in tennis. 
He is not playing tennis with her nor is he involved in her training team in any way. He is 
merely a spectator in a large audience. She is unaware of his particular presence in the crowd 
which has no impact either way on her performance.  
Rawls would probably respond that Asif in his capacity as a citizen has played a causal role in 
Sarah developing her tennis skills. I here draw upon Paul Weithman’s plausible exegesis of 
why Rawls might believe this to be the case.  
If members of the [well-ordered society] do their part in upholding just institutions, 
and they know that just institutions make it possible for others to pursue their 
good—whether it be baseball or music, stamp collecting, or family life—then each 
person can see the pursuits of others as developments of her own latent abilities 
that she has helped to make possible.538 
There are two sequences in this causal chain. Applied to our above scenario, we might say 
that (i) Asif helps maintain just institutions by doing his part as a dutiful citizen; and (ii) those 
just institutions enable Sarah to become a world-class tennis player. Both causal sequences 
are tenuous at best. Let us overlook the analysis of chapter two and assume for the sake of 
argument that Great Britain has a basic structure which accords with justice as fairness or 
 
538 (Weithman 2011, 139) 
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some other reasonable conception of justice. Asif is but one of millions of British citizens 
whose actions have contributed to maintaining just institutions. His own causal contribution 
to the justness of British institutions would be negligible. Suppose it turns out that Asif is 
actually a serial tax evader, his marginal defection would have no causal impact on the 
justness of British institutions.539  
The causal connection between Britain’s just institutions and Sarah’s successful tennis career 
is also questionable. Supposing that Sarah has a natural talent for tennis, it seems likely that 
she could also have become a tennis player under a variety of alternative regimes. Rawlsian 
institutions do not seem necessary for Sarah to manifest her tennis skills. Perhaps the claim 
is that the well-ordered society has enabled Sarah to develop her tennis capacities to greater 
degrees of complexity and subtlety than she would have done otherwise. However, it is not 
hard to imagine alternative institutional regimes under which she would have developed her 
tennis skills to an even greater degree than she did under the Rawlsian regime. Economic 
inequalities are allowed in the well-ordered society only to the extent permitted by the 
difference principle. The income one earns from playing top level tennis would likely be much 
less than under a more free market regime. Suppose that an agent’s propensity to invest 
time and effort in an activity depends at least partly on the monetary awards. Then perhaps 
Sarah would have become an even more proficient tennis player under a free market regime 
in which she could have kept more of her income.540  
It is even plausible that she would have become a more proficient tennis player under an 
authoritarian regime. Suppose that instead of being a well-ordered society, this hypothetical 
Great Britain was an authoritarian regime that promoted sport for propaganda reasons.541 
The regime might pick tennis as one of the key sports in which Great Britain would attain 
national greatness.  Sarah might have become an even better tennis player under such a 
regime because she would have received greater funding and institutional support compared 
with the well-ordered society. Further, the scenario above was predicated on the idea that 
Sarah and Asif are both citizens of Great Britain. However, the displays of human excellence 
 
539 The Rawlsian might say he is acting unfairly in not doing his part but that is not the same as 
jeopardising the outcome.  
540 The Rawlsian would object that this means she is motivated by money rather than developing her 
capacities for their own sake as the Aristotelian principle implies. Not necessarily. Rawls himself 
assumes that monetary incentives are needed to cover things like training costs, and becoming a 
tennis player (I conjecture) is not cheap. Alternatively, even a Rawlsian might not object to someone 
picking the more remunerative option to develop out of two or more capacities she finds equally 
intrinsically rewarding.  
541 As, say, the Soviet Union used to do. 
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to which we are exposed and in which we take pleasure in a liberal society are hardly going 
to be limited to only those of our co-nationals. Indeed, Wimbledon is renowned above all for 
its internationalism.542 We can imagine an amended version of the above scenario in which 
Sarah was a player representing another nation. Under such a scenario there seems no link 
whatsoever between Sarah’s development of her tennis skills and British institutions or 
indeed Asif’s conduct.543  
While the causal connections between Asif’s compliance with justice and Sarah’s expression 
of her tennis skills is quite tenuous, matters are different with our heavy metallers, Rosie and 
Jim. When Rosie and Jim play “Master of Puppets,” Jim can be confident he plays a causal 
role in her performing her part. For Rosie is playing the bass guitar to “Master of puppets” in 
part because Jim is playing drums. There is usually no point to playing a rock song without 
the percussion. Now, if we restrict ourselves to the band playing a song, it seems that we 
have shown Jim to be causally responsible only for the expression of Rosie’s talents on this 
one occasion but not its development over time. However, we could easily amend the 
scenario and imagine Rosie and Jim to be band mates who have rehearsed with one another 
for years. In which case, we might suppose that frequent rehearsals with Jim helped Rosie 
develop her bass guitar skills. Hence, Jim would have played a tangible causal role also in 
their development. (And vice versa.) The point is that the causal connections here are 
comparatively clear and straightforward. 
Our analysis parallels the Hayekian claim that we saw in chapter two about the complexity 
of the order of actions that we find in liberal societies. In small-scale social orders, where the 
participants are few in number, we can understand the interrelations between the actions 
of the participants. This is certainly true of our heavy metal band. If one of the players is out 
of time, for instance, the others will notice. Matters change under large-scale cooperative 
schemes consisting of a mass of actors operating under conditions of fragmented knowledge. 
As we just saw, the difficulty is not simply that the sheer number of actors makes it difficult 
to allocate a causal role to any one of them in particular, especially in instances where the 
aggregate outcome is over-determined. It is also that the causal connection between 
individual actions and the resulting order of actions become obscure and highly conjectural 
 
542 There is an even a term, the “Wimbledon Effect,” for the British propensity to host competitive 
institutions in which the prominent players come from abroad. The term has been used to describe 
the City of London.  
543 I appreciate that Rawls models the well-ordered society as a closed society. Since the only actual 
society that seems to meet this ideal is North Korea, I submit it to be a dubious modelling 
assumption. 
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at best. It seems clear if not trivially true that Rosie contributes the bass line to her and Jim’s 
performance of “Master of Puppets” in part because Jim is playing the drums. It seems far 
more dubious to say that Sarah is playing tennis at Wimbledon – even in part – because Asif 
obeys the law and pays his taxes. If the causal contribution of liberal citizens to the 
expression of one another’s talents is tenuous, the well-ordered society might not be a 
completion social union at all, let alone the preeminent one. For liberal citizens do not 
relevantly participate in the expression of one another’s talents. They are more akin to 
spectators.   
Let us move unto the second point. This can be stated rather more briefly.  Most of us have 
but a handful of latent talents. Few of us are polymaths. If so, and setting aside the question 
of whether we really participate in the expression of others’ talents in the well-ordered 
society, most of the diversity of talents on display in it will not help to complete our “selves” 
in the way Rawls and von Humboldt value. They will simply be wasted on us. Perhaps Rawls 
can reformulate his conception of how the self is completed in response to this point. The 
experience of self-completion might not come only from seeing others express talents that I 
latently have but chose not to develop. It might come also from seeing others express talents 
that I simply do not have but wish I did.544 This would allow us to feel “completed” by more 
of the diverse talents on display in the well-ordered society than we might do otherwise. 
Especially those of us whose range of latent talents might be somewhat meagre. This 
rendering of the claim is more plausible but it remains the case, I think, that there are only 
so many capacities that one wishes they had. I certainly wish I had a latent talent for playing 
the guitar. In fact, I most certainly do not. Perhaps I can still feel “completed” in some sense 
when I hear Jimi Hendrix express my yearned-for but altogether lacking capacity for guitar 
playing. Still, I do not feel this way about a host of activities that one finds in an open liberal 
society. Just to take some ad hoc examples, I am confident I also have no latent talent in 
either playing darts, performing ballet or competitive sailing. However, nor do I have any 
particular wish that I had such latent talents. The expression of these and many other 
competences on display in an open and liberal society would presumably, then, not aid in 
the completion of my “self”. Another way of putting this point is to say that once we 
recognise that there are only so many latent or even wished-for talents one could have, the 
“value-added” of participation in the well-ordered society in completing the self seems quite 
 
544 Many of us, I think, feel inadequate or “incomplete” because we lack capacities that we wish we 
had rather than because we opted not to develop capacities we knew we had.  
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limited. If we each only really have a handful of talents, it seems that one can adequately 
complete the self by participating in a handful of civil society associations.  
Moving unto the third point, even where the talents on display do represent the cultivation 
of our latent abilities, it is not clear we would have the knowledge to recognise and 
appreciate the subtlety of such displays. Recall that per the Aristotelian principle, it is the 
display of capacities to a high degree that are enjoyed by the self and others. The problem, 
however, is that one often has to be a seasoned practitioner in an activity themselves to 
appreciate its expression to a high degree of complexity. This seems true of Rawls’ orchestra 
or our heavy metal band. Rosie might not be a drummer herself but she can recognise Jim’s 
excellent drumming because she has general musical expertise. Suppose now she has a 
latent capacity in art but one that is relatively undeveloped. While she may have done well 
at art class in school she has not cultivated the skill since and spends little time with artists. 
She (and other liberal citizens) face a peculiar kind of knowledge problem in recognising 
excellences in fields where they have only undeveloped talents. 
To make this particular point, I wish to draw on an insight of Alasdair MacIntyre. There are 
some striking similarities between Rawls’ account of a social union and MacIntyre’s account 
of a social practice as expounded in his After Virtue. This should not be too much of a surprise 
since both draw on Aristotle. MacIntyre defines a practice as  
… [A]ny coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the 
course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, 
and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers 
to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended.545   
Like members of Rawls’ social union, MacIntyre’s practitioners should be intrinsically 
motivated. For example, to be properly engaged in the practice of chess, I should want the 
“goods internal to the practice of chess which cannot be had in any way but by playing chess 
or some other game of that specific kind”.546 I am not properly dedicated to chess if I am in 
it for the money or adulation since these extrinsic goods can be obtained by participation in 
any kind of activity.  
The similarity between the two accounts established, it is worth turning to one part of 
MacIntyre’s account of a practice that is surely also true of a social union, but about which 
 
545 (MacIntyre 2007, 187) 
546 (MacIntyre 2007, 188) 
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Rawls places comparatively less emphasis. MacIntyre observes that inculcation into a 
practice presupposes that one recognise their ignorance of the prevailing standards of 
excellence in that practice: 
To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the 
inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them. It is to subject my own 
attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently and 
partially define the practice.547 
MacIntyre’s point is not simply that the novice has to acknowledge that their performances 
fall short of the prevailing standards of excellence in the practice. The novice has to also 
acknowledge their ignorance of what those standards indeed are and their inability to 
recognise the manner in which already competent performers meet those standards.548 A 
large part of developing one’s latent capacity for an activity is becoming acquainted with the 
standards of excellence in that activity about which one knows little beforehand. Thus, one 
cannot recognise excellence in portrait painting unless one has substantial experience of 
painting portraits. Rawls, I think, would concur with MacIntyre’s claim here. Recall that his 
Aristotelian principle holds that, all other things being equal, we enjoy performing those 
activities that call on a “larger repertoire of more intricate and subtle discriminations”. It 
seems plausible to say that there is no hard-and-fast distinction between being able to 
recognise such intricate and subtle discriminations in the work of others and being able to 
exhibit them in one’s work. They are part-and-parcel of the same process.549  
It follows that one’s ability to recognise the expression of excellence by others in a field in 
which they have only latent or undeveloped talent will be limited. They will not have the 
detailed and practice-specific knowledge to properly recognise the excellence-in-question. A 
latent talent for mathematics will not allow one to understand the latest advances in the 
discipline. Indeed, the nature of specialisation is such that even within the same discipline, 
practitioners of different sub-disciplines might not be able to understand the nature of one 
 
547 (MacIntyre 2007, 190) 
548 Thus he goes on to write: “[if], on starting to listen to music, I do not accept my own incapacity to 
judge correctly, I will never learn to hear, let alone to appreciate, Bartok's last quartets” (MacIntyre 
2007, 190). The point here, I take it, is that the novice cannot recognise the standards of excellence 
displayed in a competent performance of a Bartok quartet and not simply that they would fail to meet 
those standards were they to play a part in a Bartok quartet themselves.  
549 I should say I think Macintyre’s claim is put too strongly. Surely the connoisseur can recognise great 
art or a fine wine without being an artist or a winemaker. Still, even connoisseurship requires the 
investment of time and effort to gain the requisite knowledge of the standards-in-question. But we 
can still affirm MacIntyre’s basic claim, which surely has common sense on its side, that the ability to 
recognise excellence in a field requires the cultivation of specialist ability, whether that ability is that 
of the direct practitioner or the connoisseur.  
186 
 
another’s contributions. This is certainly true of say philosophy. We need only think of the 
mutual miscomprehension that often exists between so-called analytical and continental 
approaches to the topic. This knowledge problem here is similar to that of Hayek but also 
importantly different.  His problematic pertained to knowledge of particular facts of time 
and place. In an economic context, it is the knowledge of the use that might be made of a 
particular resource or how, say, a piece of machinery may be used in a specific way. This 
knowledge was spatially and temporally distributed in such a way that it cannot be centrally 
aggregated. Now, knowledge of the standards of excellence pertaining to different human 
disciplines or practices are not spatially and temporally distributed in the above sense. 
Presumably, the art expert can recognise great art wherever and whenever she sees it. 
Nonetheless, what is similar is that such knowledge is dispersed and cannot be aggregated. 
It is dispersed because, due to scarcity of time and also to personal disposition, each can only 
come to know what true excellence looks like in at most only a handful of fields.  
In summary of this section, we have criticised the claim that the well-ordered society is the 
preeminent completion social union. Rawls’ claim being that participation in the well-
ordered society allows one to realise a much greater array of their latent talents than they 
would by participating in smaller civil society associations. We have offered three criticisms 
of this view. First, it is not clear that the well-ordered society qualifies as a completion social 
union at all since citizens do not relevantly participate in the expression of one another’s 
talents. Second, there are only so many latent talents or otherwise wished-for talents that 
one might have. The added value, with regard to completing the self, of the sheer variety of 
talents on display in the well-ordered society is questionable. Third, and in any case, our 
ability to recognise excellent expression of our latent talents in practices in which we lack 
practical experience is highly limited.   
 
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has criticised the Rawlsian claim that the well-ordered society can be 
understood as a social union. Here we can take a step back and undertake some more 
general reflections, comparing Rawls’ understanding of a liberal society as a social union with 
the very contrasting approach offered to us by Hayek. The completion model of the social 
union is here assumed to be the authoritative one. In his invocation of the well-ordered 
society as a social union, Rawls asks us to imagine a society where liberal citizens are mutually 
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aware of how their discrete exercises of freedom cohere into a wider harmony. This is, after 
all, how it feels in his ideal form of a social union, the orchestra. Each player can perform 
their part with at least some degree of individual flair and each has consciously chosen which 
instrument to play. Nonetheless, their individual performances cohere into a wider whole all 
can survey and make sense of. Indeed in §79 he writes that in the social union of the well-
ordered society, “[everyone’s] more private life is to speak a plan within a plan, this 
subordinate plan being realized in the public institutions of society”.550  The nub of our 
critique in this chapter has been in line with the general thrust of this thesis. We have 
accepted for the sake of argument that all citizens of the well-ordered society subscribe to 
the conception of goodness as rationality and strive for social union. We have focused on 
identifying epistemic reasons as to why the well-ordered society as a whole should not be 
regarded as a social union. The emergent order of actions and its workings are too opaque 
for its many participants to see themselves as participating in the expression of one another’s 
talents. As in the previous chapters, we have emphasised that it is mutual ignorance rather 
than disagreement that prevents the mass of liberal citizens from acting-in-unison.  
Hayek, like Rawls, stresses that we benefit from the talents of others in a liberal society. 
However, his emphasis on human ignorance leads him to construe this claim rather 
differently. In the Rawlsian social union we are consciously aware of how we are enriched by 
the talents of others. Hayek, by contrast, emphasises how in the Great Society we are 
enriched by the capacities of countless others in ways that we can scarcely understand. We 
can recognise the start of “civilisation” when “the individual in the pursuit of his ends can 
make use of more knowledge than he himself has acquired”.551 As we observed in chapter 
one, on the emergent view one of the functions of liberal institutions is to transmit otherwise 
unavoidably disaggregated forms of knowledge. The price mechanism transmits dispersed 
economic information. More generally, decentralised processes of social evolution and 
competition allow for the diffusion of successful cultural practices via mechanisms of 
imitation. Very often those who adopt the more successful practices will not know why they 
work. They simply know that they work.  The point here is that, for Hayek, the liberal order 
allows us to take advantage of the capacities of countless other persons. Such capacities far 
exceed, rather than purport to complete, the latent capacities of the singular self.  
 
550 (Rawls 1999, 463) 
551 (Hayek 2006 [1960], 21) 
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Relatedly, one of the striking aspects of Rawls’ thought generally but one that manifests itself 
particularly in his thinking of social unions is the lack of emphasis on social learning. The 
individual knows all her capacities but alas can secure only a subset of them. Participation in 
the liberal community allows her to realise these latent capacities via the efforts of others 
thereby avoiding the perils of partial cultivation. It is hard to make sense of this notion 
without at least implicitly assuming there is a fixed set of latent capacities or ends that each 
person has to secure in life. Suppose, instead, that the self could develop new capacities. 
Then it is not clear what it means to “complete” the self. For even if I manifest all the 
capacities that I find to be of value at a particular moment in time, new ones could 
subsequently arise and my “self” would no longer be “complete”. Such is Hayek’s view. Our 
understanding of value and what our capacities consist in are not “givens” but subject to 
processes of social learning. When others utilise their particular knowledge to discover new 
and creative practices, exposure to them could change our understanding of both what our 
capacities might be and why they are to be valued.552 On Hayek’s score, individual freedom 
is to be valued insofar as it facilitates such experimentation and learning.  He even claims 
that if we could predict the results of widespread exercises of freedom, it would have no 
value.553 The emphasis of his liberalism, then, is not on the completion of the self but its 
ability to learn new things. The following citation, then, seems a fitting way to end this 
passage and chapter: 
It is not in the fruits of past success but the living in and for the future in which human 
intelligence proves itself. Progress is movement for movement’s sake, for it is in the 
process of learning, and in the effects having learned something new, that man 
enjoys the gift of intelligence.554  
 
552 Such is the theme of chapter 2 of the Constitution of Liberty (2006), on which this discussion has 
drawn.  
553 (Hayek 2006 [1960], 27–28) 
554 (Hayek 2006 [1960], 38) 
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Chapter Seven: Alleviating Hayek’s Worry 
 
Abstract  
 
This thesis has argued that collective political agency is not possible because of the mutual 
ignorance obtaining between liberal citizens. However, Hayek worried that the desire for 
collective control of the social order is hard to dislodge because it is an evolutionarily 
inherited intuition. While such control can never be attained, the belief that it is attainable 
will lead to forms of political activity that undermine liberal institutions. This chapter 
alleviates Hayek’s worry by making two claims. First, even if we grant an innate human 
preference for a purposive and fraternal social order, our tendency to express that 
preference in politics is not an invariant social fact. Such a tendency is at least partly 
endogenous to the political institutions under which individuals are socialised. Second, 
liberal institutions in which authority is dispersed and whose operation inhibit the formation 
of faction may be prove robust even if many of their citizens are attracted to collectivist or 
otherwise illiberal political projects.   
 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
The first chapter of this thesis distinguished between the emergent and associational views 
of political society as represented in the liberalisms of Hayek and Rawls respectively. These 
views are premised on different accounts of the manner in which liberal citizens are 
alienated from one another and prevented from acting-in-unison in the pursuit of shared 
aims. The associational view assumes liberal citizens are alienated by mutual disagreement 
and the emergent view by mutual ignorance. The first chapter argued that the prospects for 
collective political agency seem quite sanguine if one assumes mutual disagreement to be 
the cause of alienation. One then just needs to identify impartial principles over which liberal 
citizens can agree. Its prospects seem much less sanguine, however, if mutual ignorance is 
the cause of alienation. This is a much deeper constraint on collective political agency. On 
this view, the mass of liberal citizens simply do not know enough about one another to act-
in-unison. Large-scale political institutions necessarily are the emergent result of many 
disparate human actions and not the expression of intentional collective agency. The 
previous chapter stressed that, for the same reason, the individual cannot contextualise her 
own achievements as a contribution to a greater whole.  
 
If the argument thus far is successful, it also brings into full view Hayek’s worry about the 
stability of liberal institutions which we first saw in chapter one. Hayek fears that the desire 
for collective political agency is the expression of an atavistic evolutionary intuition that we 
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cannot easily discard. We are constantly prone to apply the “unmodified, uncurbed, rules of 
the micro-cosmos (i.e., of the small band or troop, or of, say, our families) to the macro-
cosmos (our wider civilisation)”.555 Political projects promising to reconcile the “macro-
cosmos” with the unity and collective control of the small tribe will prove irresistible. While 
such collective political agency will never be achieved for epistemic reasons already outlined 
in this thesis, the attempt to achieve it will encourages modes of political activity ultimately 
incompatible with a free society. Or such is the thesis that Hayek offers principally in his final 
work The Fatal Conceit but also in parts of Law, Legislation and Liberty. It now behoves this 
thesis to give full consideration to this worry. This is the task of this final chapter. It will try 
to alleviate Hayek’s worry by showing that our demand for a purposive and fraternal order 
is not as invariant as the worry assumes and that in any case a liberal order can prove robust 
even if not subject to the deep endorsement of the governed. We can happily draw on some 
of Hayek’s other ideas, as expounded in other parts of his corpus, in this task of alleviation.  
 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first outlines Hayek’s worry in greater detail. It 
shows why Hayek thinks the demand for collective agency undermines freedom in liberal 
democracies. The remainder of the chapter tries to alleviate Hayek’s worry. This can be done 
by way of two argumentative strategies. One might be to show that the belief that the liberal 
order should be subject to collective control is more variable than Hayek’s worry assumes. 
Another would try to show that there are conceivable liberal regimes that could endure even 
if large swathes of their population would prefer a collectivist regime. This chapter pursues 
both strategies. Thus, the second section argues that the belief that the liberal order should 
be collectively controlled is not simply contingent on our evolutionary inheritance but also 
socially conditioned. There might be conceivable social worlds where citizens do not hold 
that belief as strongly as they do under existing social democratic regimes. Sections three 
and four articulate a conception of liberal stability in which institutional robustness is an 
emergent phenomena arising from the interactions of very many agents who individually 
may not intend that result. This conception of liberal stability is presented as one that is 
conducive to the emergent understanding of political society. I term it emergent stability. 
This understanding has a lineage going back to David Hume and James Madison. A liberal 
regime utilising emergent stabilising forces could endure even if large swathes of its citizens 
were attracted to collectivist political projects since the resulting stability would be the 
 
555 (Hayek 1988, 14) 
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unintended outcome of their various interactions. Section five responds to a key Rawlsian 
objection to the use of emergent stabilising forces.  
 
 
1. Outlining Hayek’s Worry  
 
As already outlined in chapter one, Hayek conceives of the liberal order as a “Great Society”. 
It consists of many different individuals, groups and communities who act upon their own 
contextual knowledge and understandings of value. The unity of such an order does not 
extend beyond subscription to common rules of just conduct.556 Both the institutional rules 
underlying this complex system and the order of actions to which they give rise will not be 
amenable to conscious collective control and regulation. Our moral intuitions, however, 
evolved in much smaller social orders characterised by very much higher levels of mutual 
knowledge between a very much smaller number of participants. We are evolutionarily 
prone to make the category error of expecting social relations in the Great Society to take 
place on the same purposive and fraternal terms as that of the small troupe. This tendency 
threatens to undermine a free society.557 When Hayek first engages in political theory, the 
popular collectivist project was socialist central planning. Hence in The Road to Serfdom he 
argues that socialism is incompatible with freedom. Later in his career, when the popularity 
of socialism fades, Hayek thinks collectivist politics expresses itself as the demand for 
democratically enforced social justice.558 Hence in Law, Legislation and Liberty, Hayek 
criticises social justice as incompatible with freedom. I take it to be clear how socialist central 
planning undermines liberal freedom. That is uncontroversial even among left-liberals who 
are otherwise sceptical of the market economy.  It is worth explaining why Hayek thinks the 
demand for social justice also undermines freedom. He worries that the widespread belief in 
social justice provides cover for interest group political activity. The cumulative effect of such 
political activity is the building up of rules and regulations that undermine freedom. 
 
In any moderately complex society individuals will form interest groups and engage in politics 
to secure benefits for themselves or otherwise secure goals they value using the machinery 
 
556 In chapter two we suggested that even this might be an over statement insofar as a complex 
society will have multiple makers and enforcers of institutional rules.  
557 See particularly Hayek (1988, chap. 1) and Hayek (1982b, chap. 11). 
558 Which, as we saw in chapter two, Hayek understands primarily as a patterned conception of 
distributive justice.  
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of the state. There is a natural, and for Hayek healthy, suspicion that some groups use state 
machinery to further their own partisan ends and not goal that the wider populace might 
endorse. A widespread belief in social justice undermines this suspicion. It encourages the 
thought that the claims of various interest groups can be reconciled with a discernible 
standard of the common good shared by all citizens. Of course, Hayek thinks this mistaken. 
In an impersonal order of agents mutually ignorant of one another’s circumstances and 
values, no such standard for the common good exists. This is one of Hayek’s key claims in the 
second volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty. The problem is that the belief in social justice 
provides ideological cover for such interest group politics. The expectation that, to coin a 
phrase, society is a cooperative venture between free and equal citizens who work together 
to realise social justice legitimates and encourages the rent seeking of special interests. For 
interest groups or their elected representatives can then draw on the widely accepted 
discourse of social justice to present – both to others and perhaps even to themselves – their 
partisan and private demands as being in the public interest. As Hayek puts it in the third 
volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty:  
 
The creation of the myth of "social justice' which we have examined in the last 
volume [i.e. volume 2, The Mirage of Social Justice] is indeed largely the product of 
this particular democratic machinery [i.e. interest group politics], which makes it 
necessary for the representatives to invent a moral justification for the benefits they 
grant to particular interests.559 
 
Still, it might be asked, the propensity to form factional interest groups and engage in rent 
seeking might be economically inefficient but it is not clear how it might threaten freedom. 
Hayek, I don’t think, doesn’t fully explain his thinking here so we need to explicate them a 
bit. Under simple majority voting rules, 51% of the population are able to impose their 
preferences on the remainder. The problem here is that electorally successful political 
coalitions engage in political transactions the costs of which are shared by everyone in 
society.560 Suppose the deal between the current governing coalitions involves, say, 
restrictions on smoking and extra subsidies for farmers. The losers in the election would both 
have to contribute to the subsidies and comply with the smoking restrictions (or face the 
 
559 (Hayek 1982c, 10) c.f. “Yet today, if … [an interest] group is only large enough, its representation 
of the demands of its members as just is commonly accepted as one view of justice which must be 
taken into account in ordering the whole, even though it does not rest on any principle which could 
be generally applied” (Hayek 1982b, 39). 
560 I draw here from chapter 3 of The Calculus of Consent of Buchanan & Tullock (1999), whose 
analysis has much in common with that of Hayek in the third volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty. 
193 
 
costs of non-compliance) despite not having supported the policies.561 Over time, as various 
political coalitions gain the chance to govern and fulfil the wishes of their constituents, 
restrictions on the liberties of all will build up cumulatively. Hence the deeply managerial 
nature of contemporary liberal democratic states. There are few areas of modern life that 
are not subject to some kind of regulation and control by state actors and these inevitably 
reduce the scope for individual decision-making.562 In sum, the expectation that society is a 
collective venture realising social justice legitimates interest group politics. The unintended 
consequence of such politics is the accumulation of laws that undermine liberty across 
various dimensions. Our reconstruction of Hayek’s worry completed, we will now move unto 
showing how it might be alleviated. 
 
 
2. The Endogeneity of Political Expectations  
 
Our evolutionarily inherited belief that the liberal order should be subject to collective 
control might be tempered by other factors. Hayek’s other work can help us identify three: 
 
a) The prevailing worldview popularised by the intellectual class 
b) The legitimation strategies employed by political institutions 
c) The vibrancy of civil society  
 
We shall look at each of these in turn.  
 
In his essay “The Intellectuals and Socialism”, Hayek argues that the popularity of socialist 
ideas among the general populace is a function of the ideas prevailing among the intellectual 
classes.563 “Socialism” is here understood as the centralised planning and arrangement of 
society to secure common goals.564 For Hayek the intellectual class consists not only or even 
primarily of academics but also of members of any profession who act as intermediaries 
between the intellectual world of ideas and the public-at-large, ranging from journalists to 
 
561 By contrast, regular market exchange does not allow one to coerce others in this manner.  
562 Note that, consistent with our analysis of state institutions in chapter two, these restrictions are 
themselves the emergent outcome of many interactions between different interest groups. There is 
no central agency primarily responsible for them. 
563 (Hayek 1949) 
564 Hence, he by no means saw socialism as restricted to the left and dedicated The Road to Serfdom 
to the “socialists of all parties”.  
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radio commentators to artists.565 He offers what we might term a “trickle-down” model of 
the battle of ideas. While intellectuals have little short- or medium-term impact on public 
opinion or political decision-making, their long-run influence is considerable. Intellectual 
views that are ascendant among the intellectual class in one generation will be popular 
opinion the next and influence politics. One changes politics by first winning over the 
intellectuals. Hayek’s goal in the essay is to persuade his fellow classical liberals to 
concentrate on winning the intellectual battle of ideas so as to change public opinion at large 
in the long-run. As Kukathas observes, Hayek himself dedicated much time and energy to 
this endeavour, from advising Sir Anthony Fisher to establish The Institute of Economic 
Affairs to himself helping establish the Mont Pèlerin Society.566  
 
For the purposes of this chapter, we can infer the following. Even if our inherited moral 
intuitions instil a deep and perhaps emotive preference for the concrete and face-to-face 
relations of the small group, our ability to discipline this emotive preference when 
formulating our expectations of large-scale political institutions would also be influenced by 
the prevailing world view of the intellectual class.567 If the intellectual consensus informs us 
that it is feasible to expect of large-scale political institutions the same expectations apropos 
of small-groups, then of course we are unlikely to engage in such discipline. However, this is 
arguably a contingent fact. Indeed, in his paper Hayek observes that socialist ideas gained 
ascendancy among the intellectual class only in the 20th century in Britain and the US and 
only in the late 19th century in Germany.568 The attraction of the public to such political ideas 
increased subsequent to these shifts. Similarly, in Law, Legislation and Liberty Hayek’s thinks 
the respectability conferred to social justice by intellectuals makes it much more attractive 
to the population at large than it otherwise might be.569 The converse might be true by the 
same token. If the prevailing intellectual worldview shifts towards a classical liberal direction, 
we should expect a similar shift in public opinion. 
 
We now move to the legitimation strategies employed by political institutions. This 
endogeneity of political beliefs to institutions was one of Hayek’s key concerns in The Road 
to Serfdom. That work is often interpreted as advancing what Meadowcroft and Alves have 
 
565 (Hayek 1949, 418) 
566 (Kukathas 2006) 
567 (Hayek 1949, 423) 
568 (Hayek 1949, 417) 
569 (Hayek 1982c, 135–36) 
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termed the slippery slope thesis that the interventionism of the mixed economy will lead to 
totalitarianism.570 The mechanism is that the failures of state intervention beget yet more 
state intervention until the mixed economy turns into a centrally planned one. Such a 
sociological thesis now seems implausible. Whatever their other faults, social democracies 
have seemingly resisted this inexorable shift towards Soviet-style planning, leading even 
classical liberal sympathisers of Hayek in Meadowcroft and Alves to declare the argument a 
failure.571 No doubt, something like the slippery slope thesis can be read into The Road to 
Serfdom. However, in the preface to the second edition of the book Hayek laments that his 
most important argument had been overlooked, that the “political ideals of a people and its 
attitude towards authority are as much the effect as the cause of the political institutions 
under which it lives”.572 What concerned Hayek about socialism was the kind of subject it 
might produce – “the most important change which extensive government control produces 
is a psychological change, an alteration in the character of the people”.573 
 
Comprehensive economic planning would require that many otherwise individual decisions 
be taken collectively. A regime engaged in such planning would try to encourage and 
cultivate our evolutionary instincts for a legible and purposive social order for reasons of its 
own legitimacy. It would encourage us to think of society as a very large organisation in which 
one’s station in life is the function of a collective, political decision. If it succeeded in doing 
so the citizenry would be likely to accept planning in part because they would be socialised 
to do so.  Now, The Road to Serfdom is concerned with the modern state in its most extreme 
and worrisome manifestation of comprehensive socialist planning. Still, the psychological 
thesis arguably has force for even contemporary social democratic states. While their 
propensity to regulate society is much reduced when compared to centrally planned 
regimes, it is nonetheless much greater than, say, the typical European state in the 
nineteenth century. It seems plausible that citizens socialised in such social democratic 
regimes would be disposed to see one another as participants in a democratic project to 
realise shared standards of social justice. Conversely, we might expect individuals socialised 
under a more classical liberal regime to be less disposed to see political life in this way.  
 
 
570 (Alves and Meadowcroft 2014) 
571 See particularly Alves and Meadowcroft (2014, 854-856). For an argument that the slippery slope 
thesis is more nuanced and defensible then it might initially appear, see Cowen and Tranditis (2019). 
572 (Hayek 1967c, 224) 
573 (Hayek 1967c, 224) 
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There are some clear parallels here between Hayek’s observations and those of Michel 
Foucault. The latter observed that the “art of government” under modernity differs 
drastically from the past. In the Middle Ages, sovereignty is exercised not on “things” but 
rather on a territory.574 By this Foucault means that the aim of governance was primarily the 
control of territory and not so much the regulation of the individuals and communities who 
resided within them. Such an art of governance is presumed within Machiavelli’s The Prince, 
“essentially a treatise about the prince’s ability to keep his principality”.575 Indeed, while in 
The Prince Machiavelli does offer what one might think of as managerial advice, this is with 
respect to the Prince’s personal estate. Machiavelli offers advice on what kind of staff to 
appoint or the wisdom of building castles for defence or of disarming the population. But 
these forms of managerial advice are instrumental to securing the Prince’s personal goals of 
maximising the territory under his control. The population itself is not the subject of 
management.576  The manner in which the art of governance is conceptualised begins to 
change, however, as we approach the modern era. Now, one governs things. The focus 
moves away from the territory itself to the communities within them and the regulation and 
governance of their social relations.577 This contemporary art of governance is what Foucault 
would term governmentality. What makes such governance possible is the development of 
statistics. These reveal the population of a territory to show aggregate level regularities 
across a variety of dimensions from wealth to health. These regularities can be identified, 
measured and intervened upon.  
 
Foucault’s thesis is in line with the historical sociology of the state. Van Creveld observes that 
the size and scope of even the absolutist states of the 18th century were very much less than 
their contemporary successors. Taxation was much more limited. The most heavily taxed 
eighteenth century state, Frederick II’s Prussia, appropriated the same proportion of national 
income as did the United States in 1989.578 The tasks of day-to-day governance were largely 
left to intermediary groups.579 As Michael Oakeshott observes, states in the middle ages were 
composed of diverse and largely self-governing communities united by little more than a 
common ruler whose main task was to keep the peace. 580 Matters change in the 19th century 
 
574 (Foucault 1991, 93) 
575 (Foucault 1991, 91) 
576 (Machiavelli 2004) 
577 (Foucault 1991, 91) 
578 (Van Creveld 1999, 190) 
579 (Van Creveld 1999, 190–91) C.f. (Nisbet 1953) 
580 (Oakeshott 2003, 242) 
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when even a purportedly laissez faire state like that of Britain begins to make comprehensive 
efforts to intervene in society. It begins to invest heavily in crime prevention and social 
control. The number of prosecutions grow seven fold between 1805 and 1840 and new 
legislation makes it possible to prosecute individuals for mere vagrancy.581 The state begins 
also to regulate economic life, the first Factory Act being passed in 1834. It moves into 
welfare provision and starts to regulate public health. Welfare is appropriated from the 
parishes and provided directly by the state through the infamous Victorian workhouses. The 
first Public Health bill is passed in 1848 giving local boards of health authority to control 
water supplies and maintain streets. The General Medical Council is formed in 1858 to 
oversee and regulate the medical, surgery and midwifery professions.582 Additionally, Britain 
along with other 19th century states, used transport policy, particularly with respect to rail, 
to connect their provinces and bring them under central control.583 The scale of activity 
performed by twentieth century states is of a greater magnitude and scope still.  
 
Foucault’s insight is that the shift in the art of government from the management of territory 
to the management of things necessitates a shift in the self-understandings of the 
governed—one that would both come to value having the goods promoted by these 
interventions and see the successful promotion of these goods as an appropriate mode of 
government activity. This is what Foucault has in mind when he speaks of the normalisation 
of the subject under governmentality.584 Today, most of us take for granted that the function 
of nation-states is to promote our welfare in a plethora of ways, ranging from the education 
of our children to the maintenance of our health to equipping us with skills to survive in the 
global economy to protecting our culture and so on. When we enter the voting booth, we 
judge our governments on how effective they are in meeting these goals. We have been 
socialised into thinking of our societies as organisations governed by the state. This is a new 
self-understanding among subjects, one not found in the past when the size and scope of 
state activity was much less than it is currently. Foucault’s analysis complements Hayek’s 
view, as expounded in The Road to Serfdom, that our expectations of political institutions are 
formed not simply by our genetic inheritance but are endogenous to those institutions 
themselves.  
 
 
581 (Van Creveld 1999, 210) 
582 (Van Creveld 1999, 219) 
583 (Van Creveld 1999, 260) 
584 I follow here Diana Taylor’s (2009) helpful interpretation. 
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We now move unto the third variable, the vibrancy of civil society. In a passage advocating 
radical decentralization of government services in the third volume of Law, Legislation and 
Liberty, Hayek writes that it:  
 
… would probably lead to the revival of a communal spirit which has been largely 
suffocated by centralization. The widely felt inhumanity of the modern society is not 
so much the result of the impersonal character of the economic process, in which 
modern man of necessity works largely for aims of which he is ignorant, but of the 
fact that political centralization has largely deprived him of the chance to have a say 
in shaping the environment which he knows.585 
 
In chapter four we saw Tocqueville’s thesis that centralisation of social life by the state 
undermines the propensity for local association. The decline of worker-led friendly societies 
in the UK and US following greater state provision of welfare was offered as suggestive 
evidence in favour of the thesis. It is relevant also for the concerns of this chapter. In a vibrant 
civil society, our need for fraternal and purposeful social organisation could be partly met in 
associational life.586 For instance, demands for distribution according to moral desert, 
inappropriate when made on the impersonal liberal order, could be made appropriately in 
such settings. The aforementioned friendly societies could take into account moral desert in 
their distribution of entitlements because the members of a particular chapter would be 
personally acquainted with one another. Information as to one another’s conduct could be 
ascertained relatively easily. However, once the central state displaces these local 
associations, they can no longer partially meet our need for collective control and fraternity. 
The demand on large-scale political institutions to meet such needs will increase.  By the 
same token, if the demand for collectivist politics is high in centralised social democratic 
regimes, it might be less so in regimes which afforded local associations greater autonomy.  
 
 
3. Two Accounts of Liberal Stability 
 
We now change tack and try to show that there are conceivable liberal institutions that might 
endure even if large swathes of their subjects would prefer to overturn them in favour of a 
 
585 (Hayek 1982c, 146) 
586 I add the qualifier “partly” because such fraternity and collective control will be limited to the 
tasks carried out by the association in question. There will not be a sense that the social order as a 
whole is fraternally subject to collective control. 
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more collectivist polity. Implicit in Hayek’s worry is an assumption about the sources of 
liberal stability that is quite similar to Rawls: liberal institutions endure only if they are 
populated by liberals who strongly espouse liberal values. We cannot, after all, have 
liberalism without liberals. This is the clear theme of Hayek’s aforementioned essay, “The 
Intellectuals and Socialism”. There Hayek argues that classical liberal institutions will not 
succeed unless public opinion is brought to support them.587 Rawls, as we have seen, not 
dissimilarly thinks that liberal institutions are stable when “those taking part in these 
arrangements acquire the corresponding sense of justice and desire to do their part in 
maintaining them”.588 Let us term this the intentional account of liberal stability. It matches 
nicely with the associational view. Liberal institutions endure because the association of 
liberal citizens who compose them intend this to be the case. There is, however, an 
alternative account of institutional stability in the liberal tradition more in keeping with the 
emergent view. Let us simply call this the emergent account of liberal stability. This view 
takes for granted that within the extended liberal order groups will try to organise with the 
express aim of collectivising society. Still, if the institutional structures in place are effective 
at inhibiting the formation of such factions and disaggregate political authority sufficiently, 
the order will endure nonetheless. 589  
 
Both accounts of stability are long standing within the liberal tradition. The disagreement 
between John Stuart Mill and Lord Acton over the value of the nation-state was centred on 
the dispute as to which account is the most appropriate. In his Considerations on 
Representative Government, Mill famously took the view that there is a strong prime facie 
case for ensuring, where feasible, that the boundaries of states and nations coincide,590 a 
“nation” being a group of persons united by “common sympathies” that do not extend to 
outsiders and who desire to be ruled only by themselves or a portion thereof.591 This fellow-
feeling generates the “united public opinion” and shared purposes that Mill thinks is critical 
to the stability of liberal democratic institutions.592 For a divided polity is less likely to keep 
 
587 (Hayek 1949, 431–32) 
588 (Rawls 1999, 398) 
589 I refrain here from using the term “modus vivendi,” which could be a consciously decided 
settlement between parties. Emergent conceptions of stability, as I understand them, presume at 
least the possibility of a disjuncture between the motives of agents and the outcomes. Such stability 
need not be intended. The emergent conception might best be seen as a type of modus vivendi.  
590 Chapter XVI, “Of Nationality, as connected with Representative Government”: (Mill 1861, 179–
85) 
591 (Mill 1861, 179) 
592 (Mill 1861, 180) 
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the state within liberal bounds. It is easier under such conditions for the state to adopt divide-
and-rule tactics – that “any one of them feels aggrieved by the policy of the common ruler is 
sufficient to determine another to support that policy”.593  
 
Lord Acton criticises Mill in his famous essay “On Nationality”. He too sees co-nationals as 
united by “a consistent similarity of character, interest, and opinion”.594 Unlike Mill, he sees 
the heterogeneous public opinion of multinational states as securing rather than 
undermining liberal institutions. He envisages each nationality having autonomy as to the 
laws and norms under which they are governed.595 Members of such sub-nationalities will 
develop loyalties towards them since they will constitute “a great source and centre of 
political sentiments” independent of the central state. 596 The members of each of the 
different groups will be jealous to protect the autonomy of their grouping. These local 
loyalties form “a firm barrier against the intrusion of the government beyond the political 
sphere which is common to all into the social department which escapes legislation and is 
ruled by spontaneous laws”.597 None of the autonomous nations necessarily intend to keep 
the state as a whole within liberal bounds when they defend their corporate liberties. Were 
any of them to have exclusive control of the state, their same political motivations could lead 
to their imposing their values on members of the other nationalities. However, assuming all 
goes well such that no one national group can do this, the emergent outcome of all intending 
to protect their own corporate liberties is a constrained state that cannot dominate any 
particular group. What enables this outcome is an institutional structure characterised by a 
diversity of groups and the disaggregation of power.  
 
Along with Mill, Rousseau (if read as a liberal), Locke and Rawls advocate the intentional 
account of liberal stability while, along with Acton, Hume, Madison and Tocqueville advocate 
the emergent account.598 Given that Hayek’s own sympathies lie definitively with the latter 
set of liberal thinkers, the great emphasis on intentional stability to be found in some of his 
writings is strange. After all, Hayek stresses above all else that order can result among a large 
 
593 (Mill 1861, 180) 
594 (Acton 1909, 289) 
595 (Acton 1909, 289) 
596 (Acton 1909, 289) 
597 (Acton 1909, 290) 
598 It is best, I think, to see these as ideal-types. Infeasible are both the unanimous consensus on justice 
of Rawls’ well-ordered society and institutions whose endurance is solely contingent on balance of 
power considerations. The practical question is the emphasis of the theorist. I shall return to this point 
below.  
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group of parties despite their not intending it. Given also the Hayekian difficulties afflicting 
coordinated political action, Hayek’s own framework gives him good reason to opt for 
emergent stability. Interestingly enough, when Hayek makes his own institutional proposals, 
the logic of their operation is most consistent with the emergent conception. We turn to 
such proposals in the next section.  
 
 
4. The Feasibility of Emergent Liberal Stability  
 
The aim of this section is to show the feasibility of emergent liberal stability. There are two 
institutional mechanisms that are conducive to such stability. Institutions might inhibit the 
formation of partisan interest groups. Institutions marked by a disaggregation of power 
might also reduce the power that interest groups can acquire and exercise if they are able to 
form. These strategies are well adumbrated by David Hume, James Madison and Hayek 
himself. In this section we shall briefly investigate their institutional proposals for how both 
strategies may be utilised. Note that the claim here is not that we should implement one of 
these institutional blueprints or otherwise a blueprint along the same lines. That would fall 
foul of the problems with Archimedean institutional reform that we identified in chapter 
two.599 Instead we study these institutional proposals to try and show that classical liberal 
institutions utilising emergent stabilising forces are perfectly conceivable. We shall return to 
this point later in this section. 
 
David Hume’s thinking about institutional stability approaches the problem by considering 
how the problem of faction in politics can be dealt with. His essay “of parties in general” 
provides a useful typology.600 Factions can be personal in that they are not based on any 
substantive sentiment or interest. For the human predisposition to form competing groups, 
Hume observes, can be triggered by even the most trivial of differences. They can also be 
based on material or economic interest, subscription to an abstract principle, or the affection 
of a charismatic leader or family. These are ideal-types with actual factions usually being 
“mixed”.601 Hume is concerned about such groups for the same reason as is Hayek. Factional 
 
599 Even if comprehensive design of institutions were feasible, it would not be advisable to simply 
follow a blueprint. For the most appropriate institutional structure would probably vary from context-
to-context. There are, after all, many ways to ensure that authority is disaggregated.  
600 (Hume 1777a, 59–63) 
601 He describes 18th century Britain’s political parties as such - Hume (1777b). 
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groups are dangerous because they can use the political machinery of the state to further 
their own interest at public expense. Hume’s institutional proposal, the “Idea of the Perfect 
Commonwealth,” is advanced primarily to show how the problem of faction can be 
mitigated. There he argues against the assumption made by Montesquieu and Rousseau that 
faction can only be avoided in small, homogenous states marked by little variation in interest 
or sentiment.602 Hume turns on its head the logic of this position. In a small state, the 
proximity or “near habitation” of the parties makes it relatively easy for factions to form and 
capture political power. Instead we should opt for larger states in which factions are more 
difficult to form. In such states “the parts are so distant and remote, that it is very difficult, 
either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measures against the 
public”.603 Thus, Hume says that it is “probable” that the perfect commonwealth would be 
realised in a large rather than small state. The substance of the rules regulating the perfect 
commonwealth all push towards the radical decentralisation of governmental authority to 
prevent the concentration of power in any one part of the state.604 
 
His essay would be a substantial influence on James Madison’s contributions to The 
Federalist.605 Madison understands a faction similarly to Hume, as a subset of citizens “united 
and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of 
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community”.606 He too 
thinks that a large state constitutes an institutional setting more difficult for the formation 
of faction. For when you: 
 
Extend the sphere [of the state], and you take in a greater variety of parties and 
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common 
motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it 
will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in 
unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where 
there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is 
 
602 (Hume 1777c, 528–30) 
603 (Hume 1777c, 230) 
604 He proposed to divide the United Kingdom into 100 counties each of which in turn is divided into 
100 parishes. The voters in each parish, restricted to property holders, would elect a representative. 
The hundred representatives of each county would elect out of their number a senator and ten 
magistrates. There are, then, two layers of representation between those charged with governance 
and the actual voter. Executive power would lie with the senators and legislative with the magistrates. 
Further, the magistrates would never meet as a whole body but would convene in their own counties. 
(Hume 1777c, 516–620) 
605 As convincingly argued by Adair (1957).  
606 (Madison 2003a, 41) 
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always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is 
necessary.607  
In a large state with a diverse population and diverse interests, the formation of faction is 
less likely. Even where there is a common motive, coordination problems constitute an extra 
impediment to the formation of faction. Madison too and quite famously favours the 
disaggregation of political authority that hinders factions when they do manage to form. He 
proposes to “divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different 
modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as 
the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will 
admit”.608  
Hayek himself utilises both strategies in his own institutional proposals. The first of inhibiting 
the formation of faction is on display in his essay, “The Economic Conditions of Interstate 
Federalism,” first published in 1939 immediately before the Second World War. Hayek there 
argues that a political and economic union of European countries is required if peace is to be 
secured in the future. For, “[t]he existence of any measure of economic seclusion or isolation 
on the part of an individual state produces a solidarity of interests among all its inhabitants 
and conflicts between their interests and those of the inhabitants of other states”.609 At the 
limit, this conflict of interest leads to war. Hayek here makes the empirical assumption that 
a regime of economic protectionism encourages the concentration of critical industries or 
sectors in particular states. The economic interests of the whole nation will be tied up with 
these critical sectors. In consequence, “any change which affects a particular industry in a 
certain territory should impinge more heavily upon all or most of the inhabitants of that 
territory than upon people elsewhere”.610 He continues, “[t]he mere fact that everybody will 
find again and again that their interests are closely bound up with those of one constant 
group of people and antagonistic to that of another group is bound to set up severe frictions 
between the groups as such”.611 
 
An economic union consisting of the free movement of people and capital can help to 
alleviate this problem. Under such circumstances the composition of groups will be less 
permanent. Hayek’s implicit but unstated assumption here is that a freer economic regime 
 
607 (Madison 2003a, 45) 
608 (Madison 2003b, 253) 
609 (Hayek 1948, 257) 
610 (Hayek 1948, 257) 
611 (Hayek 1948, 258) 
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will be more dynamic and subject to Schumpeterian creative destruction. Sectoral change 
will be more common and interest groups will have less time to solidify.612 Additionally, 
under such conditions it is less likely that the boundaries of key sectors will overlap with 
territorial boundaries. The conflicts, then, would not be between the same groups but of 
“groups of constantly varying composition… the various individuals finding themselves 
arrayed, sometimes with one group of people against another, and at other times on another 
issue with the second group against the first”.613 The political impact of economic union is to 
make it much more difficult, then, to form durable factions. Additionally, the diversity of 
national groups in such a union would make it much more difficult to create political 
coalitions for central planning. In national states, on the other hand, it is easy for an interest 
group to “persuade the rest of the community that it is in their interest to protect ‘their’ iron 
industry or ‘their’ wheat production or whatever it be”.614 Tellingly for our purposes, here 
Hayek cites positively Acton’s critique of Mill’s nationalism.615 
 
The chapter on Hayek’s model constitution in the third volume of Law, Legislation & Liberty 
begins with an epigraph from Hume’s “Idea of the Perfect Commonwealth”. It also states its 
aim to be the same as that of the founders of the US Constitution, though Hayek thinks with 
the benefit of hindsight one might be able to improve on their efforts.616 If in the interstate 
federalism essay he employs the strategy of inhibiting the formation of faction, the emphasis 
here is on the disaggregation of authority. His aforementioned concern in this work is the 
legislative capture of democratic institutions by coalitions of special interests. Hayek’s 
proposes an institutional framework in which the disaggregation of authority extends further 
than those found in actually existing liberal democracies. In essence, Hayek proposes to 
divide our current legislative chambers into two bodies. The first is called the “legislative 
assembly”. Their function is to produce the abstract rules of conduct on which the extended 
order depends. There are two aspects to this task. First, to formulate abstract rights of 
person and property that apply to all.  These form the common rules which structure 
interaction in the extended liberal order.  
 
 
612 C.F. (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, 25): “Creative economic destruction produces a 
constantly shifting distribution of economic interests, making it difficult for political officials to 
solidify their advantage through rent-creation”. 
613 (Hayek 1948, 257) 
614 (Hayek 1948, 262) 
615 (Hayek 1948, 270) 
616 (Hayek 1982c, 105) 
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Second, they formulate constraints on the manner in which the state provides services to 
citizens.617 The legislative assembly does not so much legislate policies itself but sets what 
we might consider as “Hayekian constraints” on policy-making.  In Hayek’s estimation they 
require a particular kind of representative. His somewhat curious proposal is that the 
candidates would need be 45 years old and “have already proved themselves in the ordinary 
business of life,” and they would be elected by peers of the same age, governing for 15 year 
terms.618 The rationale here is that their role requires politicians with a long time horizon. 
The second chamber, the “governmental assembly” will resemble the legislative chambers 
with which we are familiar. They would be staffed by conventional politicians who sought 
electoral majorities in regular elections. Though, Hayek thinks that such assemblies can be 
more numerous, governing much smaller jurisdictions than their contemporary 
equivalents.619 They would also legislate under much greater constraints. Hayek hopes that 
this makes them much less vulnerable to electoral capture by interest groups. Importantly, 
in this essay he re-affirms his earlier commitment to an international federation.620   
 
Now, as already mentioned above, the purpose here is not to advocate the top-down 
implementation of any of these institutional proposals. This thesis is sceptical as to the 
possibility of such reform. Furthermore, one can certainly identify difficulties with Hayek’s 
proposals. The concern with the international federation is that any central authority strong 
enough to enforce the rules of the economic union might be liable to abuse its power in 
other ways. The concern with his model constitution is that while it reduces the power of 
governmental assemblies, it does so by greatly empowering the legislative assembly.621 If we 
are worried about the undue sway of interest groups in democratic life perhaps super-
majority voting rules, as proposed by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, would be a 
simpler and more effective institutional mechanism.622 Given these specific concerns about 
Hayek’s institutional proposals and the thesis’ wider scepticism as to our ability to implement 
such institutional blueprints, one might wonder what function they perform in the argument 
of this chapter.  
 
 
617 (Hayek 1982c, 445) 
618 (Hayek 1982c, 449)  
619 (Hayek 1982c, 479) 
620 (Hayek 1982c, 482) 
621 On this see Müller (2015). 
622 (Buchanan and Tullock 1999); c.f. (Gaus 2012a, 540–45) 
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I suggest we think of these institutional proposals not as action-guiding prescriptions but 
rather as theoretical models illustrating that emergent liberal stability is feasible. Recall that 
Hayek’s worry is not that we cannot engineer liberal institutions where they do not exist but 
that they will have a limited propensity to endure where they do arise because they will not 
win the loyalty of their subjects. We have shown, drawing in part on his own institutional 
models, that this is not necessarily the case. Conceivable are liberal institutions that lack such 
loyalty but endure because they effectively disaggregate power and inhibit the formation of 
faction. Still, it might be objected that models conjecturing how emergent stabilising forces 
might be feasible do not show that they indeed would be feasible. In response, we can 
observe that the institutional models of Madison, Hume and Hayek are not mere theoretical 
conjecture but reflect historical constitutional practice. For instance, on one interpretation, 
liberal institutions and practices arose and were sustained in Europe as a result of 
competition between competing and overlapping jurisdictions.623 In other words, their 
endurance was secured by emergent stabilising forces.  
 
Another concern might be that it is not particularly encouraging for those who share Hayek’s 
commitments to know that liberal institutions utilising emergent stabilising forces might 
endure where they do arise but, per the contention of this thesis, there is little we can 
consciously do to create them where they do not. This point must be conceded to as an 
implication of this thesis, which indeed suggests that societies stumble upon liberal 
institutions largely as a matter of contingent, historical accident. In some societies the 
interactions between various actors and agencies will lead to convergence on such 
institutions but in others they will not. North, Wallis and Weingast’s argument, which we first 
saw in chapter three, is precisely that the checks-and-balances that we consider part-and-
parcel of Western constitutional practice arose as the unintended consequence of strategic 
interactions between political elites over successive generations. Note though that this point 
cuts both ways. If liberal institutions can’t be consciously created when they are not in place, 
then by the same token they are difficult to upend when they are in place. It might also be 
the case that the elaborate institutional proposals advocated by Madison, Hume and Hayek 
are not a necessary condition to achieving at least the disaggregation of authority. The latter 
might simply require a generalised norm of toleration towards dissent and refusing to try 
and centrally regulate the social order. Perhaps under circumstances where that norm was 
 
623 On this see Salter and Young (2019). Another relevant historical example is the Ottoman Empire, 
which we shall discuss briefly in the section to follow. 
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upheld, we might see the proliferation of different institutional authorities.624 These 
numerous associations would emerge in a spontaneous fashion and they would also check 
one another’s ambitions in a spontaneous fashion. They would thus be emergent in both 
senses in which the term has been used in this thesis. A final and important worry, articulated 
by John Rawls among others, is that emergent stabilising forces are insufficient to engender 
the long-run stability of liberal institutions. The next section will deal with this important 
objection at length. 
 
 
5. The Rawlsian Objection to Emergent Stability 
 
The Rawlsian objection to emergent stabilising forces runs as follows. Institutions that rely 
upon such a stabilising force will not long endure because they are at the mercy of changes 
in the distribution of power. Since none of the factions have any intrinsic commitment to 
liberal institutions, the institutional constraints will be upended as soon as a faction or 
coalition of factions have the political power to do so. The mere modus vivendi of the 
emergent conception is insufficient to achieve a sufficient degree of institutional stability. As 
Jacob Levy articulates this Rawlsian view: “[t]here is no constitutional design so clever, no 
multiplication of veto points so elaborate that the liberal order can be formally guaranteed. 
There need to be some actual liberals involved”.625 In other words, we can’t have a liberalism 
without genuine liberals because institutional constraints on illiberal political ambitions can 
bear only so much of that weight. Now, we have already argued that classical liberal 
institutions might well produce subjects who endorse the manner of their operation. Still, 
we are setting that argument aside here and trying to respond to this objection by defending 
the emergent conception of liberal stability on its own merits.  
 
There are three responses we can make. First, there are historical precedents of 
comparatively decent regimes that achieved accommodation between different groups 
without being subject to deep endorsement by any of them. If that is true of such regimes, 
it should be true of liberal institutions reliant upon emergent stability. Take the Ottoman 
Empire. Its system of millets protected the rights of non-Muslim minorities to practice their 
religion and live according to their own customs. Bernard Lewis writes: 
 
624 I here follow Chandran Kukathas (2003) model of a “liberal archipelago”. C.f. Pennington (2015) 
625 (Levy 2018, 155). 
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A millet was a religio-political community defined by its adherents to a religion. Its 
members were subject to the rules and even to the laws of that religion, 
administered by its own chiefs. . . In return for this measure of religious freedom and 
communal autonomy, non-Muslim millets owed allegiance to the state.626 
 
Given their subservient status, it seems plausible to assume that the minorities within it did 
not endorse the regime in any deep or substantive sense. Indeed, the eagerness with which 
many broke away from the Ottoman regime as it disintegrated in the early twentieth century 
suggest that they did not. Still, it was a comparatively decent regime, particularly when 
compared to its European neighbours at the time, and it lasted for several centuries. No 
actually existing liberal democracy has endured for such a length of time. This suggests that 
it is perfectly possible for regimes that lack the deep endorsement of the governed to endure 
over the long run.  
 
This leads us to our second response. The Rawlsian approach to thinking about liberal 
stability amounts to something of a false dilemma. Either all or nearly of the parties deeply 
endorse the institutions and are fully motivated to comply or the parties are purely strategic 
actors who value institutions only instrumentally and are prepared to defect as soon as the 
cost-benefit calculus is in their favour. The error with this view is that it overlooks more 
ambiguous political motivations that lie in between these two extremes. If we reject deep 
Rawlsian consensus, then we must be positing a world of purely Hobbesian instrumentalists. 
However, even if I live under a political regime whose tenets are out of sync with my deepest 
motivations, it does not follow that I will behave only as a knave. I might still place at least 
some intrinsic value on complying with certain conventions in political life. There is probably 
no sphere of life in which interactions take place on purely strategic terms. Even power 
relations between states, from which the term “modus vivendi” was originally derived, are 
not motivated solely by strategic self-interest.  
 
Such a perspective is gleaned from Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical Society, a key text in the 
“English” school of International Relations.627 According to his theory, in some contexts the 
international relations between states can constitute an international society.628 Such a 
society exists when the states in question “conscious of certain common interests and 
common values. . . regard themselves as bound by certain rules in their dealings with one 
 
626 Cited in Gray (2000, 152). 
627 In contemporary international theory, the constructivist school takes a similar view to Bull. See 
Wendt (1992). 
628 I draw here primarily from Bull (2012, 13–18) 
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another”.629 These rules might include respecting one another’s claims to independence, 
honouring agreements and exercising force on one another subject to certain limitations. 
The critical point is that the political elites did not view these rules entirely strategically but 
placed some measure of intrinsic value on complying with them. The relations between post-
Westphalian European states or Ancient Greek city states constitute international societies 
on Bull’s score. He certainly does not exaggerate the intrinsic commitment to these rules. 
They were applied often partially and selectively. In the European case, the interests of small 
states in particular were overlooked as they were progressively absorbed by their larger 
neighbours between 1648 and 1848. However, there presence can be verified by the 
different form that intra- and inter-society relations respectively took. Thus, while European 
states recognised at least a putative norm that they should fulfil their promises to one 
another, there was no expectation that agreements entered into with the Ottoman Empire 
were binding. Similarly, in their relations with one another Greek Greek-city states 
recognised certain constraints on how war should be conducted. They did not recognise such 
constraints in their relations with the Persian Empire. 630 I take Bull’s point to be that if states’ 
foreign policy was dictated purely by strategic considerations, we should not see this kind of 
difference.  
 
If power relations between states can be mediated to some degree by intrinsic commitment 
to the rules, then perhaps something similar can be said about the domestic sphere. This 
might explain the observation of many realist political theorists that actually-existing liberal 
democracies seem to cope reasonably well with citizens whose political motivations are 
much more contingent and apathetic than their hypothetical counterparts in Rawls’ well-
ordered society.631 Despite their often less-than-full endorsement of their societies, these 
citizens are not complete knaves. I believe the following thought experiment can exemplify 
this point. Imagine, say, a conservative Christian party. They take the view that traditional 
Christian morality with respect to matters such as homosexuality or abortion or blasphemy 
should be enforced in public life. We might say that their first-best regime is one where 
society is united in upholding Christian values and goals. Suppose they are allowed to freely 
operate in a liberal political society that nonetheless contains an elaborate system of checks 
 
629 (Bull 2012, 13) 
630 The manner in which Europeans would treat non-Europeans during colonialism is also surely 
relevant here.  
631 E.g. (Gray 2000); (McCabe 2010); (Horton 2003)  
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and balances to ensure that no group, including them, can comprehensively succeed in their 
legislative agenda. Suppose also that the system is performing reasonably as intended. Our 
Christian party might gain some victories here and there. A tax-break for marriage perhaps 
or some moderate regulation of abortion but overall the results of their efforts are quite 
limited. This is so because they are neutered, in effect, by factions with opposing views and 
other constitutional constraints built into the political institutions. In turn, our conservative 
Christian party acts as a counterbalance to the legislative agenda of many of their rivals.  
 
The following I believe is a plausible picture of the party’s motivational attitudes. The 
constitutional framework is certainly not their first-best. Were the opportunity available to 
campaign for constitutional change, they would campaign for a system which would make it 
easier for them to win legislative victories and correspondingly harder for their political 
opponents. They look forward to the day when enough of their fellow citizens come round 
to their way of thinking making such a constitutional change viable. Indeed, they are happy 
to “play politics” with certain constitutional procedures to rig the rules in their favour. If they 
are to decide or to have a say in deciding how, say, constituency boundaries are to be 
reformed, they will try to push for reforms that benefit them electorally. If, likewise, they 
have a say in selecting judicial officials, they will try to pick those that are sympathetic to 
their view. 
 
Still, this does not mean they take a purely strategic or instrumental view of constitutional 
procedures. That the constitutional conventions under which they politically labour are a 
time-honoured practice might engender a certain kind of fidelity – they might think: “for all 
its faults, that this is how we doings around here makes it worthy of some respect”. 
Relatedly, a history of contestation and sometimes collaboration with their political 
opponents could generate some degree of good-will towards them. The upshot is that their 
strategic motivations are moderated by some sense of “fair play” even when operating under 
political institutions which are inconsistent with their deepest commitments. Thus they 
might affirm that one does not disenfranchise opposing party voters or refuse to 
acknowledge a clear electoral victory of one’s opponent or tamper with the counting of 
ballots. They would maintain their commitment to these norms even when a purely strategic 
calculus might make breaking them seem worthwhile. Still, this falls some way short of the 
deep commitment that Rawlsians hope all citizens would have towards liberal institutions. 
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The case of this political party is entirely a thought experiment. I hope its force lies in its 
familiarity. I think many political parties and factions in actually-existing liberal democracies 
adopt this complex and ambiguous attitude towards the political institutions under which 
they operate. This seems especially true of political participation by groups who by their 
nature cannot deeply endorse their political institutions, such as secessionist groups.632 
Actually-existing liberal democracies already appear reasonably stable despite their frequent 
reliance on what we might term these “ambiguous loyalties”. The stability of a classical 
liberal order might likewise be predicated in part on these ambiguous loyalties and also in 
part on institutional features that disaggregate power and hinder the formation of faction. 
It does seem plausible to say that not even the most byzantine checks-and-balances can 
ensure stability if vast swathes of persons actively want to undermine existing institutions. 
Neither, however, do we need posit that they all be fully committed liberals either, of the 
Hayekian or Rawlsian or any other variety.  
 
The third response is to suggest that the Rawlsian objection in any case under-estimates the 
efficacy of strategic or self-interested motivation alone in securing stable and long-term 
political cooperation. Here we can draw on conceptual and sociological claims made by 
Russell Hardin. Before investigating Hardin’s arguments we should revisit in some detail why 
Rawls thinks deep endorsement of liberal institutions is crucial to their endurance.633 As we 
saw in chapter four, Rawls’ assumes that once liberal citizens are committed to liberal values, 
all that is required for stable political cooperation is that they assure one another of this 
fact.634 In the language of game theory, they play an assurance game. The pay-offs for such 
a game were displayed in figure 4.1 in chapter four. However, he also thinks that if liberal 
citizens lack an adequate sense of justice – i.e. if they are solely self-interested actors – then 
they are engaged not in an assurance game but a prisoner’s dilemma, the pay-offs to which 
are showed in figure 7.1: 
 
 
 
 
632 From my anecdotal observations, the Scottish National Party, who are committed to Scottish 
independence, do not seem less committed to British parliamentary principles and practices than 
other parties, despite their evident lack of deep loyalty to the British state.  
633 As in our discussion of the Rawlsian assurance game in chapter four, the interpretation of Rawls to 
follow draws greatly on Paul Weithman’s (2011) reading, particularly chapter two of that work.  
634 Though we also observed that this is much more easily said than done.  
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Figure 7.1 – The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
As with figure 4.1 from chapter four, the pay-offs are represented in an ordinal fashion with 
the 1st being the highest and the 4th being the lowest. The difficulty here is that cooperative 
relations are much more difficult between players caught in a prisoner’s dilemma. Recall that 
in the assurance game none of the players have a dominant strategy worth executing 
regardless of what the other player does. One is better off complying if the other player does 
and vice-versa better off defecting if the other player does. Matters differ in the prisoner’s 
dilemma. The pay-offs for each are such that they are better off defecting no matter what 
the other counter-party does - (1st > 2nd) if they comply and (3rd > 4th) if they defect. Both 
parties will defect. This is the “Nash equilibrium”. If both are defecting neither can improve 
their position by switching to a compliance strategy. Each will gain a higher pay-off if both 
complied but joint-compliance is not an equilibrium strategy. For if both are complying, each 
can improve their position by defecting. Self-interested behaviour leads to sub-optimal 
outcomes for all. One solution to the problem is to utilise external sticks and carrots to 
change the incentives facing our players to make it worth their while complying. This solution 
Rawls associates with Hobbes.635 The problem with this solution is that the self-interested 
parties to a prisoner’s dilemma are fundamentally not trustworthy. Players receive the 
highest possible pay-off when the others comply and they defect i.e. each is more than happy 
to free-ride on the efforts of others. While the hope would be to utilise a system of external 
sanctions that would minimise if not eliminate opportunities to free-ride, opportunistic 
actors will always find some loop holes or otherwise renege as soon as the balance of power 
is in their favour. Once one player defects, it is in the interests of the other to do so also and 
 
635 (Rawls 1999, 238, 304–5) 
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cooperation will break down.636 It is for this reason that Rawls thinks institutional constraints 
alone are insufficient to maintain cooperation.  
 
The only way we can reliably secure compliance by the parties is to change their internal 
motivation structure so they place intrinsic value on compliance. Once parties acquire an 
intrinsic commitment to liberal justice, their pay-offs change such that they are no longer 
playing a prisoner’s dilemma but an assurance game as displayed originally in figure 4.1. The 
pay-off table for the latter game is reproduced below in figure 7.2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 – Mutual Assurance Game 
 
The key difference is that since there is no dominant strategy, there is no single Nash 
equilibrium in the mutual assurance game. Joint-defection is an equilibrium since no party 
can improve their pay-off by changing strategy under such circumstances. Joint-compliance, 
however, is also a possible equilibrium. Further, each gain their highest pay-off if both 
comply. So long as players can reliably signal to one another their commitment to comply, 
they can arrive at and stay in a stable equilibrium of joint-compliance.637 Cooperative 
behaviour in political life is thus much more viable if the agents are playing an assurance 
game. We do not need to worry about their defecting as soon as a loophole presents itself. 
For the players themselves have no wish to defect from the stable cooperative equilibrium. 
For Rawls a widespread sense of justice turns political life from an intractable prisoner’s 
dilemma into a resolvable assurance game by giving liberal citizens intrinsic motivation to 
comply with justice so long as others reciprocate.  
 
636 Chapter 4 of Political Liberalism, “The Idea of Overlapping Consensus” articulates Rawls’ concerns 
here at length. The “social unity” between self-interested actors, he writes there, “is only apparent, 
as its stability is contingent on circumstances remaining such as not to upset the fortunate 
convergence of interests”. (Rawls 1996, chp. 4, 147) 
637 Of course, as we saw in chapter four, acquiring this assurance in a large-scale society, particularly 
as it relates to the internal motivations of other actors, is not as straightforward as Rawls assumes.   
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The Rawlsian objection to the utilisation of emergent stability is based, then, upon the 
presumption that self-interested actors would face the pay-offs of a prisoner’s dilemma. 
Russell Hardin, however, disputes this assumption.638 On Hardin’s Humean view, the 
Rawlsian assumption that strategically motivated actors would play a prisoner’s dilemma in 
the absence of a strongly internalised sense of liberal justice is mistaken. For Hardin, Rawls 
and other contractualists make this mistaken assumption because they think participation in 
political life is akin to a commercial contract. Viewed in this way, political interaction looks 
like a prisoner’s dilemma because contractual relations often provide opportunities for the 
parties to renege and improve their position. However, Hardin observes, political 
interactions is decidedly not like this: 
 
One can renege on any given contract and plausibly still keep open the opportunity 
for mutually beneficial contractual relations with other potential partners. But one 
cannot will away the whole institution of enforcing contracts and then still expect 
mutually beneficial contractual exchanges with anyone to work.639 
 
Precisely because it is in no one’s interest to “will away the whole institution of enforcing 
contracts,” Hardin argues that strategically motivated actors, pace Rawls, are already playing 
an assurance game.640 Positing a strongly internalised sense of justice is unnecessary. Hardin 
also thinks that the pay-off for the first-best outcome far exceeds that of the second-best 
outcomes and the difference between the second- and the third- and fourth-best outcomes 
respectively are trivial in comparison.641 Thus, if our strategic actors have some reasonable 
assurance that others will comply, they will have overwhelmingly self-interested reasons to 
comply themselves, unlike in the prisoner’s dilemma scenario. Hence, political constitutions, 
he writes, are “self-enforcing”.642 Why might actors have an overwhelming interest to 
comply with the “whole institution of enforcing contracts” and not renege from it as they 
might do when engaged in the everyday transactions made possible by such an institution? 
Hardin provides two answers to this question. The first is that everyone is made better off 
under such an institutional framework which moves us away from a subsistence economy 
into a productive one.643 This strikes me as only partially true given that states have often 
 
638 I here draw on chapter 4 of his Liberalism, Constitutionalism and Democracy (Hardin 1999).  
639 (Hardin 1999, 87) 
640 (Hardin 1999, 92-98) 
641 (Hardin 1999, 92–98) 
642 (Hardin 1999, 92–98) 
643 (Hardin 1999, 98) 
215 
 
incorporated individuals and communities into market institutions regardless of their own 
wishes simply because they are subsequently easier to regulate and tax.644  
 
Another reason Hardin offers is that once these institutions gain a critical mass of followers 
network affects are generated which markedly changes the cost-benefit calculus of those 
who are yet to sign unto them.645 He provides a case study of such network affects in action: 
the ratification of the US Constitution.646 Its contents, particularly the Commerce Clause, 
were framed for the benefit of the commercial class, namely large business and plantation 
owners. At the time of its formulation, the Constitution would have been opposed by the 
bulk of small farmers who composed the large majority of US property owners. However, 
the ratification process was manipulated such that the Constitution was put to vote first in 
those states in which it faced little or no opposition. Once these states ratified, other states 
who may initially have been opposed now felt that they had strong self-interested reasons 
to comply: 
 
By staging votes in the states where there was little or no opposition first, the 
Federalists were able to make the votes of later states a matter of joining the 
coordination or accepting a world even worse than that of the Articles of 
Confederation, a world in which they would be outside the nation and unable to 
enjoy the benefits it offered and, just possibly, at risk of war from the more populous 
new nation.647 
 
In other words, as each new agent endorses the constitution, so increases the costs of 
holding out for the remaining players, giving them strong reasons to comply themselves. In 
the North American case, the hold-outs would eventually ratify not simply to avoid the risk 
of war but also to avoid the economic isolation that comes with being on the other side of 
an external tariff barrier. In many ways, this is a restatement of the point that we already 
made earlier in the thesis when considering Gaus’ Kantian coordination game or Mainsbridge 
et al’s concept of an emergent “societal decision”. Institutional rules can emerge and become 
entrenched without the deep endorsement of those subject to their authority. This, I think, 
is normatively worrying in many ways. But it also shows that prudential considerations can 
go much further in securing political and social cooperation than Rawls allows.  
 
644 On this see Scott (1998, Chp. 1). 
645 Though the use of “network affects” is my terminology rather than Hardin’s.  
646 (Hardin 1999, 103–7) 
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Conclusion 
 
We have tried to alleviate Hayek’s worry about the viability of classical liberal institutions on 
two fronts. The stability of such institutions can be secured either through the endogenous 
socialisation of those subject to their authority or through emergent stabilising forces that 
hinder the formation of faction and reduce its potency when it can form by disaggregating 
political authority. In practice, the stability of liberal institutions can be secured through a 
mixture of both these mechanisms. The final section responded to the Rawlsian objection 
that emergent stabilising forces will falter unless liberal citizens deeply internalise liberal 
values. The manner in which we have tried to understand liberal stability in this chapter is in 
keeping with the general tenor of this thesis. Large-scale outcomes, including even the 
endurance of liberal political institutions, are emergent phenomena outrunning the 
intentions of the actors involved. For most of us, most of the time, politics is experienced as 
something that happens to us rather than something we control. We find ourselves in a 
political and social context and try to make the best of it. The concluding section will make 
some remarks as to which understanding of freedom might be most helpful in this regard.  
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Thesis Conclusion: The Freedom “Inherent” in Agency 
 
This thesis has argued against collective political agency. The theme running throughout has 
been that mutual ignorance prevents impersonally related citizens from forming and acting 
upon shared intentions as to how their institutions should be structured. It is not simply that 
we do not live in a political world of our own making, there really is no meaningful referent 
to the “we” that such a claim deploys. The two great goods promised by the associational 
understanding of political society, collective control and social unity, are not within our grasp 
according to the account that has been advanced and defended here. This is the price of 
living in the impersonal liberal order in which we find ourselves. Hayek thought that for many 
of us the cost is too much to bear. There will be a perennial attraction to political projects 
that try to reconcile our desire for freedom with our desire for unity and control over our 
social world. The last chapter alleviated Hayek’s worry that this would undermine the 
stability of liberal institutions. This conclusion offers some reflections on what kind of 
orientation in the world might help us make peace with the liberal order. Particularly, the 
aim is to offer some remarks as to what understanding of freedom can help us do so.  
Undoubtedly, if one thinks about freedom in a Rawlsian fashion, the arguments of this thesis 
are most dispiriting. Taking its debt from Rousseau as much as Kant, the Rawlsian 
understanding of freedom is in an important sense deeply collectivist. On this view, I do not 
attain my full autonomy unless the basic structure of my society accords with a conception 
of justice that I affirm along with all my other fellow citizens. In other words, I am free only 
if I live in a social world over which the citizen-body, of which I am but one part, exercises 
collective control. If the arguments of this thesis are correct, then under the impersonal 
conditions of modernity, we cannot be free. Undoubtedly this seems like an unhappy result. 
Fortunately, there is another way of thinking about freedom under modern conditions. This 
understanding of freedom is to be found in the work of Michael Oakeshott. 
As a segue way into our discussion of Oakeshott, it would prove useful to reflect on why the 
exercise of freedom without collective control and social unity seems inadequate. Such 
freedom might lack meaning. This is the problem that Hegel identified with the bare 
subjective freedom available to us as isolated members of civil society. I am but one of 
millions of citizens who compose a nation-state. On a more Hayekian construal, we might 
say that I am but one of billions of persons who compose the extended order of cooperation, 
or “Great Society,” which by now covers the globe. I am also but one among countless human 
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beings who will inhabit this planet in the lifetime of the human species. These facts alone 
might be enough to provoke the existential worry that one’s singular life is irrelevant. If we 
think in even grander terms, of our place in the wider scheme of the universe, our singular 
lives seem to occupy a category beyond irrelevance.  All this, Thomas Nagel once famously 
observed, lends the human conditions its absurdity. The seriousness with which we pursue 
our lives when we are focused on living them seems ridiculous when, from a more 
Archimedean perspective, we dwell on how irrelevant if not futile our efforts are in the grand 
scheme of things.648 This absurdity is not always easy to bear. We wish that somehow our 
individual exercise of freedom connects to something of greater significance. Contextualising 
our own life story as at least partly a contribution to a grand scheme of cooperation in pursuit 
of shared goals, from one generation to the next, is one way of giving it this wider 
significance. If the value of our freedom is contingent on its being meaningful in this sense, 
then the arguments of this thesis suggest that such meaning is not to be found.  
Freedom without collective control and social unity might also be insecure. If the social world 
which I inhabit is subject to unpredictable and uncontrollable changes, I will not always be 
able to secure my goals. For many, the value of freedom is questionable unless they can have 
some confidence, if not a guarantee, that the objectives they use their liberty to pursue can 
indeed be obtained. Concerns about social justice can often be interpreted as a concern 
about the security of our freedom. It is unfair that some—the wealthy or the privileged—
have access to opportunities that the less fortunate do not. They are better placed to secure 
the objects of their freedom than are the less advantaged. Above all, the intuition driving the 
Rawlsian idea of a just society is that the freedom of all liberal citizens should be made as 
secure as possible. One way of increasing the security of one’s freedom is by changing the 
wider institutional framework – the basic structure in Rawls’ terms – within which we live. 
The lone person can exercise agency only within this institutional structure but not over the 
structure itself. This is something we can only do together as a citizen body. In Margaret 
Moore’s terms, citizens engaged in political participation experience a “different (collective) 
dimension of autonomy”. Chapters two and three in particular criticised this notion in various 
ways. There is no Archimedean point from which major institutional rules, understood as a 
holistic basic structure, can be reformed at will. States are not the intentional projects of a 
civic minded citizenry but emergent phenomena that arise from human action and yet not 
by design. (Though the “actions” of the politically well-connected may have much more sway 
 
648 (Nagel 1971) 
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over events.) The capacity of the citizenry to ensure that government operates in line with 
their views and preferences is much exaggerated. If they find themselves in an institutional 
setting where their freedom is secure in the sense that concerns Rawls and other liberal 
egalitarians, they are above all lucky.649 If they don’t find themselves under such institutional 
settings, they are not going to change it through the force of an intentional will they share 
with their peers.650  
Both these fears arise to the extent that we value freedom instrumentally. If the value of 
freedom is to be found in the objects it allows us to pursue, then freedom is as valuable as 
our expectation of securing the objects of our pursuit. The insecurity of that pursuit 
diminishes the value of freedom. If the value of freedom is to be found in what it helps us 
achieve, then we worry about the lasting significance of that achievement. Reflection on the 
wider insignificance of our achievements diminishes the value of our freedom. Michael 
Oakeshott’s reflections on the nature of freedom in his work, On Human Conduct, point 
towards a different way of thinking about freedom. Oakeshott is keenly aware that 
accompanying freedom is the risk of both failure and meaninglessness – “The sort of self-
fulfilment it promises is partnered by the notorious risk of self-estrangement and self-
destruction”.651 Freedom so understood can feel like a heavy burden. Certainly, historically, 
for many the “opportunities of self-disclosure and self-enactment which emerged from the 
desuetude of a communally organized life” did not seem worthwhile.652 Oakeshott also 
reflects on the kind of personality who, by contrast, adopted a disposition that helped them 
to make something of these opportunities. Such a disposition: 
… displayed itself in the persons of the younger sons making their own way in a world 
which had little for them, of foot-loose adventurers who left the land to take to 
trade, of town-dwellers who had emancipated themselves from the communal ties 
of the countryside, of vagabond scholars, in the speculative audacities of Abelard, in 
venturesome heresy, in the lives of intrepid boys and men who left home to seek 
their fortunes each intent upon living a life for “a man like me”, and in the 
relationships of men and women.653  
What distinguished this kind of personality for Oakeshott? A disposition to cultivate the 
freedom “inherent” in agency. The freedom to choose should be made to “yield a satisfaction 
 
649 Danish citizens did not create Denmark. They were fortunate enough to be born there.   
650 One of the great and I think under-appreciated Hayekian lessons of North, Wallis and Weingast’s 
Violence and Social Orders is that the open-access liberal order with which we are familiar were 
emergent phenomena. No one willed it. This was the key claim advanced in chapters two and three.  
651 (Oakeshott 2003, 236)  
652 (Oakeshott 2003, 275) 
653 (Oakeshott 2003, 239) 
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of its own, independent of the chancy and intermittent satisfaction of chosen actions 
achieving their imagined and wished-for outcomes”. The process of “imagining, deliberating, 
wanting, choosing and acting” should not be seen as costs to be incurred in the pursuit of 
other ends but the “exercise of a gratifying self-determination or personal autonomy”.654 
Still, it may be asked, why should we think of freedom as having intrinsic value in this way? 
The Oakeshottian answer would be that if we are unsure as to whether we will get to our 
destination and if we are unsure as to whether we will find the destination meaningful if and 
when we do arrive there, then we might as well enjoy the journey. One way of making do 
with a world where there is no guarantee that we will indeed achieve what we want or that 
what we do achieve will be of lasting significance, is to orient ourselves towards the value of 
trying to achieve in-of-itself. It is in this regard that cultivating the freedom inherent in 
agency can help us make do with our lack of collective control over the world. Perhaps 
looking for meaning in the exercise of agency itself rather than its results or achievements 
might also render more palatable the absurdity of the human condition. Of course, the 
cultivation of such an attitude is easier said than done. And perhaps these concluding 
remarks are suffused with a slightly excessive idealism. Still, given that the argument of this 
thesis has deflationary implications for certain other ideals, perhaps it is not an undesirable 
note on which to end. 
 
 
 
  
 
654 (Oakeshott 2003, 236) 
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